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Foreword
Relatively high levels of unemployment, together with 
other social and economic developments, have resulted in in 
creased interest in work sharing. Although the concept is far 
from new, it has emerged as an increasingly viable alter 
native solution to the problems of unemployment, both at 
the firm level and from a public policy perspective.
A broad array of specific approaches has been proposed 
under the concept of work sharing. The strategies range 
from specific proposals that are designed as short term ef 
forts to avert layoffs and dismissals to long term methods for 
alleviating unemployment by creating jobs for the 
unemployed through reduced worktime.
In this monograph, Dr. Best provides an excellent review 
of the history and current relevance of work sharing and 
assesses the issues, policy options, job creation potential, 
and likely social and economic impacts related to the con 
cept. In the author's opinion, the primary issues for the 
future relate to the scope of work sharing and the alternative 
forms that it may take.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are 
the sole responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent the positions of the W.E. Upjohn In 
stitute for Employment Research.






This monograph has been prepared with the hope of 
widening the scope of discussion given to work sharing. Over 
the last several years, debate about work sharing has emerg 
ed on many occasions. Unfortunately, attention given to this 
topic has generally taken the form of advocacy for and op 
position to very specific approaches. As a result, many peo 
ple have come to view work sharing as taking only one par 
ticular form rather than as a generic concept. First and 
foremost, this volume is intended to encourage readers to 
think of work sharing as the general idea of reducing 
worktime in order to spread employment, and second, to 
recognize that there are many approaches to this general ob 
jective. I hope that the pages that follow will serve to 
broaden the debate on work sharing so that awareness of 
available options progresses hand-in-hand with the social 
and political pressures which may catalyze interest in sharing 
work during coming years.
Yet another hope for this volume is that it will help in the 
isolation and understanding of the social and economic 
forces that will determine the viability of the most promising 
forms of work sharing. Proponents have all too frequently 
paid inadequate attention to the very real economic costs and 
institutional constraints that can neutralize the proposed 
benefits and applicability of work sharing. Correspondingly, 
even highly trained and sophisticated opponents have fre 
quently dismissed all work sharing as a "defeatist strategy" 
without adequate attention to specific proposals or the cur 
rents of social change which may make such programs both 
advisable and viable. Work sharing, like all prospective areas
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of public policy, will succeed or fail within a complex web of 
technical, economic and social conditions. Some effort has 
been made in this volume to isolate and examine these condi 
tions.
The topic of work sharing is, for the most part, a largely 
unexplored issue. While there is a growing literature, em 
pirical grounding is sparse and most analysis is largely 
theoretical and speculative. This is also true for this volume. 
Thus, I urge readers to be aware that some of the judgments 
made in this monograph may be subject to reappraisal as em 
pirical research progresses.
I am most grateful to the W.E. Upjohn Institute and its 
Director, E. Earl Wright, for providing the opportunity to 
publish this study. The contents represent thoughts and 
writings that have been in various stages of partial comple 
tion for some time, and the support of the Institute provided 
a most welcome impetus to define and consolidate this 
material.
A particular note of appreciation is due the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development in Paris. Dur 
ing May 1979, their support enabled me to complete the in 
itial stages of this volume in the form of a paper titled, 
"Work Sharing: Policy Options and Assessments." They 
have graciously agreed to let me use portions of the paper for 
this monograph.
Numerous other persons and institutions have contributed 
to the research activities which led to this volume. Foremost, 
Isabel V. Sawhill, the past Director of the National Commis 
sion for Employment Policy, played a critical role by pro 
viding the guidance and resources necessary for me to ex 
plore the topic of work sharing while serving as an Associate 
at the Commission. It must be said that she has always ex 
pressed grave reservations about the viability of work shar 
ing, but that she has been thoroughly committed to the goal
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of insuring an honest and open debate on the topic. Addi 
tionally, Barry Stern of the U.S. Department of Education 
has conducted and guided much of the initial research on the 
issue. Others who have generously helped with technical ad 
vice, data and encouragement include Lennart Arvedson, 
Patsey Fryman, Janice Hedges, William Greene, Peter 
Henle, Linda Ittner, Gary Lefkowitz, James Mattesich, 
Maureen McCarthy, Gail Rosenberg, Robert Rosenberg, 
Frank Schiff, Alfred Telia, Joyce Radke, Howard Rosen, 
Bernhard Teriet, Gordon Winston, James Wright, Casey 
Young and John Zalusky.
Needless to say, the contents of this volume represent only 
the views and interpretations of its author, and do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of any of the in 
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The History and Current Relevance
of Work Sharing
Persistence of high unemployment over the last several 
years has led many persons to advocate worktime reduction 
as a means of combating joblessness by spreading work 
among a larger number of persons. Proposed approaches for 
sharing work have varied tremendously, including man 
datory reduction of the workweek with and without pay loss 
to employees, various forms of earlier retirement and pro 
longed schooling, extended vacations and worker sab 
baticals, long term exchange of prospective economic growth 
for worktime reductions, increased part-time employment, 
and stimulation of voluntary exchange of current earnings 
for more free time.
To date, discussion of work sharing has been somewhat 
unproductive; it has been diffused on one side by com 
mitments to more traditional job creating policies, com 
plicated by tendencies to conceptualize work sharing as tak 
ing the form of only one of the many possible approaches, 
and overly generalized by a lack of specific policy proposals 
which might be rigorously assessed. This volume will seek to 
better focus discussion by building upon available thought 
and research to outline the history of work sharing, discuss-
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ing the current relevance of sharing work, synthesizing the 
observations that should be considered in evaluating work 
sharing policies, describing and provisionally evaluating 
leading policy options, and finally seeking to assess the 
viability of the most promising options in comparison to 
other employment policies.
WORK SHARING IN THE PAST
Although the idea of sharing work has always been con 
troversial, 1 it is important to recognize that industrial 
societies have consistently applied policies to reduce and ra 
tion worktime as a means of combating joblessness. In a very 
general sense, there are two basic forms of work sharing. 
The first type is usually restricted to specific firms and used 
as a short term strategy to prevent layoffs and dismissals by 
temporarily reducing worktime. As an example, employers 
and employees in a given firm may decide to reduce the 
workweek and earnings for a short period by 10 percent as 
an alternative to laying off one-tenth of existing workers. In 
terestingly, about one-fourth of existing collective bargain 
ing agreements have formal provisions for such work shar 
ing. 2 The second type of work sharing seeks to reduce 
worktime among the employed in order to create jobs for 
those who are unemployed, thus distributing available work 
more evenly among a larger number of persons. This second 
type has been used to combat unemployment caused by long 
range conditions which are likely to persist beyond the 
periodic downswings of the business cycle.
While efforts to gain more free time have been a concern 
of labor movements dating back to the 18th century, the no 
tion of reducing worktime in order to share employment 
made its most obvious appearance in 1887 when Samuel 
Gompers, the President of the American Federation of 
Labor, declared that, ' 'As long as we have one person seek-
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ing work who cannot find it, the hours of work are too 
long." To what degree such comments reflected the intent to 
combat joblessness as opposed to a desire to justify the 
reduction of work hours remains an open question. 
Nonetheless, Gompers' position was embraced as a major 
justification for the series of worker movements to shorten 
the workweek which took place between the late 19th century 
and the 1930s.
The "Great Depression" of the 1930s fostered the first 
widespread and explicit efforts to reduce worktime in order 
to spread employment. As unemployment rose to crisis pro 
portions, employers sought to ease the burden of job loss by 
shortening workweeks as an alternative to laying off 
employees in an era when there was no unemployment in 
surance and great aversion to the few welfare programs that 
did exist. 3 The Hoover Administration made such work shar 
ing the centerpiece of its effort to control unemployment 
which was soaring over 20 percent. At the request of Presi 
dent Hoover, New Jersey Standard Oil President Walter 
Teagle toured the nation advocating worktime reductions in 
order to save jobs. 4 Even though this general concept was en 
dorsed by President of the American Federation of Labor, 
William Green, 5 the work sharing concept became un 
popular among workers. Although it was often accepted as 
the best of undesirable options, worktime reductions were 
often extensive, accompanied by major pay cuts, and regard 
ed as symbolic of a depression which many workers viewed 
as the creation of the business community and the Hoover 
Administration. 6 This resentment was summarized aptly by 
one critic's comment that work sharing was a device by 
which "industry is asking labor to bear the major costs of 
unemployment relief.'' 7
After 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" made 
multifaceted initiatives to combat joblessness and economic 
hardship. The approaches used included macroeconomic
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"pump priming," major public job creation, unemployment 
insurance and other income maintenance programs, and new 
forms of work sharing that were more palatable to workers. 
Social Security, a self-proclaimed hallmark of the Roosevelt 
Administration, was passed in 1935 primarily to insure 
retirement with dignity, but also to reduce the number of 
persons seeking jobs. 8 A more direct work sharing policy 
dealt with limiting the workweek. The Black-Connery Bill, 
which limited the workweek to 30 hours, passed the Senate 
but was defeated in the House during 1933. 9 Five years 
later, Roosevelt signed into law a more flexible work limiting 
approach in the form of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938. 10 This act sought to spread employment by defining 
the standard workweek as 40 hours and imposing a time- 
and-a-half overtime pay premium for time worked over this 
standard workweek. While available data indicate that 
predepression collective bargaining followed by massive 
work sharing during the years immediately preceding 
passage of this act had driven the average workweek down to 
the neighborhood of 40 hours (see table l-l), 11 this measure 
appeared to encourage new hiring as an alternative to over 
time and has come to be regarded as the single most dramatic 
public policy to foster the sharing of employment.
World War II and the subsequent years of economic pro 
gress fostered little in the way of overt work sharing, but 
gave rise to conditions which have had a subtle effect on 
worktime trends and the distribution of employment within 
the United States. First, the combination of tax law incen 
tives for fringe benefits and occasional wage-price freezes 
gave rise to an ongoing multi-decade trend toward increasing 
fixed labor expenditures on retirement pensions, health care, 
paid time-off and other nonwage compensation. In addition 
to increasing free time, particularly in the form of earlier 
retirements, expenditures on such benefits are, for the most 
part, fixed so that their costs to employers for every hour of
History and Relevance
Table 1-1
Average Length of Workweek
Selected Years and Industries, 1909-1978



















































































































NOTE: Discontinuities of data collection method do not allow strict comparability of 
figures for years prior to 1947.
SOURCE: Workweek data for 1947 to 1978 cited from The Employment and Training 
Report of the President, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC, 1979, p. 322. 
Workweek data for years prior to 1947 from multiple sources cited from The Statistical 
History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present, Fairfield Publishers, 
Stamford, CN, 1965, pp. 92 and 94.
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labor received increases as the job time of individual workers 
declines. Thus, the increase of such fixed expenditures on 
fringe benefits has become a growing barrier to worktime 
reductions. 12 Second, the growth of income maintenance 
programs such as unemployment insurance and welfare have 
tended to encourage many persons who experience difficulty 
finding employment to withdraw from the labor force. 13 
Finally, social norms and some social policies were solidified 
which tended to discourage women from holding jobs. Such 
discouragement was certainly a phenomenon rooted deeply 
in the nature of traditional family organization, but up 
through the 1960s the work sharing implications of such 
restrictions were evidenced by the common expression that 
"women should not work because they might take jobs away 
from men who must support their families." 14
During the recessionary downturns of the 1960s, alarm 
over worker displacement due to automation15 and the influx 
of the large post-World War II "baby boom" generation in 
to the labor force revived interest in limiting the sup 
ply of labor to reduce unemployment. Collective bargaining 
efforts sought to reduce the workweek, 16 promote early 
retirement, 17 and instigate more exotic policies such as the 
U.S. Steel Sabbatical. 18 Public policies also sought to reduce 
the supply of labor to match the availability of jobs. An ef 
fort by organized labor to discourage overtime by increasing 
premium pay to double-time was narrowly defeated in the 
early 1960s. 19 More important, programs were developed to 
increase the school years of youth and retirement years of 
old age. While these programs had many social purposes, 
policymakers of this era freely acknowledge that an impor 
tant goal of these programs was to reduce the size of the 
labor force. 20 These policies worked well. As one indication 
of their success, the percentage of the average U.S. male's 
total lifespan given to the nonwork activities of schooling 
and retirement increased from 35.5 percent in 1940 to about
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43 percent in 1980 (see figure I). 21 Generally high economic 
growth coupled with the somewhat subtle employment 
distribution impacts of these policies tended to downplay 
overt discussion of work sharing during this period.
The ultimate entrance of the "baby boom" generation in 
to the labor force, dramatic increase of women workers, and 
high unemployment and limited job creation fostered by 
"stagflation" once again renewed open consideration of 
work sharing during the 1970s. During and since the 1975 
recession, work sharing within individual firms occurred in 
dependent of government intervention in much the same way 
that it did during the 1930s. 22 Also serious consideration was 
catalyzed for "short-time compensation," a program used 
by European nations to provide partial UI benefits to 
workers put on reduced workweeks as an alternative to 
layoffs. 23 While several states have expressed interest in this 
concept, only California had implemented such a program 
by mid-1980. 24 Starting in 1977, a coalition of unions in 
itiated a new drive to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act so 
that the standard workweek was redefined as 35 hours and 
the overtime premium was increased to double-time. 25 Cor 
respondingly, many unions, most notably the United Auto 
Workers, reassumed their historic effort to reduce worktime 
via collective bargaining. 26 Finally, a range of novel and 
volunteeristic proposals have been put forth to share 
employment via public sabbaticals, expanded part-time jobs, 
voluntary programs allowing workers to trade earnings for 
reduced worktime, and nullification of legal barriers to 
worktime reduction. 27 In parallel fashion, many European 
nations have also developed serious policy interest in the 
potentials of work sharing in fighting joblessness. 28
Clearly, work sharing is not a new idea. Both private and 
public policies have promoted various ways of sharing and 
distributing jobs. In many cases, work sharing has been 
fostered by a number of social forces in conjunction with
Figure 1
U.S. Men's Lifetime Distribution of Education, Work, and Leisure by Primary Activity, Actual 1900,1940, 1960,
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SOURCE: Worklife expectancy figures (number of years in labor force) obtained from Howard N. Fullerton and James J. Byrne, "length of 
Working Life for Men and Women, 1970," Monthly Labor Review, February 1976, pp. 31-33; and Howard N. Fullerton, "A Table of Expected 
Working Life for Men, 1968," Monthly Labor Review, June 1971, pp. 49-54. Life expectancy figures (at birth) obtained from Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States, 1974 (Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, 1975), p. 55. School years (completed for persons over 25) obtain 
ed from Digest of Educational Statistics for 1975 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, 
1975), pp. 14-15. Projected figures of worklife and life expectancy from unpublished computations provided by Howard N. Fullerton, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. Projected years of education are estimates derived from Current Population Reports, Series 20, nos. 243 and 293, and Series 
P-25, no. 476 (Bureau of the Census).
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unemployment; and in many cases the work sharing implica 
tions of social policies have been secondary but important 
considerations. Employment has indeed been shared and ra 
tioned within most industrial societies, and this has had pro 
found impact upon the nature of unemployment and pat 
terns of work and leisure. The main issue concerning work 
sharing is not whether or not to use it. Work sharing is 
already a reality. The issues for the future are how much 
work sharing to have, and what forms it should take.
WORK SHARING IN THE FUTURE
Aside from prolonged frustration over unemployment, 
economic and social circumstances within the United States 
and other industrial nations are contributing to interest in 
sharing work. On the economic side, there appears to be an 
emerging consensus that "stagflation" is likely to persist 
well into the 1980s. The tenacity of inflation has led increas 
ing numbers of economists and policymakers to be wary of 
stimulating economic growth and job creation by 
macroeconomic demand management. As a result, op 
timistic speculations indicate real economic growth con 
siderably below past norms and pessimistic forecasts of 
unusually low growth are commonly viewed as a realistic 
possibility. 29 This emerging acceptance of sluggish economic 
growth and limited job creation has fostered consideration 
of nontraditional employment policies, such as work shar 
ing, as "second best" options for reducing unemployment 
within economies constrained by inflation.
On the social side, ongoing transitions in labor force com 
position and related changes in life styles are creating a 
climate which may be conducive to the use of work sharing. 
Demographic trends show that the large post-World War II 
"baby boom" generation has recently completed its entry in 
to the labor force. This generation, which crowded schools
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in the recent past, is now creating intense competition among 
its members and with other age groups for available jobs. 
Over the long run, the job seekers of this "baby boom" 
generation are likely to be absorbed by the labor market, 
perhaps leaving in their wake a labor shortage borne of 
smaller subsequent generations. 30 However, these ad 
justments will not occur overnight and labor force growth 
from other sources is likely to foster extremely intense com 
petition for employment into the 21st century.
Most notably, the labor force participation of women rose 
from 32.7 percent in 1948 to 50.1 percent in 1978, 31 and it is 
likely to continue rising in coming decades. 32 As an indica 
tion of what may occur in the long run in the United States 
and other nations, the participation rate of women in 
Sweden is almost equal to that of men. 33 This increase of 
women will not only intensify labor market competition, but 
also tend to alter the worktime preferences and needs of 
tomorrow's labor force. As the proportion of dual-earner 
families increases along with women workers, the typical 
household of the future will experience tremendous time 
pressures in the performance of family responsibilities and 
pursuit of leisure activities. 34 At the same time, dual-earner 
families will have increased financial discretion to forego 
income-earning worktime for more free time. 35
In addition to women workers, it appears likely that many 
older workers may resist retirement because of nervousness 
about the impact of inflation on fixed incomes. 36 This would 
block the promotion of younger persons and increase the size 
of the labor force. While it is still too early to claim an 
established trend in this direction, there are indications that 
the tendency toward earlier retirement may have halted. 37 
Correspondingly, there are signs that while large portions of 
older workers prefer to remain employed past traditional 
retirement age, they also prefer to work less than full time. 38 
For example, one representative survey of the American
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labor force found that 28 percent of those aged 50 to 64 
preferred to retire at age 65, 9.4 percent were undecided 
about their retirement plans, and that the remaining 62.3" 
percent wished to keep working. Some 84.6 percent of those 
wishing to work preferred to work either part-year or part- 
week. 39
An overview of the increasing propensity to work among 
all persons comes from past and projected labor force par 
ticipation rates. In short, the proportion of the U.S. popula 
tion over age 16 who are either employed or looking for 
employment rose from 60.4 to 63.7 percent between 1970 
and 1979, and is projected to rise to 67.9 percent by 1990 and 
68.6 by 1995 (see table 1-2). While there has been specula 
tion of future labor shortages due to the lack of entry level 
workers following the "baby boom" generation, 40 it is more 
likely that previously mentioned trends will far outweigh the 
lack of entry level workers. Indeed, labor economist Eli 
Ginzberg convincingly demonstrated that there were some 17 
million persons in 1977 who would be likely to enter the 
labor force if the possibilities of finding a job increase. 41 
Thus, it is quite likely that the labor force participation rate 
will grow faster than Bureau of Labor Statistics 
projections. 42
In sum, a number of fundamental social trends are likely 
to foster a long term growth of labor force participation 
rates despite a scarcity of employment opportunities. 
However, while a larger portion of the U.S. and other 
populations may seek employment, increasing proportions 
are likely to prefer less than what we currently define as "full 
time" employment. In terms of employment policies, growth 
of labor force participation is likely to intensify the demand 
for more jobs, while preferences for reduced worktime may 
increase the acceptability of work sharing as a means of com 
bating joblessness.43
12 History and Relevance
Table 1-2















































SOURCE: Figures for 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1975 computed from 1977 Employment and 
Training Report of the President, U.S. Department of Labor, p. 135, Table A-7; figures for 
1978 computed from John Bregger and Kathryn Hoyle, "The Employment Situation," 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Press Release 79-181, February 1979, p. 2; and projections 
for 1985, 1990, and 1995 cited from Howard N. Fullerton, "The 1995 Labor Force: A First 
Look," Monthly Labor Review, December 1980, pp. 11-21.
Persistent unemployment coupled with changing social 
conditions is likely to foster ongoing and growing interest in 
reducing worktime to combat joblessness. This interest not 
withstanding, important policy questions must be answered 
concerning whether work sharing is a viable approach to the 
problems of unemployment. Would it actually create jobs? 
Would it be costly and inflationary? What types of secon 
dary effects would it have?
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Like all employment policies, work sharing is likely to en 
tail costs, some of which may be increased or decreased by 
secondary impacts. These costs are likely to vary tremen 
dously according to the specific approaches used. A major 
task in determining the viability of work sharing will entail 
estimating the costs of alternative work sharing approaches 
and comparing these costs to other job creation policies. 
This task is complicated by a lack of past experience and 
research on such policies, underscoring the need to proceed 
with caution.
It should be noted that worktime reduction as a cure for 
unemployment has been frequently proposed by individuals 
and groups primarily concerned with goals other than job 
creation or preservation. 1 Many of these nonemployment- 
related goals are laudatory and should be given due con 
sideration in assessing the viability of alternative work shar 
ing policies. Indeed, many of these secondary effects may, 
on their own, justify worktime reductions. 2 However, care 
must be taken to isolate the job creation and preservation 
potentials of work sharing policies from such impacts in 
order to rigorously assess their viability as employment 
policies.
19
20 Issues of Sharing Work
Fruitful discussion of work sharing must be focused upon 
specific policy proposals and their implications. However, 
prior to such considerations, it may be useful to review a 
number of issues that have been isolated from existing 
literature on work sharing. Such a review can be synthesized 
into a criteria for assessing specific policy options which will 
be discussed later. This section consolidates these considera 
tions into the categories of impacts on productivity and price 
stability, job creation and preservation, level of participation 
and aggregate employment impact, social equity and 
targetability, flexibility of implementation and termination, 
administrative costs and regulatory effectiveness, and secon 
dary social concerns.
IMPACT ON PRODUCTIVITY 
AND PRICE STABILITY
There appears to be a general consensus that employment 
policies must cost little and be noninflationary for the 
medium range future. Work sharing has been criticized as 
highly inflationary as well as promoted as one of the few 
employment policies that might be pursued within the con 
text of fiscal austerity. The reason for this disparity of 
opinions stems primarily from the fact that opponents and 
proponents have frequently focused their attention upon dif 
ferent work sharing policies. As such, it is increasingly 
necessary to assess the impact of specific alternative work 
sharing programs on productivity and price stability.
Ultimately, the impact of work sharing on productivity 
and price stability is likely to be determined at the firm or 
organizational level. Extra firm costs from work sharing 
would likely be added to the price of goods and services, 
which would foster inflation, be imposed on employees, or 
be assumed in some fashion by the government, to be funded 
by a reallocation of public revenues or potentially infla-
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tionary fiscal expenditures. Thus it is at the firm or organiza 
tional level that assessments of the impacts of work sharing 
on productivity and price stability will be primarily focused.
Worktime Reductions Without Pay Loss
The greatest potential inflationary impact from work shar 
ing would likely come from worktime reductions without 
commensurate reductions of pay. Under such circumstances, 
employers would either increase organizational efficiency so 
as to reduce labor needs and job creating impacts, or incur 
increased production costs which would result in lower pro 
fits and investment, higher prices and inflation, or lower 
total output and declining employment. 3 Government sub 
sidy of worktime reductions taken in this fashion would also 
tend to foster inflation if resulting increases in fiscal expen 
ditures were not matched by taxation. Clearly, worktime 
reductions without pay loss would either reduce productivity 
or increase inflation. The only reasonable exception to this 
expected impact would be if worktime reductions were ob 
tained incrementally as a dividend of increased productivity 
and economic growth.
Increased Fixed Costs of Labor
An extra cost inherent in virtually all forms of work shar 
ing stems from likely increases in employer expenditures on 
the fixed costs of labor. Most employers within the United 
States spend between 30 and 40 percent of base employee 
wages or salaries on labor costs including medical plans, paid 
holidays, some retirement pensions, certain payroll taxes, 
and training (see table 2-1). 4 Many, but not all, of these costs 
are fixed, thus representing expenditures for each employee 
regardless of length of worktime. As such, expenditures on 
the fixed cost portion of fringe benefits per hour of labor in 
crease as worktime is reduced. As a rough illustration, 1974 
data from the United States show that the average employer
Table 2-1
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SOURCE: Fringe Benefits, and Employee Benefits, various issues, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., Washington, DC, 1953-1975.
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spent something like $60 a week on essentially fixed labor 
costs per employee. 5 Simple mathematical computations 
demonstrate that the hourly cost of labor increases with 
worktime reductions. Even if workers were willing to forego 
base wage or salary income proportional to worktime reduc 
tions, the average U.S. employee in 1974 would have cost ap 
proximately 33 cents an hour more if the workweek was 
reduced from five to four days, and about a dollar more an 
hour if the workweek was shortened to three days (see table 
2-2). 6 When one considers the aggregate costs of significant 
worktime reductions for large numbers of employees, it 
becomes apparent that the extra expenses of adjusting 
worktime downward are notable. 7
Even if workers were willing to forego or subsidize 
selected fringe benefits, training and certain payroll taxes 
would still insure that the cost of labor would be increased by 
virtually all forms of work sharing. However, it should be 
emphasized that these costs, while significant, may not be 
prohibitive. To illustrate, a reduction of the workweek from 
40 to 32 hours with a commensurate hourly pay reduction 
but maintenance of all fringe benefits provided at a cost of 
30 percent of total wages or salaries for the prior 40 hour 
workweek would lead to a 5.7 percent rise in total hourly 
labor costs. Further, the possibility of sharing such added ex 
penditures among employers, workers and the government 
could attenuate resulting loss of productive efficiency, 
reduce inflationary impacts, and equitably distribute added 
costs.
Organizational Efficiency
It is likely that many employers would confront extra costs 
from organizational inefficiencies resulting from downward 
adjustments of worktime and accompanying increases of 
personnel. Presumably, growth of organizational 
workforces would require some increased expenditures for
Table 2-2
Dollar Costs per Hour for Fixed Costs of Labor by Variations of Worktime






























Weekly fixed costs of labor
$20 $30 $40 $50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100 $110 $120 $130 $140 $150
.33 .50 .67 .83 1.00 .17 1.33 1.50 1.67 1.83 2.00 2.17 2.33 2.50
.36 .54 .71 .89 1.07 .25 1.43 1.61 1.79 1.96 2.14 2.32 2.50 2.68
.38 .58 .77 .96 1.15 .35 1.54 1.73 1.92 2.11 2.31 2.50 2.69 2.88
.42 .62 .83 .04 1.25 .46 1.67 1.87 2.08 2.29 2.50 2.71 2.92 3.12
.45 .68 .91 .14 1.36 .59 1.82 2.04 2.27 2.50 2.73 2.95 3.18 3.41
.50 .75 1.00 .25 1.50 .75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.75
.56 .83 1.11 .39 1.67 .94 2.22 2.50 2.78 3.06 3.33 3.61 3.89 4.17
.63 .94 1.25 .56 1.88 2.19 2.50 2.81 3.13 3.44 3.75 4.06 4.38 4.69
.71 1.07 1.43 .79 2.14 2.50 2.86 3.21 3.57 3.93 4.29 4.64 5.00 5.36
.83 1.25 1.67 2.08 2.50 2.92 3.33 3.75 4.17 4.58 5.00 5.42 5.88 6.25
1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00 6.50 7.00 7.50
SOURCE: Fred Best, "Individual and Firm Work Time Decisions: Comment," Work Time and Employment, Special Report No. 28, National 
Commission for Employment Policy, Washington, DC, October 1978, p. 225.
a. Nonwage compensation defined as including life and health insurance, private pensions, social security, paid time off, miscellaneous fringe 
benefits, and unemployment insurance taxes, (1977 Handbook of Labor Statistics, p. 217).
b. Can be viewed to include all nonwage compensation (fringe benefits) as well as costs of supervisional coordination, record keeping, recruit 
ment, hiring, training, and retraining.
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added recordkeeping and supervision. More important, 
worktime reductions resulting in increased personnel could 
result in a less than optimal balance between labor and 
capital. For example, there would be a likely decline in pro 
ductive return on "setup" and "shutdown" time for many 
lines of work, and existing machinery might be overused by 
more employees at a given point in time. In some cases, pro 
ductivity might increase due to reduced worker fatigue, but 
most data on this issue suggest that such gains would be 
minor or nonexistent. 8 Another source of productivity gains 
that might result from worktime reductions is the increase of 
"shift work." Worktime reductions may encourage 
employers to increase the number of shifts, thus maximizing 
the return on overall fixed capital. 9
Views vary as to whether work sharing would affect firm 
efficiency by increasing or decreasing organizational flex 
ibility. On one side, it has been suggested that work sharing 
policies would impede firm discretion to make necessary 
layoffs and hire workers with needed skills. 10 On the other 
side, it has been suggested that work sharing would allow 
firms to retain trained workers and reduce hiring and recall 
costs during expansionary periods. 11 In overview, no com 
prehensive statement can be made about increased or 
decreased firm efficiencies resulting from worktime reduc 
tions to spread employment. Work organizations vary 
tremendously. Some have capacity to make a wide range of 
worktime adjustments without undue costs, many are likely 
to be able to make a limited number of adjustments within a 
limited range of technical and institutional constraints, and 
some have virtually no flexibility for worktime reductions 
without confronting prohibitive costs. 12
It is particularly noteworthy that recent empirical studies 
of firm production functions indicate that most organiza 
tions evidence constant production costs per unit of output 
over a reasonably wide range of output levels. This suggests
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that most firms have the capacity to significantly adjust their 
capital-labor ratios without serious loss of productivity. 13
Underutilization of Labor
It has been suggested that organizations seeking to op 
timize their resources tend to hire the most productive 
workers in the labor force, and that work sharing may force 
firms to limit the worktime of their best employees and hire 
those who are less productive. 14 The presumed effect would 
be a reduction of average worker productivity with resulting 
sub-optimization of economic growth or increased prices. 15
It has also been suggested that a number of conditions 
could counterbalance such underutilization of labor 
resulting from work sharing. First, trends evolving over the 
last decade indicate that the educational attainment of the 
U.S. labor force is surpassing the skill requirements of 
available jobs, thus providing a surplus of well-trained 
workers capable of efficiently replacing the worktime 
foregone by those who are currently employed. 16 Second, 
provisional conclusions of a recent review of studies indicate 
that even the "hardcore unemployed" are not significantly 
less productive than persons currently holding jobs. 17 Third, 
studies of social mobility and human capital development 
suggest that the presumed higher productivity of those cur 
rently employed is in large measure the result of "ac 
cumulative advantage" gained by work experience: 18 This 
raises the question of whether underutilization of labor 
resulting from work sharing may be a short term cost which 
may ultimately result in more productive use of dormant 
labor reserves. Finally, it has been noted that there are costs 
to firms and society-at-large for the nonutilization of 
unemployed workers. Firm payroll and profit taxes support 
welfare and transfer payments, as well as social programs 
resulting in part from unemployment, 19 and such expen 
ditures could have inflationary impacts by increasing firm 
expenses and government expenditures.
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Higher Wage Costs Resulting from 
Increased Demand for Labor
Some have suggested that work sharing could reduce the 
pool of available labor, increase demand for workers among 
employers, and cause a bidding up of pay levels which would 
increase the costs of production and foster inflation. 20 More 
specifically, it has been noted that the application of 
worktime reductions to economic sectors with a shortage of 
certain skilled labor will greatly enhance the labor market 
value and collective bargaining power of workers with scarce 
skills, thus leading to undue increases of wages and salaries 
among such groups. 21 Assuming market responsiveness to 
reduced labor supply, it is reasonable to assume that infla 
tionary pay increases would result in some fashion from 
work sharing. However, this effect may be attenuated by the 
likelihood that many workers hired because of worktime 
reduction would be new labor force entrants or re-entrants 
receiving junior level incomes and benefits.
Reduced Capital Investment
Finally, it has been noted that any increases of production 
costs resulting from work sharing which are not passed on to 
consumers in the form of price increases or government taxa 
tion might reduce firm profit margins and lead to a decline in 
capital maintenance and investment. The ultimate impact is 
hypothesized to attenuate long term increases of productivi 
ty. 22 In some cases, reduced worktime may stifle investment. 
However, this effect is likely to vary greatly. For example, in 
France, where work sharing is receiving serious discussion, a 
1979 survey of 526 French business executives found that 43 
percent thought worktime reductions would have no impact 
on investment, 23 percent thought it would increase invest 
ment, 32 percent felt it would result in some form of more in 
tense capital utilization (more overtime, added shifts, etc.), 
and 2 percent expected overuse of existing equipment. 23
28 Issues of Sharing Work
To sum up the production and price stability effects, most 
theoretical assessments indicate that worktime reductions 
resulting in a significant creation or preservation of jobs are 
likely to result in higher production costs. Such costs are ex 
pected to reduce profits and investment, decrease overall 
firm production, or increase prices. As a result, the direct ef 
fects of work sharing are hypothesized to reduce productivi 
ty and foster inflation. However, these negative impacts on 
productivity and prices would vary tremendously among 
specific work sharing approaches. Further, the impacts of 
work sharing on productivity and prices must be evaluated 
relative to alternative employment policies and with con 
sideration of secondary social effects. 24 Other employment 
policies (demand management, public job creation, training 
programs and wage subsidies) also have costs which likewise 
would vary according to specific approach. Similarly, accep 
tance of high unemployment entails costs from welfare, 
unemployment insurance, foregone productivity, 
undeveloped human capital and social degeneration. 
Ultimately, the costs of specific work sharing policies must 
be assessed relative to alternative measures in accord with 
their expected job creating and secondary impacts.
JOB CREATION AND IMPACT 
ON UNEMPLOYMENT
It is frequently noted that worktime reductions may not 
create new jobs or preserve existing employees. 25 This reser 
vation directly questions the viability of work sharing as an 
employment policy. Considerable attention must be focused 
on the questions of what portion of reduced worktime can be 
expected to create or preserve jobs, and what impact would 
jobs created as a result of worktime reductions have on the 
unemployment rate? While these questions must ultimately 
be resolved by evaluating specific policies, some general 
isolation of issues is pertinent.
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Substitution of Labor by 
Organizational Efficiency
One possible organizational response to worktime reduc 
tions would be to increase efficiency so as not to require add 
ed employees. This would likely be accomplished in two 
ways. First, the organization of labor might be streamlined 
so as to require greater effort from workers, 26 jobs and the 
interrelations of workers might be rationalized through 
operations management techniques, or unnecessary or non 
productive workers might be terminated. 27 Second, firm effi 
ciency and productivity might be increased by substitution of 
capital for labor. 28 This, of course, may occur independent 
of work sharing as a result of ongoing investment and 
technical advancements. 29 Certainly, the effort to substitute 
labor with increased organizational efficiency is likely to be 
further stimulated by any increase in labor costs resulting 
from worktime reductions. 30 Some organizations and in 
dustrial sectors will find it reasonably inexpensive to replace 
lost worktime with new employees, while others may find it 
highly costly and unattractive. 31 In some cases, increased 
production costs and diminished financial reserves might 
limit investment in labor-saving capital. In most cases, it is 
highly likely that any stimulation of capital investment 
fostered by work sharing would occur over a long term 
period. 32
Reduced Labor Demand
It has been suggested that job creation and preservation as 
a result of work sharing may be limited due to diminished de 
mand for goods and services caused by price increases made 
necessary by labor cost increases resulting from worktime 
reductions. Put differently, increases in the cost of labor as a 
result of reduced worktime may cause firms to increase the 
prices of their goods and services, possibly resulting in reduc 
ed market demand and ultimately a declining need for
30 Issues of Sharing Work
workers. 33 The existence and strength of this potential effect 
would, of course, depend on the amount of labor cost in 
crease caused by specific work sharing approaches, the 
degree to which these costs are passed on to consumers, and 
whether consumer demand for specific goods and services 
varies significantly with changes in price.
Skill Shortage Barriers 
to New Employment
In some cases, structural barriers stemming from specific 
skill shortages would limit the number of new workers hired 
as a result of worktime reductions. If needed skills are not 
available among those seeking employment, it may be im 
possible for employers to hire new workers even if labor 
shortages are brought about by work sharing. 34 The ex 
istence and severity of such problems with transferring the 
worktime of employed persons to those who are unemployed 
would, in some measure, depend upon the nature of specific 
work sharing policies and the flexibility with which they are 
implemented. Sudden and compelling worktime reductions 
are more likely to result in "hiring bottlenecks" than those 
which are put into effect gradually and with flexibility. Fur 
ther, the current surplus of highly trained workers in the 
United States suggests that difficulties with recruiting 
workers who are appropriately skilled or could be easily 
trained are likely to be rare and short run.
Increased Costs of Job Creation
Just as fixed labor costs and other factors would cause 
some firms to confront increased expenditures for employees 
on reduced worktime, these same factors may increase the 
cost of creating new jobs at less than full time. As a result, 
the creation of new jobs as a result of shortened worktime 
may be impeded. 35 Of course, the degree of attenuated job 
creation resulting from this source would depend upon the
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severity of extra costs incurred by particular work organiza 
tions.
Windfall Job Creation
In the case of work sharing policies providing subsidies to 
employers or employees for worktime reductions, there is a 
possibility that such benefits could be received by organiza 
tions and individuals who would have reduced worktime and 
spread employment regardless of such incentives. 36 This 
possibility presents some troubling problems concerning the 
job creation and preserving capacities of many work sharing 
approaches, as well as other leading employment policies. 37
Increased Overtime, Moonlighting 
and Subterranean Work
It has frequently been suggested that worktime reductions 
would increase overtime, second job holding, and illegal 
subterranean employment; and that this would attenuate or 
nullify any reduction of unemployment within the economy 
as a whole. 38 While such effects may occur to some degree, 
the extent to which they would impede the job creating 
potential of work sharing needs to be carefully assessed. Of 
these effects, increased overtime presents the greatest threat 
to the viability of work sharing. If worktime reductions in 
crease the fixed costs of labor, it can be expected that many 
employers would be motivated to increase overtime rather 
than hire new workers. 39 However, if public policies sub 
sidize increased fixed labor costs or instigate more severe 
restrictions on overtime (as some work sharing proposals 
would) the tendency for employers to increase overtime 
would be muted. Presumably, restricted use of overtime by 
employers could force employees seeking to earn more in 
come to turn to second jobs of some type. However, if 
worktime reductions do not entail pay decreases, or if such 
work reductions are voluntarily chosen despite pay
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decreases, the extent of increased second job holding would 
not likely be significant.
In the United States, a reasonably constant 6 percent of all 
workers hold two or more jobs, and the vast majority of se 
cond jobs pay significantly less than the primary job. 40 Thus, 
relatively few workers experiencing worktime reductions 
with no pay loss or voluntary pay loss would be expected to 
seek second jobs. If worktime reductions are compulsory 
and entail pay loss, it would be likely that second job holding 
would rise. The extent to which this would nullify the job 
creating potential of work sharing is subject to speculation. 
Increases in subterranean work due to worktime reductions 
would, in large measure, be determined by the conditions 
mentioned above. In the case of work sharing policies which 
make new hiring increasingly costly or seek to exclude 
workers from labor force participation, it might be expected 
that the incidence of subterranean work would grow.
Stimulation of Labor Force Growth
A major reservation expressed about work sharing is that 
the jobs created would encourage more persons to enter the 
labor force, and therefore the unemployment rate would not 
be reduced. 41 Further, it has been suggested that the less than 
full-time work opportunities would stimulate increased labor 
participation among women, older workers, students and the 
handicapped. In particular, the increase of part-time 
employment opportunities, which accounts for the employ 
ment of large portions of women workers, is likely to further 
accelerate the already rapid growth of female labor force 
participation. At the same time, it has been suggested that in 
creased opportunities for part-time and other less than full- 
time employment would remove barriers which now prevent 
many unemployed job seekers from finding suitable employ 
ment. 42
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Although the impact of increased job creation through 
worktime reductions on labor force growth and unemploy 
ment rates is a matter of speculation, available data suggests 
that this form of job creation would likely have particularly 
stimulating effects on the number of persons seeking jobs. 43 
However, considerable thought needs to be given to the issue 
of whether this is good or bad. While extra stimulation of 
labor force growth brought about by work sharing may at 
tenuate desired reductions of the unemployment rate, it is 
likely that such policies would create more new jobs than 
new workers. 44 More important, there is a question of 
whether worktime reductions which meet the needs of 
today's changing labor force (i.e., more women and older 
workers) might facilitate long-run adjustments in working 
conditions that will ultimately be necessary. 45
In overview, it appears unlikely that work sharing is likely 
to create or preserve as many job hours as the amount of 
worktime foregone. Thus, all other things held constant, 
work sharing would be likely to foster an aggregate decline 
of total time worked by the labor force. 46 The question 
which is not answerable at this time concerns what portion of 
worktime reductions can be expected to lead to jobs for the 
unemployed, and if any work sharing policies can be ex 
pected to yield a reasonable replacement of work reductions 
with new jobs without undue harm to productivity and 
prices?
Certainly, the most promising work sharing approaches 
might be adjusted in a number of ways to yield the maximum 
possible job creation or preservation. In many cases, the 
ways in which worktime is reduced may have considerable 
impact on job creation. For example, it has been suggested 
that longer vacations would not stimulate new jobs within 
most industrial sectors. 47 Correspondingly, other forms of 
worktime reduction might yield substantial transfers of 
foregone work to the unemployed. 48 In addition to selecting
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the most promising form of reducing worktime, supplemen 
tary policy adjustments may increase the employment impact 
of work sharing. As an illustration, it has been estimated 
that "job release" provisions attached to some early retire 
ment policies in Europe have created four times as many jobs 
as regular retirement programs which do not require that 
vacated positions result in new hiring. 49 In similar fashion, 
some promising work sharing policies might be augmented 
with requirements that a certain proportion of worktime 
reductions result in new jobs, subsidies to encourage job 
creation, and other such devices. While such programmatic 
elements may limit the acceptability and participation of 
work sharing policies, they may be necessary to guarantee 
some minimal job creation return for the costs of worktime 
reductions.
LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION 
AND AGGREGATE IMPACT
It has been suggested that work sharing may be an ineffec 
tive approach to combating joblessness because firms and 
workers would not participate in voluntary programs and 
mandatory policies could not be enforced. Employers might 
be likely to eschew work sharing because of presumed extra 
costs, particularly if workers do not accept some pay loss 
along with reduced work. Managers have also expressed 
reservations on the basis of administrative complexities, cau 
tion about unpredictable developments, and fear of govern 
ment interference. 50 It has also been claimed that employed 
workers would not accept worktime reductions if they 
resulted in loss of pay, 51 and unions have been quick to voice 
this view as well as express opposition to volunteeristic forms 
of work sharing because such programs are thought to 
undermine standardized work conditions and the integrity of 
the collective bargaining process. 52 Some forms of work 
sharing, most notably mandatory worktime reductions and
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limitations, are thought to be largely unenforceable without 
the immediate presence of unions, and in areas where 
organized labor represents a small portion of the work force, 
such policies may have only limited impact. 53
At this stage, attempts to assess the level of participation 
in work sharing and its aggregate impact on employment are 
highly speculative. There are certainly barriers to widespread 
application, and it is difficult to determine if it is possible to 
remove them and how long it would take for employers to 
readjust to the removal of these barriers.
Response from Employers
Many of the reservations of employers to work sharing 
have already been discussed in previous pages. Needless to 
say, the costs and benefits, and therefore the acceptability of 
work sharing, will vary tremendously from firm to firm. 
Quite notably, some specific approaches to work sharing 
may not be particularly costly or otherwise threatening to 
employers, and extra costs that do exist might be partly ab 
sorbed by the government and possibly by workers. In many 
cases, presumed resistance from the business community 
may be over-estimated. For example, a recent survey study 
suggests that the vast majority of French business leaders ex 
pect and accept worktime reductions to spread employment 
opportunities. 54 There are also indications that U.S. 
employers might be open to certain forms of work sharing. 55
Response from Workers and Desire 
for More Free Time
Worktime trends and recent survey studies of employee 
preferences indicate that a growing portion of the U.S. work 
force are willing to forego earnings for time away from their 
jobs. 56 One study of American workers indicates that this in 
terest in reduced worktime may be quite notable. A brief
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review of this study will provide insight into the extent and 
nature of workers to trade income for time. 57
During August 1978, a nationally representative survey of 
the American population over age 18 was conducted to 
assess whether workers were willing to forego earnings for 
more free time. Among the questions fielded were two series 
pairing percent reductions of potential and current income 
against proportionally valuable gains of specific forms of 
free time. When working respondents were asked if they 
would forego some portion of a 10 percent pay raise for dif 
ferent forms of free time, 26.8 percent reported willingness 
to trade some portion of such a pay raise for shorter 
workdays, 43.5 percent would forego some pay increase for 
longer weekends, 65.6 percent stated willingness to trade 
potential pay for extended vacations, a similar 65.3 percent 
for prolonged leaves with pay every seven years 
(sabbaticals), and 51.4 percent were interested in taking a 
lower pay raise to obtain an earlier retirement (see table 
2-3). 58
Interest in exchanging some portion of current income for 
more free time was also substantial. Specifically, 23 percent 
were willing to forego 2 percent or more of their current in 
comes for shorter workdays, 26.2 percent would trade 2 per 
cent or more for longer weekends, 42.2 and 42.1 percent 
would exchange 2 percent or more for extended vacations or 
sabbatical leaves, respectively, and some 36 percent would 
trade the same for earlier retirement (see table 2-4). 59
Responses to these questions varied somewhat according 
to social characteristics such as age, sex and income, but the 
general patterns described above were reasonably constant 
for all subgroups. The most important variation was the dif 
ference of preferences demonstrated for alternative forms of 
free time. Clearly, the ways in which potential free time is 
scheduled is an important determinant of whether or not in 
dividuals are willing to trade potential or current earnings
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Table 2-3
Stated Worker Preferences Toward Exchanging All or Portions of a 
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SOURCE: Data cited from results of a national random survey conducted in August 1978 
(Fred Best, Exchanging Earnings for Leisure, Special Research Monograph, Office of 
Research and Development, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department 
of Labor, Washington, DC, 1980). 
QUESTIONS:
Workday: Which one of the following choices between a pay raise and a shorter workday 
would you select? (A) 10 percent pay raise and no reduction of the workday; (B) 6 percent 
pay raise and a 19-minute reduction of each workday; (C) 3 percent pay raise and a 
34-minute reduction of each workday; (D) no pay raise and a 48-minute reduction of each 
workday.
Workweek: Which one of the following choices between a pay raise and a shorter 
workweek would you select? (A) 10 percent pay raise and no reduction of each workweek; 
(B) 6 percent pay raise and 1.6-hour reduction of each workweek; (C) 3 percent pay raise 
and a 2.8-hour reduction of each workweek; (D) no pay raise and a 4-hour reduction of 
each workweek.
Vacation: Which one of the following choices between a pay raise and a longer paid vaca 
tion would you select? (A) 10 percent raise and no added vacation time; (B) 6 percent pay 
raise and 10 workdays of added vacation; (C) 3 percent pay raise and 17.5 workdays added 
vacation; (D) no pay raise and 25 workdays added vacation.
Sabbatical: What is your choice between a pay raise and an extended leave with pay from 
work after six years of work? (A) 10 percent pay raise and no leave time; (B) 6 percent pay 
raise and 12 workweeks (60 workdays) paid leave; (C) 3 percent pay raise and 21 
workweeks (105 workdays) paid leave; (D) no pay raise and 30 workweeks (150 workdays) 
paid leave.
Earlier Retirement: What is your choice between a pay raise and earlier retirement? (A) 10 
percent pay raise and no change in retirement plan; (B) 6 percent pay raise and 10 workdays 
earlier retirement for each future year of work; (C) 3 percent pay raise and 17.5 workdays 
earlier retirement for each future year of work; (D) no pay raise and 25 workdays earlier 
retirement for each future year of work.
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Table 2-4
Stated Worker Preferences Toward Exchanging Portions of Current
Income for Alternative Forms of Free Time
(percentage breakdown)
Shorter Reduced Added Sabbatical Earlier
workday workweek vacation leave retirement
Value of tradeoff vs. pay vs. pay vs. pay vs. pay vs. pay
Nothing for time . . . 
2 percent of pay 
for time .........
5 percent of pay 
for time .........
10 percent of pay 
for time .........
12 percent of pay
15 percent of pay
20 percent of pay 
for time .........
30 percent of pay
33 percent of pay 
for time .........
40 percent of pay
50 percent of pay 
for time .........



































SOURCE: Data cited from results of a national random survey conducted in August 1978 
(Fred Best, Exchanging Earnings for Leisure, Special Research Monograph, Office of 
Research and Development, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department 
of Labor, Washington, DC, 1980).
NOTE: Column spaces are frequently blank for many tradeoff options because questions 
dealing with different forms of free time did not always have parallel exchange options. 
QUESTIONS:
Workday: What is the largest portion of your current yearly income that you would be will 
ing to give up for shorter workdays? (A) nothing; (B) 2 percent (1/50) of your income for 
10 minutes off each workday; (C) 5 percent (1/30) of your income for 25 minutes off each 
workday; (D) 12 percent (1/8) of your income for 1 hour off each workday; (E) 30 percent 
of your income for 2 hours off each workday; (F) 50 percent (1/2) of your income for 4 
hours off each workday.
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Workweek: What is the largest portion of your current yearly income that you would be 
willing to give up for shorter workweeks? (A) nothing; (B) 2 percent (1/50) of your income 
for 50 minutes off 1 workday a week; (C) 10 percent (1/10) of your income for 4 hours off 
1 workday a week; (D) 20 percent (1/5) of your income for 1 full workday off each week; 
(E) 40 percent (4/10) of your income for 2 full workdays off each week; (F) 50 percent 
(1/2) of your income for 2 full workdays off each week.
Vacation: What is the largest portion of your current yearly income that you would be will 
ing to give up for more paid vacation time? (A) nothing; (B) 2 percent (1/50) of your in 
come for 5 workdays added paid vacation each year; (C) 5 percent (1/20) of your income 
for 12.5 workdays added paid vacation each year; (D) 10 percent (1/10) of your income for 
25 workdays added paid vacation each year; (E) 20 percent (1/5) of your income for 50 
workdays added paid vacation each year; (F) 33 percent (1/3) of your income for 87.5 
workdays (17.5 workweeks) added paid vacation each year.
Sabbatical: What is the largest portion of your current yearly income that you would be 
willing to give up in exchange for an extended leave without pay every seventh year? 
(A) nothing; (B) 2 percent (1/50) of your yearly income for 7 workweeks' paid leave after 
six years of work; (C) 5 percent (1/30) of your income for 17.5 workweeks' paid leave after 
six years of work; (D) 10 percent (1/10) of your income for 35 workweeks' paid leave after 
six years of work; (E) 15 percent (1/20) of your income for 52 workweeks' (1 workyear) 
paid leave after six years of work.
Earlier Retirement: What is the largest portion of your current yearly income that you 
would be willing to give up in exchange for earlier retirement? (A) nothing; (B) 2 percent 
(1/50) of your income for earlier retirement at a rate of 5 workdays for every year worked 
until retirement; (C) 5 percent (1/20) of your income for earlier retirement at a rate of 12.5 
workdays for every year worked until retirement; (D) 10 percent (1/10) of your income for 
earlier retirement at a rate of 25 workdays for every year worked until retirement; (E) 20 
percent (1/5) of your income for earlier retirement at a rate of 50 workdays for every year 
worked until retirement.
40 Issues of Sharing Work
for time. Specifically, extended time away from work, most 
notably vacations and sabbatical leaves, evoked the greatest 
desire to make time-income trade-offs.
The possibility that many workers might desire to 
simultaneously exchange some portion of their earnings for 
two or more types of free time, coupled with the likelihood 
that the maximum trade-off that individuals are willing to 
make will vary according to personal preferences for specific 
types of free time, suggests that simple summaries of 
responses for each question may underestimate interest in ex 
changing income for time. To date, neither data nor 
analytical techniques have been developed to assess the first 
source of possible underestimation. However, a composite 
summary of responses from each series of trade-off ques 
tions made it possible to compute the maximum exchange 
that each individual respondent was willing to make for any 
of the five alternative forms of free time. For example, if an 
individual was willing to forego 20 percent of current income 
for shorter workdays but only 5 percent for other forms of 
time, he or she would be reported as being willing to make a 
maximum trade-off of 20 percent. The totaling of all such 
computations for each survey respondent reveals that a full 
84.4 percent of working respondents were willing to ex 
change some portion of a 10 percent raise for one of the five 
free time options; and that the average respondent stated a 
willingness to trade some 65.6 percent of this raise for some 
form of free time. Correspondingly, 59.3 percent of the 
working respondents expressed desire to forego two percent 
or more of their current earnings for some form of reduced 
worktime, with the average respondent willing to trade 4.7 
percent of his or her income for one of the five forms of free 
time. 60
One might question whether workers would freely make 
the exchanges reported above if "real life" options were pro 
vided. Realistically, actual trade-offs might be smaller than
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stated preferences. However, variance between stated and 
actual trade-offs may not be as great as some might think. In 
one case, which will be discussed later in this volume, some 
17 percent of 10,000 county employees actually gave up be 
tween 5 and 20 percent of their annual incomes for added 
vacation time. 61 Presumably, if the types of free time 
available were expanded to include other alternatives, and 
the threshold for income forfeiture was reduced to 2 percent 
(as in the case of most of the questions used in the above- 
noted survey), the proportion of employees choosing to 
forego earnings for time would likely increase notably.
Response from Organized Labor
Despite indications that large portions of the United States 
labor force may prefer to exchange some of their earnings 
for more free time, union initiatives in this area have been 
restricted to proposals for mandatory workweek reductions 
without pay loss and limited collective bargaining efforts for 
varied forms of free time." American unions have so far 
evidenced only limited interest in the areas of increasing in 
dividual worktime choices63 or willingness to discuss the 
prospect of actually foregoing pay for leisure. 64 As noted 
earlier, the lack of interest in these areas stems in part from 
concern with maintaining a manageable standardization of 
work conditions and consolidated bargaining influence. 65 In 
many cases, steadfast union commitment to worktime reduc 
tion without pay loss may be a reasonable bargaining posture 
which may become open to negotiation at some future date. 
Additionally, some union officials have voiced the viewpoint 
that shorter workweeks are the type of worktime reductions 
which will yield the greatest creation of jobs. 66 In any case, 
unions at this time appear to be avidly in favor of only a 
limited number of work sharing approaches. Whether or not 
this position will change is unclear at this time.
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Speculation on Aggregate 
Employment Impact
Given the imponderables concerning the extent to which 
worktime might be reduced and the transferability of 
foregone job time to those who are unemployed, it is only 
possible to estimate a range of participation in work sharing 
programs and the resulting aggregate impact on employ 
ment. Table 2-5 isolates a range of possible impacts for a fic 
titious labor force of 100 million persons (approximately the 
size of the U.S. work force in 1977) employed an average of 
2,000 hours a year (40 hours a week with two weeks vaca 
tion). Simple computations show that a very small average .5 
percent reduction of worktime would yield a maximum of 
1,000 billion work hours or 500,000 full-time jobs. 
Presumably, the hours of work and number of jobs created 
for the unemployed would be less than the amount of 
worktime reduction. At the other end of the spectrum, op 
timistic computations show that an average worktime reduc 
tion of 10 percent would decrease aggregate worktime by 
20,000 billion hours each year to produce a maximum of 10 
million new full-time jobs. A moderate speculation of poten 
tial participation and impact would be that average yearly 
worktime might realistically be reduced by from 2 to 5 per 
cent and, on the cautious assumption that 50 percent of 
foregone worktime could be transferred to the unemployed, 
between 1 and 2.5 million new full-time jobs might be 
created. These speculations suggest that reasonably suc 
cessful work sharing policies would be unlikely to solve the 
problem of high unemployment, but that such policies may 
have potential as a significant supplementary strategy for 
reducing the intensity and inequities of widespread 
joblessness. 67
Table 2-5
Illustrative Computations of Hours of New Employment and Number of Full-Time Jobs* Created by Varied Average 
Levels of Aggregate Worktime Reductions Under Different Replacement Rate Assumptions (Calculations based on a 





































































































*Full-time job is defined as employment for 2000 hours a year.
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SOCIAL EQUITY AND TARGETABILITY
It has been occasionally observed that even if worktime 
reductions spread employment among a larger number of 
persons, the result would be to concentrate costs on those 
least able to bear the burden while doing little to relieve 
joblessness among the "hardcore unemployed."
Inequitable Distribution of Costs
In the broadest sense, work sharing policies in which some 
of the costs are passed on to all workers would certainly im 
pose the greatest hardships on those with the lowest earn 
ings. 68 If earnings were to decline in roughly the same pro 
portion to worktime, there can be little doubt that many less 
well-to-do workers would be pushed to the financial break 
ing point. Put differently, it is likely that earnings lost 
among nonaffluent workers have more serious impacts than 
proportionally equal income losses among the affluent. 69 In 
the final analysis, any inequitable distribution of the costs of 
work sharing will be largely determined by specific policies. 
Universal and mandatory policies will likely aggravate in 
equities while targeted and volunteeristic approaches could 
minimize such effects. Of course, thought must be given to 
the financial duress experienced by many of those who are 
totally without jobs and whether it is better to have workers 
with jobs share some of this burden so that the trauma of 
total unemployment can be reduced.
Additionally, it has been suggested that an across-the- 
board reduction of worktime to spread employment would 
increase the demand for highly skilled workers who are 
already well paid. As a result, earnings among groups of 
workers with scarce skills would rise and the range of income 
inequality between highly trained and poorly trained workers 
could be expected to increase. 70 Conversely, it has also been 
suggested that labor shortages within highly paid occupa-
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tions would encourage employers to recruit and train 
workers for such positions. 71 Presumably, the upward oc 
cupational mobility resulting from such recruitment would 
increase the incomes of many skilled but underutilized 
workers, thus attenuating or nullifying medium- and long- 
range income inequities resulting from most work sharing 
schemes.
Inequitable Distribution of Jobs
A number of conditions have been cited that may cause 
jobs created by work sharing to be disproportionately 
distributed to job seekers with less urgent unemployment 
problems. First, it has been suggested that jobs created by 
work sharing would be snatched up by relatively well-trained 
but marginal job seekers such as women re-entering the labor 
force. If this proved to be true, work sharing would con 
tribute little to the pressing problems of less competitive 
"hardcore" unemployed persons. At the same time, it must 
be noted that worktime reductions in the more attractive and 
better paid occupations are likely to have a "trickle up" ef 
fect in which adequately skilled but less competitive workers 
are drawn into better positions with a resulting reduction of 
competition for entry level positions for less competitive job 
seekers.
Second, it has been noted that unemployment is 
disproportionately high among groups working in the lower 
skilled occupations, and that work sharing would have to be 
restricted to these occupations because such persons 
presumably would not be suitably trained for higher skilled 
jobs. 72 If this is true, redistribution of employment by work 
sharing would reduce worktime available to individuals 
within certain blue-collar and service occupations while hav 
ing little effect on the hours and earnings available to more 
highly skilled workers. However, as previously noted, educa 
tion and skill attainment is significantly underutilized, and
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the availability of surplus abilities can be expected to nullify 
such restrictions on work sharing. Further, the existence and 
severity of such effects would vary notably according to the 
specific work sharing approaches applied. For example, 
volunteeristic approaches encouraging individuals to ex 
change earnings for desired free time would presumably 
engender the greatest participation among highly skilled and 
trained workers, thus reducing worktime among those best 
able to afford pay losses, and providing upward occupa 
tional mobility to workers with underutilized skills and even 
tually opening jobs for those in lower skilled occupations.
Third, worktime reductions among workers who are more 
competitive in the labor market could cause such persons to 
seek second jobs to recoup pay losses. Since second jobs are 
generally held in occupations requiring less skill and pro 
viding lower pay than primary jobs, increased second job 
holding could displace workers in lower skilled 
occupations. 73 The extent to which lower skilled workers 
would be displaced by higher skilled persons seeking to 
regain earnings lost due to work sharing is highly 
speculative. As noted earlier, the proportion of the work 
force holding second jobs is generally low. 74 Further, since 
highly skilled and paid workers would be best able to sustain 
pay reductions, it cannot be expected that displacement of 
lower skilled workers as a result of work sharing would be 
appreciable. Certainly, the extent of such displacement 
would vary according to work sharing approach. Mandatory 
work sharing could be expected to maximize this effect while 
volunteeristic approaches encouraging individual exchanges 
of earnings for free time would minimize displacement due 
to second job holding because worktime reductions would 
largely reflect individual time-income trade-off preferences.
In overview, there may be some inequitable distribution of 
jobs and income resulting from work sharing, but such in 
equities are not likely to be large and would vary notably in
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accord with specific work sharing policies. In many cases, 
the extent of inequitable distribution of costs and jobs might 
be reduced by policy provisions which target the application 
of work sharing and subsidies for attenuating the costs of 
worktime reductions.
FLEXIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
AND TERMINATION
A major reservation expressed about work sharing has 
been that worktime reductions may become inflexible and 
nonreversible. 75 This would likely hamper organizational 
capacities to adjust to changing economic and technical cir 
cumstances. 76 As already noted, fears have been expressed 
that sudden and inflexible sharing of work could result in 
"skill bottlenecks" in which worktime reductions among 
employees with scarce skills might foster critical labor short 
ages and accompanying economic slowdowns. 77 Others have 
warned that nonreversible worktime reductions which may 
be suitable to the labor surplus of the immediate future may 
complicate long term labor shortages projected for the late 
20th and early 21st centuries as a result of demographic 
trends. 78 Further still, there has been concern that certain ap 
proaches to work sharing may unduly constrain individual 
freedom to adjust worktime upward or downward to meet 
personal needs. 79
Concerns over flexibility and reversibility should be given 
considerable attention in the evaluation of prospective work 
sharing policies. As has been the case with all the issues men 
tioned in this section, different work sharing approaches of 
fer considerable variation of flexibility and reversibility. 80 
Indeed, some approaches even enhance current capacities for 
adjusting worktime. Whenever possible, it would seem that 
both short and long tern impacts would be enhanced by the 
design and selection of policies which provide the maximum 
flexibility for both implementation and termination.
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ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY 
AND REGULATION
As suggested earlier, a critical determinant in assessing the 
viability of proposals for work sharing is whether a signifi 
cant portion of foregone worktime would be transformed in 
to new jobs, which would in many cases depend on the effec 
tiveness of regulatory provisions to insure such transforma 
tions. While effective administration and regulation might 
guarantee that induced worktime reductions produce high 
job yields, it should be noted that there are costs to effective 
administration and that participation and compliance would 
probably decline with the extent and complexity of such pro 
visions. As such, some balance must be found between insur 
ing participation and job creation while avoiding undue ad 
ministrative problems and costs.
SECONDARY SOCIAL IMPACTS
Many work sharing policies are likely to have important 
secondary impacts which would enhance the general quality 
of life. 81 For example, work sharing might provide workers 
with desired free time; 82 this in turn might be used to im 
prove family well-being, 83 increase options for education and 
retraining, 84 and open many opportunities for self-enriching 
leisure. Similarly, worktime reductions brought about by 
work sharing would have the potential to ease the transition 
to retirement. 85 Finally, work sharing could attenuate the 
problems resulting from the social degeneration and the 
economic costs of government programs which accompany 
unemployment. 86
FOCUSING ON THE SPECIFICS
Existing discussions have postulated many benefits and 
costs to a wide range of distinct work sharing approaches.
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Realistically, every approach to sharing employment is likely 
to foster some degree of the positive and negative impacts 
observed in this section. The critical questions yet to be ad 
dressed concern which approaches to sharing work minimize 
the costs and maximize the benefits, and whether the job 
creation and social benefits which can be expected from the 
more promising work sharing policies outweigh prospective 
costs and problems.
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CHAPTER 3 
Assessing the Policy Options
As noted previously, consideration of worktime reduc 
tions as a strategy to combat unemployment has been severe 
ly hampered by a tendency to view work sharing in terms of 
only one of many approaches and by a lack of specifics con 
cerning the approaches that have been proposed. The pur 
pose of this chapter, and indeed the bulk of this volume, will 
be to describe the range of work sharing policies and pro 
posals that are available and to assess the specific viability of 
each approach.
The public policy options to be discussed deal with the 
mechanisms that might be used to reduce worktime rather 
than different types of worktime reduction. For example, a 
shorter workweek is one way of spreading employment. 
However, there are many ways to stimulate this and other 
types of worktime reduction. This chapter will focus 
primarily on the various policy levers that might be used to 
foster work sharing, and only secondarily on the types of 
worktime reductions that would be created by these policies.
Some 17 public policies designed to redistribute existing 
and prospective employment opportunities will be reviewed. 
In an effort to develop a framework for considering these 
options, the policies have been grouped into four major
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categories. The first category is made up of policies which 
provide income subsidies to individuals in order to induce 
worktime reductions or labor force withdrawal. The second 
category includes approaches which seek to limit worktime 
over weeks or longer periods via legal restrictions and 
economic disincentives for prolonged work activities. The 
third category presents a number of approaches clustered by 
the common objective of fostering long term partial 
forfeiture of pay raises resulting from economic growth or 
promotion for more time away from work. The fourth 
category includes government efforts to encourage institu 
tional options allowing individuals to voluntarily exchange 
portions of current earnings for worktime reductions which 
might open jobs for the unemployed. These general 
categories and the 17 specific policy options will be discussed 
as follows:
Subsidized Worktime Reductions
1. Larger and Earlier Retirement Pensions
2. Opportunities for Prolonged Schooling During 
Youth
3. Worker Sabbaticals
4. Mid-Life Educational Leaves
5. Short-Time Compensation
6. Welfare and Income Maintenance Programs
Limitation of Worktime
7. Restriction of Overtime




Long Term Time-Income Trade-Offs
12. Neutralization of Tax Incentives for Selected Fringe 
Benefits
13. Public Subsidization of Fringe Benefits
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14. Tax Incentives for Worktime Reductions
15. Encouragement of Flexible Benefit Options
Voluntary Time-Income Trade-Off Options for Individuals
16. Neutralization of Payroll Taxes
17. Subsidies for Worktime Reduction Options
The discussion will outline the nature of each of the four 
policy categories, then deal with each specific option 
separately. In many instances, the specific policy options can 
and have been combined. For example, higher pay for over 
time work has frequently been proposed along with 
legislative reduction of the standard workweek. While such 
combinations are often used, the component approaches are 
nonetheless distinct and will, therefore, be assessed as 
isolated proposals.
The level of specificity of the 17 alternative work sharing 
proposals varies greatly. In some cases, proposals have been 
well developed and even brought to the point of implementa 
tion. In other cases, work sharing proposals have scarcely 
matured beyond the point of broad conceptualization. The 
discussion of policy options in this chapter will seek to pur 
sue a middle range of specificity, generalizing those options 
which have become highly detailed and further elaborating 
those proposals which have been only broadly outlined.
Some of the 17 policy options will receive considerably 
more attention than others. Those receiving focal treatment 
include the options which either appear most promising or 
have tended to receive notable attention and support in the 
course of contemporary policy debates. In some cases, par 
ticular attention has been given to promising proposals 
which have, up to now, received only sparse elaboration and 
discussion.
Alternative work sharing policies will be given a 
preliminary assessment in accord with the general issues 
outlined in the previous chapter. To review: these issues will
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include impacts on productivity and price stability, job crea 
tion and reduction of unemployment, level of participation 
and aggregate employment impact, influence on social equi 
ty and targetability, administrative efficiency and accoun 
tability, and secondary social effects. These preliminary 
evaluations will ultimately be summarized and compared in 
the final chapter.
SUBSIDIZED WORKTIME REDUCTIONS
Many public policies have been proposed and im 
plemented which have the effect of redistributing employ 
ment by providing financial incentives which make it easier 
for individuals to forego worktime in one form or another. 
While most of these programs were not primarily intended as 
a means of reducing unemployment, current discussions of 
work sharing have cited their alleged impacts on the distribu 
tion of work. Public programs which have been singled out 
and examined for their work sharing potentials include 
larger and earlier retirement pensions, opportunities for pro 
longed schooling during youth, worker sabbaticals, mid-life 
educational leaves, short-time compensation, and welfare 
and income maintenance. These will be discussed in turn.
(1) Larger and Earlier Retirement Pensions
Both public and private retirement pensions have been us 
ed, in part, to redistribute employment by encouraging the 
withdrawal of older workers from the labor force. Publicly 
funded pension systems were first initiated by Germany in 
1875, primarily for humanitarian reasons. The United States 
did not implement such a system until the Social Security Act 
of 1935, which was passed in part to combat unemployment 
by reducing the labor force. 1 Subsequently, this act has been 
amended several times to broaden coverage to over 90 per 
cent of the labor force and reduce minimum eligibility age to
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62, changes once again undertaken in part to reduce the 
number of persons holding or seeking jobs. 2 Private pen 
sions also emerged in the late 19th century, but coverage was 
restricted to less than one-fifth of the labor force as late as 
1940. However, numerous social forces expanded the por 
tion of the labor force covered by private pensions to over 50 
percent by 1970. 3 One reason for such expansion was the 
desire of both employers and employees to open jobs for 
younger workers. 4
Available evidence suggests that the labor force participa 
tion rates of older workers have responded to the proportion 
of workers covered by pension programs, the level of pen 
sion benefits and the age requirements for benefit eligibility. 5 
Thus, as coverage and benefits increase, and the eligibility 
age declines, the proportion of older persons seeking and 
holding jobs has declined. 6 This has caused advocates of 
public and private pension programs to note their potential 
for redistributing employment according to age. 7
Preliminary assessment suggests that earlier retirement op 
tions and increased pension benefits would be an infla 
tionary way of inducing worktime reductions in order to 
share employment. Since pension levels commonly amount 
to 50 percent or more of take-home earnings prior to retire 
ment, 8 the prospect of funding more and larger pension 
payments without productive returns would be a costly prop 
osition for governments, firms and individual taxpayers. 9 
Similarly, lowering of pension eligibility ages, even at reduc 
ed benefit levels, would also require significant expenditures. 
For example, one study estimated that the isolated effect of a 
reduction of the average retirement age in the United States 
from 65 to 62 would result in about a 20 percent increase of 
total public pension costs by the year 1990. 10 Further, pen 
sion programs to induce earlier and more extensive retire 
ment would become increasingly expensive in future years. 
As the large post-World War II "baby boom" generation
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ages to retirement, proportionally smaller younger genera 
tions will be severely taxed to finance the pensions of older 
cohorts. 11 Additionally, retirement age populations are tend 
ing to live longer. Specifically, the average life expectancy 
for persons aged 65 was 12.2 years in 1930, 16.0 in 1976, 12 
and projected to be 16.8 years in 2000. 13 Thus, the elderly 
population will not only be larger during the initial years of 
retirement, but also draw pension benefits for an increasing 
number of years.
The impact of earlier and more extensive retirement upon 
unemployment and job creation would likely be mixed. On 
the surface, there is little doubt that increased retirement 
reduces labor force size. As an illustration, a combination of 
social forces and government programs in the United States 
has contributed to a decline of labor force participation rates 
for men aged 65 and over from 54 percent to 20 percent be 
tween 1930 and 1978, 14 and a decline for all persons age 65 
and over from 27 percent to 13 percent between 1948 and 
1978. 15 If the participation rates for all persons 65 and over 
had remained at the 1948 level up through 1978, there would 
have been about three million additional workers holding or 
seeking jobs in recent years. 16
Whether or not the withdrawal of these workers has open 
ed jobs for others is a matter of conjecture. One would 
assume that complete and permanent withdrawal of workers 
would require near total replacement. However, this need 
not always be the case. Many employers plan on attrition 
from retirement and other sources to allow humane displace 
ment of labor in response to capital improvements and 
necessary economic realignments. 17 In many cases, skills lost 
with the retirement of senior employees may not be directly 
replaceable by new or younger workers. 18 Further, a signifi 
cant portion of pension-receiving retirees leave their original 
job only to take up another, thus attenuating the impact of 
earlier retirement on unemployment. 19 Finally, unemployed
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or marginally employed older workers who choose early 
retirement as an honorable solution to their plight do not 
release jobs for others. 20
As an indication of job release potential, the British 
Department of Employment estimates that a reduction of the 
statutory retirement age from 65 to 60 years would create 
200,000 positions for the unemployed in the first year and 
something like 600,000 jobs after three years; but that the 
total hours of new employment created in this fashion would 
only amount to about one-fourth the worktime foregone by 
retiring workers. 21 To insure replacement of retiring workers 
with the unemployed, Britain and Belgium instigated "job 
release schemes'* in early 1977 and mid-1976 respectively, 
which require that employees retiring early with special 
benefits be replaced by a person under age 30 who is 
registered as unemployed. 22 While such schemes have a high 
job yield, their replacement requirement greatly reduces par 
ticipation. Specifically, by early 1978 only 23,800 British 
workers (one-tenth percent of the British labor force) had 
participated in the program, and 26,000 Belgium workers 
(about one-third percent of the Belgium labor force) had 
participated by July 1977. 23 While participation is certainly 
diminished, such job release schemes are certainly more cost- 
efficient than regular pension programs in terms of creating 
new employment opportunities. Thus, it would appear that 
the potentials of earlier and expanded retirement programs 
to combat unemployment would be notably enhanced by 
some form of new hiring requirement. 24
The viability of income subsidies to encourage earlier and 
more widely spread retirement as a work rationing 
mechanism is likely to be limited in the United States. Earlier 
retirement has become so prevalent that the average 
American male was spending almost 17 percent of his 
lifetime in nonwork during "old age" in 1980 (see figure 1, 
ch. I). 25 Recent survey research concerning retirement age
66 Policy Options
preferences indicates that trends toward earlier retirement 
may have reached a point of "diminishing returns" for 
American workers, such that few would desire to retire 
earlier26 and many would prefer to retire later (see table 
3-1). 27 Finally, there are notable indications that a growing 
portion of the U.S. labor force is losing trust in the fiscal 
solvency of today's pension programs. For example, one na 
tional survey conducted in 1980 found that 73 pecent of 
Americans aged 25 to 44 had little or no confidence that the 
Social Security system would have the funds to pay benefits 
when they retire, and about 57 percent of those aged 45 to 65 
felt likewise. 28 In short, emerging evidence suggests that the 
multi-decade movement toward early retirement may be end 
ing and possibly reversing.
The effects of pension liberalizations on social equity and 
selected target groups is unclear. For those desiring or 
needing to withdraw from the labor force but too poor to do 
so, enhanced pensions covering more workers would provide 
a welcome option. Similarly, increased pension benefits 
would benefit those with marginal or inadequate retirement 
incomes. At the same time, cautions must be made about 
potential negative effects. First, the benefits provided by 
most pension programs do not keep pace with inflation, and 
as life expectancy at retirement age rises, it can be expected 
that many who choose early retirement will be doomed to 
poverty in the last years of their lives. Second, it should be 
kept in mind that provision of retirement pensions for the 
large post-World War II "baby boom" generation will place 
extreme financial burdens on the working population during 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries. 29 Third, whether or not 
jobs released by earlier and more extensive retirement would 
go to those with the greatest need would most likely have to 
be determined by explicit targeting provisions. For example, 
just as British and Belgium job release schemes require that 
vacated positions be given to unemployed persons under age
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30, similar requirements or incentives might encourage the 
hiring of the long term unemployed.
Income subsidies to encourage earlier and more extensive 
retirement would not likely be flexible in terms of implemen 
tation and termination. While there are some exceptions to 
the rule, 30 retirement is a permanent state. Those who retire 
commonly find it difficult to find new jobs or regain their 
former positions; 31 and employers rarely have the means to 
recall previously retired employees. Thus, it would appear 
that earlier retirement would not allow much in the way of 
flexibility for adjustment to medium- and long-range labor 
market conditions. Most particularly, labor scarcities pro 
jected as a result of the eventual withdrawal of the 
1940-1950s "baby boom" generation from the work force in 
the early 21st century could be further intensified by 
liberalized pension programs. At the same time, it should be 
noted that a good deal of flexibility could be built into pen 
sion programs through phased and reversible retirement pro 
visions, as well as part-time retirement options. 32
In its simplest forms, stimulation of earlier and more ex 
tensive retirement via liberalized pension benefits should be 
administratively feasible. For the most part, changes in pen 
sion programs could be accomplished by actuarial ad 
justments which would not require total system redesign. 
Regulation could, however, prove more difficult. Current 
procedures could be enlarged to insure that pension benefits 
are distributed in accord with the work and earnings status 
of beneficiaries. However, regulations to insure some degree 
of new hiring as a result of the withdrawl of older workers 
would likely harbor significant added costs and problems.
The secondary social impacts of earlier retirement are 
highly controversial. The institution of retirement evolved as 
a result of many social changes and problems, one of the 
least important of which was combating joblessness. Current
Table 3-1




















































































































































































































SOURCE: 1978 national survey.
QUESTION: Considering your expected financial situation and ability to stay in or change your current line of work when you reach retirement 
age, which of the following worktime options would you personally prefer at age 65: (A) no work at all; (B) work part time or short workweeks 




discussions of the social costs and benefits of existing and 
proposed retirement systems are volatile. 33 All in all, it is 
probably fair to say that earlier retirement helps some and 
hurts others, and that more retirement age options for in 
dividuals would foster the greatest social well-being. As 
such, it seems reasonable to suggest that the option, but not 
the requirement, of retiring earlier may have many social 
benefits. 34
In overview, it appears that pension liberalization foster 
ing earlier retirement would have inflationary costs, produce 
a moderate number of jobs depending on new hiring re 
quirements, and present a number of significant but 
manageable secondary problems. 35
(2) Opportunities for Prolonged 
Schooling During Youth
The extension of school years during youth has frequently 
been mentioned as a means of reducing the supply of labor 
and therefore lessening unemployment. 36 Aside from extend 
ing compulsory school enrollment (which will be discussed 
later), time spent in school during youth can be prolonged by 
increasing educational opportunities through subsistence 
funds for students and accessible educational institutions. 
Presumably, young persons desiring education would re 
spond to available resources by postponing entry into the 
labor force, and therefore relieve competition for jobs.
The idea of providing public support for students pursuing 
prolonged schooling emerged as a result of many factors. 
Public student assistance gained its first major impetus in the 
United States with educational grants provided in the post- 
World War II "G.I. Bill." During the 1950s, the successful 
launching of the Russian Sputnik catalyzed intensive arms 
and space races and a national commitment to better educate 
the American labor force. This commitment, coupled with a 
parallel objective of insuring equal educational opportunity
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to all qualified persons, lead to a massive expansion of col 
lege enrollment and educational attainment during the 
1960s. 37 Policymakers of the times have noted that the im 
pact of such educational opportunity in postponing the labor 
force entry of the large post-World War II "baby boom" 
generation was not an altogether unplanned side-effect. 38 
There can be little doubt that this inducement of prolonged 
schooling significantly relieved unemployment during the 
1960s and 1970s, thus causing some persons to suggest ex 
panded student financial assistance as a means of combating 
contemporary unemployment.
Initial indications are that a general expansion of educa 
tional opportunities would be a relatively costly way of shar 
ing work and provide little productive gain. The costs of pro 
viding student loans or grants as well as educational facilities 
would be considerable, while the value of a better educated 
labor force to economic production would likely be negligi 
ble. In the case of the United States, there appears to be a 
surplus of highly educated workers. 39 In most cases, even 
highly trained labor force entrants must be given specific on- 
the-job instruction which is costly to employers; 40 and 
underutilization of pre-existing educational attainment may 
actually reduce productivity due to job dissatisfaction, high 
turnover, absenteeism and other personnel problems. 41 
However, nations other than the United States with low or 
uneven educational attainment may find that the expansion 
of educational opportunities may be relatively uncostly in 
comparison to other employment programs, as well as pro 
vide skills and knowledge needed by employers. Further, 
even when educational attainment is underutilized, increased 
training opportunities for specific job-related skills may 
yield significant productive returns. Finally, some of the 
costs of prolonging education among the young might be 
nullified by repayment of student educational loans. 
Nonetheless, it can be expected that expanded educational
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opportunities would be a costly way of reducing the size of 
the labor force, and that low productivity returns on these 
costs could ultimately be inflationary.
It would appear that increased school enrollment would 
effectively reduce the number of job seekers. However, it 
should be noted that a large portion of students are enrolled 
less than full-time, that both full- and part-time students fre 
quently seek and hold jobs, and that the incidence of job 
holding among students increases with age. 42 Unless work 
restrictions are imposed on students, it is likely that only a 
portion of young persons taking advantage of expanded 
educational opportunities would totally postpone labor force 
involvement.
The impact of prolonged schooling on delayed or reduced 
work force activity may not be as great in the future as it has 
been in the past. For a number of reasons, young persons of 
the future are not likely to be as willing to forego earnings 
and commit time and money to extended schooling as their 
counterparts of the 1960s and 1970s. While norms of educa 
tional achievement have risen, 43 the surplus of highly trained 
workers is causing the economic and social returns to the in 
dividual for prolonged schooling to decline. 44 As an illustra 
tion, while college graduates continued to earn more than 
high school graduates in the United States, the advantage fell 
from 53 percent to 40 percent between 1969 and 1971. 45 
Presumably, these trends will cause a declining interest in 
prolonged schooling. At the same time, the small size of cur 
rent and future school age generations (as compared to the 
post-World War II "baby boom" generation) is likely to 
foster an inadequate supply of entry level workers. In con 
trast to the conditions of the 1960s and 1970s in which young 
persons stayed in school longer because there were no jobs 
available, future school age generations may be increasingly 
prone to leave school because entry level job opportunities 
will be more available to them. Thus, there will be a smaller
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number of young persons who might prolong schooling, and 
these young persons may be less likely to postpone labor 
force activity to take advantage of opportunities for pro^ 
longed education. As such, any relief of unemployment 
resulting from increased educational opportunity for the 
young is not likely to be as great as that occurring in the past.
Of course, expanded educational opportunities for 
younger persons tend to enhance social equity, and these op 
portunities could be effectively targeted to groups with the 
greatest need. Studies abound which demonstrate that 
employment and social mobility are, as many times as not, 
distributed to individuals as a result of irrational and even 
unjust conditions. 46 Schools, for all their shortcomings, 47 
tend to perform a "sorting and selecting" function which en 
courages the distribution of social and occupational oppor 
tunities in accord with demonstrated abilities and motiva 
tion. 48 Expanded access to education tends to improve the 
distribution of employment to groups with the greatest need. 
As such, it would appear appropriate to target access to 
educational opportunity to selected groups for reasons other 
than work sharing.
The expansion of educational opportunities has both flexi 
ble and inflexible aspects. For the individual, flexibility is 
considerable and changes in educational methods suggest 
that this flexibility is likely to increase. 49 Further, it would be 
reasonably easy to adjust the availability of student financial 
assistance in accord with labor market conditions. At the 
same time, the establishment and maintenance of educa 
tional institutions is an expensive and somewhat inflexible 
undertaking. Similarly, the administration and regulation of 
institutions providing educational opportunities as a means 
of redistributing work presents a mixed picture. On one 
hand, student aid, like retirement pensions, could likely be 
run smoothly with existing apparatus. On the other hand,
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the development and maintenance of educational facilities 
would be costly and cumbersome.
Educational opportunity, like retirement programs, has 
many purposes, the most important of which is not the 
redistribution of available employment. As already noted, 
schools teach basic skills necessary for employment and 
specific on-the-job training. They also provide some 
semblance of equal opportunity within an irrational and 
somewhat unfair world. Additionally, educational systems 
provide custodial services, a means of preparing young per 
sons for citizenship, and, for many, a valuable form of 
leisure and source of self-enrichment. In short, the social 
benefits to expanding educational access are substantial and 
independent of work sharing implications.
In overview, expansion of educational opportunities for 
the purposes of slowing labor force growth would be 
relatively costly and offer limited relief for those who are 
jobless in future years. Ultimately, it seems that the value of 
increasing access to prolonged schooling for the young 
should be assessed on the basis of criteria other than employ 
ment impacts.
(3) Worker Sabbaticals
A number of proposals have been made for sharing 
employment through public worker sabbatical programs. In 
general, these proposals would provide workers with some 
portion of their normal incomes during an extended period 
away from work after several years of consecutive employ 
ment. It is reasoned that such staggered withdrawal of a 
significant portion of the work force would require new hir 
ing that would relieve the unemployment problem. This 
basic idea must be viewed as somewhat exotic and im 
probable for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, recent 
surveys on work time preferences suggest that the sabbatical
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concept is attractive to a large portion of the labor force (see 
table 2-4). 50 and therefore meriting some attention.
The sabbatical concept is literally ancient. The idea was 
embraced by the Jewish faith as far back as the 6th century 
B.C., and subsequently adapted by Christianity and other 
religions. 51 The first notable secular application of the idea 
occurred in 1880 when Harvard initiated the first academic 
sabbatical. Ten major campuses had such programs by 1910, 
58 by 1922, and over 300 of the 575 existing colleges and 
universities by 1932. 52 Although there were erratic efforts to 
apply the concept to high school faculty and other occupa 
tions, 53 the sabbatical remained almost exclusively within the 
domain of higher education for decades.
Aside from a 1945 proposal to combat unemployment 
with a national sabbatical program, 54 the idea received scant 
attention until the 1960s. At that time, the combined in 
fluence of recessionary downturns and fear of widespread 
worker displacement due to automation fostered considera 
tion and limited applications of sabbaticals. Most notably, 
U.S. steel and aluminum workers obtained a 13-week "sab 
batical" through collective bargaining, 55 and then Secretary 
of Labor Willard Wirtz and others proposed consideration 
of national programs for the dual purposes of spreading 
employment and upgrading labor force skills through 
retraining. 56 However, public policy discussion of the con 
cept faded, and only minor initiatives were made by a few 
large corporations which developed limited executive sab 
batical programs primarily for the purposes of management 
renewal and provision of social service. 57 High unemploy 
ment during the mid-1970s once again catalyzed a host of 
proposals for national sabbatical programs. 58
Proposals put forth during the 1970s for sabbaticals varied 
greatly. All provided for some type of income maintenance 
during the period away from work, but the level of income
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maintenance varied greatly. Most required that participants 
not work on paying jobs while on leave and many required 
some type of educational activity. Most also guaranteed job 
return rights to participants and allowed some flexibility in 
the timing of sabbatical leaves. Some include a forfeiture of 
some or all of personal sabbatical savings for not par 
ticipating. The greatest area of variation concerned the 
source of funding (see figure 2).
The impact of a national worker sabbatical on economic 
productivity and price stability would depend, in large part, 
on the means of funding the program. Some programs 
would be highly volunteeristic and funded by some type of 
forfeiture of income by individuals, thus posing no extra 
direct costs to firms. The implications of this type of sab 
batical are discussed in a later section dealing with voluntary 
time-income trade-offs. Virtually all proposals mentioned 
above entail funding from new taxes, expenditures from ex 
isting income maintenance programs, or new allocations 
from general revenues. If new taxes were levied completely 
or partially on firms, they would likely increase the costs of 
production and the prices of output. 59 If sabbaticals were 
funded directly or indirectly from general government 
revenues through deficit spending, it would tend to foster in 
flation. 60 Consideration of sabbaticals also raises some in 
teresting questions about the impact of program actuarial ar 
rangements. 61 As in all work sharing proposals, these costs 
must be compared to the costs of dealing with unemploy 
ment in other ways. 62
The effects of sabbaticals on productivity and price stabili 
ty will also entail the impact of such programs on the 
economic efficiency of participating firms. Periodic and pro 
longed absence of employees will certainly create organiza 
tional inefficiences due to lost continuity of operations, new 
hiring and training, and administrative complications. Such 
inefficiencies, coupled with the income maintenance costs of
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sabbaticals, would almost assuredly reduce economic pro 
ductivity and increase the costs of goods and services. 63
As with most work sharing proposals, there are varying 
opinions concerning the job creating and preserving 
capacities of sabbaticals. Advocates of this approach to 
sharing employment claim that this type of worktime reduc 
tion would be particularly effective because extended 
absence would force employers to replace departed workers 
in order to maintain production. Such advocates estimate 
that the proportion of foregone worktime transormed into 
new employment might range from 75 to over 100 percent. 64 
Others are more reserved about the job creation potentials of 
the sabbatical. There have been many claims and observa 
tions that employers could not find adequate trained replace 
ment labor, 65 particularly if sabbatical leaves are not 
scheduled evenly over time. 66 It has also been claimed that 
employers will seek to avoid new hiring by use of slack per 
sonnel, 67 investment in labor saving machinery, and 
postponement of leaves. 68 Correspondingly, it has been 
claimed that workers will also seek to postpone or avoid sab 
baticals and take new jobs when on leave. 69
The few cases in which sabbaticals have been actually tried 
provide varied and inconclusive indications of their potential 
to create or preserve jobs. Reports on the employment im 
pacts of the U.S. Steel sabbatical are mixed and data less 
than satisfactory. At the beginning, David McDonald, then 
President of the U.S. Steelworkers, claimed that the pro 
gram was opening as much new job time as that foregone by 
workers taking sabbaticals. 70 However, he was never explicit 
as to whether this was new hiring for the unemployed or 
preservation of employment for workers in an industry re 
quiring a declining number of employees. 71 Steel manage 
ment agreed that the sabbatical would cause new hiring, but 
has remained noncommittal on the extent of job creation or 
preservation. 72 One of the few attempts to assess the employ-
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ment impact in the early stages of the program found that 
only 16 workers were hired for 41 on a sabbatical in one 
small plant. 73 However, these reports have been unclear as to 
whether these new hirings were permanent or temporary. 
Since 41 13-week sabbatical leaves roughly equals ten full- 
time jobs, 16 permanent new hirings (presumably at the less 
trained entry levels) would be an excellent job yield. Other 
wise, it is safe to say that some portion of foregone worktime 
went to preserving current jobs or was lost due to managerial 
efforts to avoid new hiring.
Other sabbatical programs provide mixed evidence concer 
ning job creating potentials. There are frequent reports of 
how the sabbatical absences of professors teaching key 
courses have led to the hiring of new faculty for temporary 
periods within academia. However, there appear to be an 
equal number of cases in which no new hiring occurred. In 
the case of a voluntary sabbatical program within Califor 
nia's Alameda County, which will be discussed in a later sec 
tion, every four persons choosing to take a three-month sab 
batical led to the employment of one full-time worker. 74 In 
Sweden, three public policies approach the characteristics of 
the sabbatical. The first is the parental leave program, which 
allows one parent to take up to six months leave with full pay 
after the birth of a child. The second is a national vacation 
law which guarantees all workers at least five weeks of paid 
vacation each year and allows one week to be postponed so 
that it is possible to take a ten week mini-sabbatical every 
five years. The third is an education leave program which 
allows prolonged leaves with pay for retraining. While there 
is no direct empirical link between use of these programs and 
the extent of joblessness, many observers believe that par 
ticipation helps to keep the Swedish unemployment rate at a 
remarkably low and constant rate of around 2 percent. All in 
all, it appears that the job creating and saving potentials of 
sabbaticals will vary greatly according to the nature of par 
ticipating organizations.
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What then would be the aggregate impact of a widespread 
worker sabbatical program on employment? One dated 1966 
survey of 100 varied corporate presidents found that only 38 
percent favored sabbaticals in their own organization, and 
those favoring the concept did so only for managerial and 
professional personnel. 75 A previously cited 1978 national 
survey found that about 42 percent of the labor force would 
forego 2 percent or more of their current income and that 66 
percent would forego some 40 percent or more of a 10 per 
cent pay raise for some type of sabbatical. 76 Taking the later 
survey as an indication of potential worker participation, the 
average 1978 American worker would only forego 2.1 per 
cent of current earnings for a sabbatical. At the maximum, 
this would only mean a 2 percent increase in employment, 
and, most likely, notably less than full replacement of time 
foregone with new employment. Of course, the sharing of 
the basic costs of a sabbatical program by employers, 
government and workers could increase acceptance and par 
ticipation in such a program. However, the direct and in 
direct costs of such a program could be expected to ultimate 
ly limit participation. Thus, it is likely that the aggregate job 
creation potentials of the sabbatical would not greatly sur 
pass the potentials indicated by the previously noted volun 
tary time-income trade-off preferences.
The notion of a worker sabbatical raises a number of ques 
tions about the equity and targetability of such proposals. 
While sabbaticals would open jobs to the unemployed and 
provide retraining opportunities for the underemployed, 
they might also lead to discontinuities in the occupational 
advancement of persons who have struggled to attain a 
"take-off" point in their careers. It is also possible that a 
sabbatical program funded by the general populace would be 
inequitably used by select occupational groups such as pro 
fessionals or unionized workers. 77 There is also an important 
issue concerning the level and value of income provided to
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workers on sabbatical. Most notably, inflation could eat 
away the real dollar value of sabbatical income so that the 
benefits received are not equal to the amount contributed. It 
has been suggested by one proposal that eligibility for sab 
baticals be targeted to areas or groups experiencing high 
unemployment in order to create jobs for those in greatest 
need. 78 This could focus the employment impact of such pro 
grams, but also lead to a sharing of jobs among those least 
able to sacrifice.
Assessment of the flexibility for implementing and ter 
minating sabbaticals must be undertaken at either the 
societal or firm level. From the societal perspective, a univer 
sal or near-universal sabbatical program would be rather in 
flexible. Like the Social Security system, large constituencies 
would acquire vested interest in the program. For better or 
worse, it would be difficult to terminate once implemented. 
At the firm level, sabbaticals would have both flexible and 
inflexible elements. As in the case of the U.S. Steel sab 
batical program, provisions could insure a reasonable 
amount of discretion to both employers and employees in the 
timing of leaves. 79 At the same time, it is exactly the inflex 
ibility of prolonged labor departures that advocates of sab- 
-baticals claim are the greatest job creating strength of this 
form of work sharing. 80 Thus, rigidities at the firm level are 
at once a desirable and undesirable aspect of these proposals.
There can be little doubt that a government sabbatical pro 
gram would present a number of difficult administrative 
challenges. While development of the funding and income 
maintenance aspects of such a program would be no easy ac 
complishment, there is no question that a reasonably effi 
cient system could be developed. The major difficulties 
would come with the regulation of the program to insure 
participant rights and prevent abuses. One of the greatest 
difficulties would stem from efforts to insure job return 
rights to participating employees. Advocates claim that such
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rights could be provided in the same manner as post-World 
War II statutes, which provided such options to returning 
soldiers. 81 However, it is well known that such rights are ex 
tremely difficult to guarantee. In the cases where sabbaticals 
require educational activities and abstinence from paid 
employment, 82 there would be regulatory difficulties. En 
forcement of training endeavors would be feasible though 
costly, but current difficulties with detecting "subterranean 
work" suggest that the prevention of paid activities would be 
extremely cumbersome. In addition, there would also be 
complications in guaranteeing departure rights, providing 
mechanisms for the transfer of earned sabbatical time for 
workers changing employers, and determination of excep 
tions to overall program guidelines. All in all, a public sab 
batical program would be cumbersome to administer.
One of the reasons that sabbatical proposals have come to 
the forefront in recent years is their potential to serve a 
multitude of secondary social purposes. Indeed, it might be 
claimed that the sabbatical concept has been justified more 
on the basis of these social impacts rather than its potential 
as an employment policy. There are many appealing aspects 
to the sabbatical. It represents a form of free time that allows 
people a chance to accomplish things that might otherwise be 
very difficult or impossible. Specifically, sabbaticals provide 
an opportunity for a prolonged and total break from daily 
and yearly routines. Such prolonged leaves could be used for 
any of a number of purposes, including returning to full- 
time school, care of young children, extensive voluntary ser 
vice, entrepreneurial business efforts, initiation of a new 
career, construction of a new house, or simply a period to 
reassess one's life. 83
Despite the attractive social returns that might accrue 
from widespread sabbaticals, the costs of providing such a 
program make it an unlikely prospect for the near future. 
Nonetheless, the concept may merit further attention.
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Specifically, efforts might be made to encourage the 
development of sabbatical programs on a limited basis 
within the public and private sectors and to evaluate those 
that currently exist. 84
(4) Mid-Life Educational Leaves
It has been suggested that competition for available jobs 
might be reduced by encouraging workers to periodically 
return to school in order to undertake educational programs 
which would update skills, facilitate mid-life occupational 
changes, or simply allow self-renewal and enrichment. 85 As 
in the case of worker sabbaticals, such extended leaves for 
education would make it necessary for employers to hire new 
workers to replace employees who have temporarily left for 
mid-life educational programs; periodic withdrawals by a 
significant portion of the work force would create a situation 
in which jobs are shared and rotated among a larger number 
of persons. 86 For the most part, it can be expected that the 
impacts of such leaves on productivity, employment and 
other areas of concern would be essentially the same as those 
previously discussed for the worker sabbatical. However, it 
is likely that participation would be limited by worker in 
terest in mid-life schooling and the formal learning re 
quirements of such programs. 87
(5) Short-Time Compensation (STCT
One of the most promising approaches to work sharing en 
tails the provision of partial unemployment insurance 
benefits to employees in work groups that experience 
workweek reductions in order to prevent layoffs or 
dismissals within a specific firm. As a rough illustration, if a 
firm were to reduce the workweek and pay levels of its 
employees 20 percent rather than lay off 20 percent of its 
workers, those employees working short-time would receive 
one-fifth of the weekly unemployment insurance they would
Policy Options 85
have received if totally laid off. Thus, employees on reduced 
workweeks would be partially reimbursed for lost earnings 
and no workers would lose their jobs.
Although such "short-time compensation" programs 
have been widespread and reportedly successful within many 
European nations since the 1920s, the unemployment in 
surance system was not used for such purposes within the 
United States until 1978. Many U.S. unemployment in 
surance programs have provisions for paying partial benefits 
for less than a full week of unemployment, 89 but only in 
amounts roughly equal to the dollar amount of full weekly 
UI benefits minus the income earned during the week in 
question. A quick example demonstrates why such partial 
benefits are not suitable for work sharing. If an employee 
earns $250 for a full 40-hour workweek and is eligible to 
receive $100 in benefits for a week of unemployment, he or 
she could not receive benefits for working a reduced 32-hour 
workweek because earnings for more than two days employ 
ment would total over $100.
With short-time compensation provisions, UI benefits 
would be paid as a proportion of the maximum benefits 
available to an individual for a given week if the lost time 
equals or surpasses an established minimum worktime reduc 
tion. Thus, a worker eligible to receive a maximum of $100 
in weekly benefits could receive about one-fifth that amount, 
or $20, for every full day of lost work. Although each state 
has the discretion to adjust its unemployment insurance 
system to allow compensation for reduced workweeks, only 
California had put such a program into effect as of February 
1981.
Foreign Short-Time Programs. Programs similar to those 
being considered in the United States have been in effect 
within other nations since the 1920s. 90 Among the nations 
reporting use of such programs are the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain, Luxem-
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burg, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, and most 
recently Canada. 91 Of the varied short-time benefit pro 
grams, the German program most closely parallels the 
framework that is being discussed within the United States. 
Since this program is the oldest and best documented of such 
approaches, an examination of its details can provide useful 
insights for policymakers and planners within the United 
States.
The West German program is administered by the Federal 
Labor Institute (Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit), an independent 
tripartite organization composed of labor, business and the 
government which administers unemployment insurance and 
other labor market programs. 92 Since worker eligibility for 
short-time benefits is determined by eligibility for unemploy 
ment insurance, it can be said that short-time compensation 
(STC) is administered within the context of the UI system. 93 
All Federal Labor Institute programs are financed by a 3 per 
cent payroll tax divided equally between employers and 
employees up to an earnings ceiling. 94
The German short-time program is available to firms with 
at least one paid employee. To gain eligibility, a firm must 
demonstrate that a reduction in hours of labor is 
unavoidable, and that worktime reductions with short-time 
benefits will prevent the dismissal of employees. 95 Further, 
employers must document that worktime reductions of 10 
percent or more have been made for one-third or more of 
their employees for a period of at least four continuous 
weeks. 96 Although some consideration has been given to us 
ing the program for long term adjustment assistance, 
eligibility to firms that show signs of permanent decline has 
traditionally been denied. 97
Despite generally laudatory reports from European 
representatives of labor, business and government about the 
value of short-time programs, 98 a number of reservations 
have been expressed about the applicability of the concept in
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the United States. Less intense labor market competition for 
workers among American employers may make the program 
far less attractive to U.S. firms. Additionally, established 
mechanisms for cooperative labor-management decisions in 
Europe are likely to make STC more acceptable abroad. Fur 
ther, large portions of European fringe benefits are ad 
ministered by the government, thus reducing fixed costs of 
labor barriers which would likely deter U.S. firms from par 
ticipation. Finally, the maximum benefit ceiling for the Ger 
man STC program is considerably higher than most 
American ceilings. In Germany, maximum UI and STC 
benefits are determined annually to be 163 percent of 
average gross earnings for all insured workers, while the 
highest UI ceiling in the United States is a relatively low 70 
percent of the average weekly income of covered workers." 
This difference is assumed to reduce opposition from senior 
employees in Germany to a much greater degree than would 
be likely in the United States.
Short-Time Compensation Programs in the United States. 
Consideration of using short-time compensation within the 
United States emerged as a response to the aggravated 
unemployment problems in New York City during 1975. The 
"Poses Plan," as it came to be called, was generally sup 
ported by a highly publicized conference of business, 
organized labor, and academicians. 100 The proposal received 
considerable press attention in the New York area and the 
persistent support of many groups because it appeared to 
have the potential to both reduce joblessness and minimize 
back slippage of affirmative actions gains by preventing the 
layoff or dismissal of minorities. 101 In March 1976, a short- 
time compensation bill was introduced to the New York 
State Assembly. 102 However, the bill died in committee due 
to technical complications.
Federal interest in short-time compensation has progress 
ed cautiously. During 1978 and 1979, the U.S. Department
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of Labor established a special task force to monitor existing 
programs, make preliminary assessments of the concept, and 
explore the possibility of funding a pilot study. 103 Most 
recently, federal legislation has been introduced to Congress 
to support the development of state programs. 104
Independent of federal initiatives, California established 
an experimental statewide program in mid-1978. Hearings 
held by the State Senate to explore the general topic of work 
sharing drew attention to the short-time compensation con 
cept in November 1977. 105 In response to expected 
unemployment resulting from the Proposition 13 tax cutting 
referendum, State Senator William Greene introduced and 
gained passage of a "Work Sharing UI" program during 
July 1978. The program was rapidly signed into law by 
Governor Edmund Brown, Jr., and implemented. Although 
the widespread layoffs expected from Proposition 13 did not 
occur, the program was renewed in July 1979 and is being 
administered as a prolonged experiment. 106 The basic design 
of this California program is similar to the German pro 
gram. Work Sharing UI is operated by the California 
Employment Development Department which administers, 
among other programs, Unemployment Insurance, Disabili 
ty Insurance and the California State Employment Service.
The legislation creating Work Sharing UI provides that an 
employer facing an economic downturn may choose, instead 
of layoffs, to reduce the hours and corresponding wages of 
all or a designated part of his or her work force and share the 
work remaining among those employees. The reduction must 
involve not less than 17 percent of the employer's regular 
permanent work force involved in the affected work unit or 
units. Additionally, the hours and wages of the affected 
employees must be reduced by 10 percent or more. Each par 
ticipating employee is eligible to receive a weeky unemploy 
ment insurance benefit proportional to the percentage of his 
or her wage and hour reduction.
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The program was designed to operate within the existing 
California unemployment insurance system. Each employee 
must therefore meet basic UI eligibility requirements to 
receive work sharing benefits. California eligibility re 
quirements are relatively liberal. In 1980, a worker must 
have earned at least $900 in wages during the 12-month 
"base period" prior to receiving benefits. That amount of 
earnings would provide, however, only minimal regular 
unemployment insurance weekly benefits of $31. The 1980 
weekly ceiling for unemployment insurance benefits was a 
maximum of $120 if the recipient earned $4,160 or more in 
the highest quarter of his or her base period. Thus, a worker 
who is eligible for maximum weekly benefits would receive 
about $24 for each day lost out of a workweek. Benefits and 
ceilings in other states vary substantially, with some higher 
and others lower.
The California legislation allows the payment of Work 
Sharing UI benefits to each participating employee for up to 
20 weeks during a 52-week period beginning the first week 
benefits are paid. Workers laid off after this 20-week dura 
tion period are eligible for regular UI with a duration reduc 
ed slightly to reflect the dollar costs of the work sharing 
benefits already received. 107
Opinions collected from representatives of participating 
firms and unions provide provisional indications that the 
California program has been generally well received. Early in 
December 1979, representatives from 30 of the firms which 
actually used Work Sharing UI were interviewed by phone. 
Of these firms, 25 strongly favored the program and 5 were 
neutral. 108 Firm representatives favored the program because 
it helped them retain valued employees, was generally ap 
preciated by workers, and was easy and flexible to ad 
minister. Representatives from 30 of the 36 local unions par 
ticipating in the program prior to December 1979 were also 
interviewed. Some 14 favored the program, 3 were neutral or
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unaware of the program, and 3 had not actually used the 
program. Major reasons for approval were that use of Work 
Sharing UI was fairer than layoffs and that workers in 
general were better off financially because only a portion of 
earnings were lost and most fringe benefits were maintained. 
Four union representatives reported initial resistance to the 
program from their members, but also noted that opposition 
had dropped off once workers became familiar with the idea.
The Viability of Short-Time Compensation. Unlike many 
work sharing proposals, short-time compensation is a well- 
defined and working employment policy. While evaluations 
of these programs are still in process, 109 there is ample data 
from both the German and California programs to both pro 
vide an empirical basis for a preliminary assessment of some 
of their impacts and illustrate issues pertinent to other work 
sharing policies.
Impact on Productivity and Price Stability: Early ad 
vocates of the STC concept within the United States com 
monly claimed that it would facilitate a fairer distribution of 
available worktime without extra costs to employers or the 
government. It was assumed that employers would be indif 
ferent toward reducing their workweek and laying off a com 
mensurate proportion of their work forces, and that there 
would be no difference in cost to the UI system between pay 
ing full benefits to some workers or partial benefits to all 
workers. Thus, it was reasoned, work sharing with the use of 
STC should not impede production or raise prices any more 
than comparable layoffs. While this assumption is perhaps 
more true than it is false, some care must be taken to qualify 
the likely effects of STC on productivity, job preservation, 
and other factors.
Ultimately, the economic costs to firms and government 
must be determined by an empirical evaluation of working 
programs that has not yet been completed. Nonetheless, data
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on the costs of labor and social programs can be used to il 
lustrate the likely economic impacts of using short-time com 
pensation in comparison to layoffs. This can be accomplish 
ed by a hypothetical example developed to contrast laying 
off 20 percent of low seniority and low income employees 
with a 20 percent (1 day) worktime reduction with STC 
benefits within a fictitious firm employing 100 wage-earning 
workers. These workers have average 1980 U.S. pay levels 
and benefits under the income tax and UI benefit conditions 
existing in California. Further, the income and fringe 
benefits are distributed within this fictitious group of 
workers to roughly reflect prevailing conditions in the 
United States. Thus, the highest paid 20 percent receive a 
gross weekly wage of $380, the average worker a gross week 
ly income of $265, and the lowest 20 percent a gross weekly 
income of $155. The lowest paid 20 percent are assumed to 
have low seniority and be subject to layoffs when they occur. 
The economic impacts of STC and layoffs under these condi 
tions are demonstrated in table 3-2.
The typical firm is likely to have lower labor and turnover 
costs under STC as opposed to layoffs, but other factors are 
likely to preempt these considerations in determining 
whether short-time compensation is a viable alternative to 
layoffs. Despite higher firm expenditures per hour of labor 
on fixed fringe benefit commitments, overall labor costs are 
likely to be lower under STC because reductions in worktime 
for all employees as opposed to total layoff of low paid 
junior workers will tend to reduce average wage rates. The 
average hourly wage and benefit costs computed in the 
hypothetical example was $9.81 under STC as opposed to 
$10.22 under regular layoffs and $9.26 under standard full- 
time conditions. Lower turnover costs resulting from 
avoidance of recall, new hiring, and training would likely 
lead to further savings by firms using STC as an alternative 
to layoffs. However, these savings are likely to be at least
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partly counterbalanced by a slight increase of firm UI taxes 
as a result of higher partial UI payments given to senior 
workers with large base earnings. Generally, hourly labor 
costs can be expected to be higher under both STC and 
layoffs than they would be under full-time conditions, sug 
gesting that firms would not wish to utilize STC unless con 
fronted with economic problems.
As suggested previously, factors other than labor costs are 
likely to determine the viability of STC to firms. Most 
notably, the nature of firm technology and organization are 
likely to be a predominant consideration. In some cases, 
workweek adjustments can be made without undesirable 
subutilization of capital and reduced productivity. In other 
cases, rigid relationships between capital and labor may 
make workweek reductions technically impossible. Addi 
tionally, if experienced senior workers are significantly more 
productive than their junior counterparts, firms may be 
reluctant to retain low seniority workers by cutting back the 
worktime of senior employees.
Presumed benefits to workers and firms resulting from use 
of STC are likely to be gained through increased costs to the 
government. As previously noted, the level of average 
benefits under STC is likely to be higher than UI payments 
resulting from layoffs because benefits for senior workers 
will be greater than those collected by junior workers who 
earn less. However, such extra costs to the government are 
likely to be recouped over the long-run by increased UI taxes 
for participating firms. Additionally, use of STC can be ex 
pected to reduce general tax revenues received by the govern 
ment. Since workers, particularly those with higher incomes, 
will pay proportionally less taxes with reduced earnings, 
total revenues from income based taxes will likely be lower. 
Specifically, the weekly state, federal and social security 
taxes collected from the average STC participant in the 
hypothetical example was $56.80 as opposed to $69.88 for
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the average worker in the group experiencing layoffs. To 
some degree, these losses will be slightly offset by lower ex 
penditures on public programs such as food stamps, social 
security, and medicare for work groups using STC as oppos 
ed to layoffs. 110 Finally, there may be some increased pro 
gram administration costs resulting from the need to process 
more claims than would occur with layoffs.
In sum, it appears that the use of short-time compensation 
will not directly cause firms to reduce productivity or in 
crease prices as compared to what might be expected under 
layoffs. Most of all, extra costs to the unemployment in 
surance system would ultimately be counterbalanced by 
higher UI taxes among participating firms, who would 
presumably accept such costs due to compensating benefits 
from use of STC. Previously noted reductions of aggregate 
income tax payments could contribute to inflation if they 
fostered deficit spending by the public sector. However, such 
inflationary impacts would likely be minor.
Job Creation and Preservation: While there are 
unanswered questions, the impacts of short-time compensa 
tion programs on job creation and the reduction of 
unemployment appear reasonably clear. However, it should 
be emphasized that STC programs are defensive strategies 
designed to preserve jobs under threat of layoff rather than 
create jobs for the unemployed. Thus, such programs can be 
expected to reduce unemployment by preventing layoffs 
rather than creating new jobs.
Although it is generally agreed that workweek reductions 
under STC transfer all or most of foregone worktime to 
those who would otherwise lose their jobs, important ques 
tions remain about whether replacement of lost worktime 
with preserved employment is as high as some maintain. 
First, some critics have suggested that the program will pro 
vide "windfall" benefits to workers who already experience
Table 3-2
Hypothetical Comparison of Costs and Benefits of Short-Time Compensation and Layoffs to Typical Firm, Workers
and Government1 (Typical firm with 100 production workers over 1 week)
Comparison of Alternative Methods of Reducing Worktime by 20 Percent




Cost and income factors
Impact on workers: 
Income and benefits 
Total gross wage, unemployment
Total net wage, unemployment insurance
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Impact on unemployment insurance: 
Unemployment insurance system 
Benefit payments' ....................
Other government, programs 
Program expenditures' ................
Income tax revenues1 ................. 47 44 4 547 60
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1. The assumptions underlying the table are (1) 40-hour workweek with no overtime, (2) all employees eligible for unemployment insurance, 
(3) lowest paid 20 percent of workers are also lowest seniority and subject to layoffs, (4) distribution and levels of wages and benefits approx 
imate late 1979 conditions for nonsalaried U.S. production workers, and (5) taxes and unemployment insurance benefits based on California 
conditions.
2. Gross average weekly wage approximated from August 1979 average U.S. manufacturing workers' weekly income (Monthly Labor Review, 
October 1979, p. 98), and typical distribution of earnings within a work group of 100 employees into highest 20 percent and lowest 20 percent 
approximated from national income distribution patterns for male wage earners in manufacturing industries. (Current Population Reports, 
Consumer Income, Series P 60, No. 118, March 1979, pp. 228-29).
3. Dollar amount of taxes deducted from gross weekly earnings to determine net earnings based on Federal and California income tax 
withholding rates for a worker with three exemptions (California Employment Development Department, January 1979), and 1979 Social 
Security tax rates requiring payment of 6.13 percent of the first $22,900 of individual annual earnings by both employer and employee.
4. Dollar cost of fringe benefits such as medical care, private retirement pensions and paid time off computed as 32 percent of gross earnings 
based on available data (Handbook of Labor Statistics 1977, p. 237) and Employment Benefits (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1975).
5. Full weekly unemployment insurance benefits and 20 percent benefits based on California benefit determination formula in effect in January 
1980. Full unemployment insurance benefits would be $74 a week for a fully unemployed worker earning $165 a week, $107 for a worker earning 
$265 a week, and $120 for a worker earning $380 a week or more. The California unemployment insurance benefit ceiling is $120 a week.
6. Unemployment insurance tax payments computed from estimated typical employer unemployment insurance tax based on average 1977 
California tax rate of 2.46 percent (Actuarial Report of the California Unemployment Fund, 1977, pp. 28-29) adjusted upward 4 percent to ac- 
count for employee turnover (Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, p. 332) and prorated over one-year period to represent 
average unemployment tax expenditures by employer on first $6,000 of employee earnings for varied levels of continuously earned annual in- 
come.
7. Because of the unavailability of acceptable data showing dollar amounts of employer turnover costs resulting from hiring and training, and 
public program expenditures associated with varied levels and types of work losses, it was necessary to note expected impacts in terms of (+) for 
increased expenditures.
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shortened workweeks as an alternative to layoffs, thus 
resulting in benefit expenditures without reduced incidence 
of job detachment. 111 Since the incidence of such workweek 
reduction appears to be low in the United States and com 
monly smaller than the 10 percent threshold reduction of 
worktime required before employees are eligible to receive 
benefits, 112 the extent of such a "windfall" effect would be 
limited. Second, and more important, it has been suggested 
that employers may find workweek reductions to be easier 
and less costly than layoffs, thus leading to the imposition of 
greater and possible longer worktime losses than would 
otherwise be the case with layoffs. 113
This second possibility is an extremely complex issue 
which has not yet been subjected to satisfactory empirical 
assessment. 114 Despite general assessment by German of 
ficials that STC effectively prevents layoffs, available data 
leaves a number of ambiguities concerning its job saving ef 
fects. It has been noted that the aggregate worktime reduc 
tions measured for the work force have been significantly 
greater than the estimated reductions of full-time unemploy 
ment resulting from use of short-time compensation (see 
table 3-3). However, it is also noted that this difference 
comes primarily from a "silent reserve" (Stille Reserve) of 
employees on reduced worktime who do not or cannot claim 
short-time benefits. 115 This explanation is supported by early 
data from the California program, 116 and further 
underscored by the absence of complaints from participating 
workers and unions about excessive worktime reductions 
under STC. Nonetheless, the question of whether temporary 
workweek reductions under STC lead to greater losses of 
worktime than layoffs requires more elaborate empirical 
assessment.
Participation and Aggregate Impact on Employment: 
Available data indicate that short-time compensation is 
suitable for use by a large and diverse portion of the firms
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Table 3-3















































SOURCE: Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarket-und Berufsforschung ("The Development 
of the Labor Market in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1977"), No. 1, 1977, p. 8. (In 
terpretation of data provided by Beatrice Reubens, Conservation of Human Resources, 
Columbia University, New York.) Data for 1977 and 1978 cited from Gunther Schmid, 
"Selective Employment Policy in West Germany: Some Evidence of Its Development and 
Impact," International Institute of Management, Berlin, Discussion Paper Series, July 
1978, p. 14. 
*1978 figures are provisional.
within industrial economies, and could therefore contribute 
significantly to the reduction of aggregate unemployment. 
Data from the German program provide insight concerning 
the potential level of participation in nations such as the 
United States. Ninety-five percent of all German workers 
receiving STC payments are found in manufacturing, mining 
and construction (see table 3-4). Within these sectors, the 
program is most widely used in the fabrication of metal pro 
ducts, ranging from the mining of iron and coal to the pro 
duction of steel, machinery, automobiles and ships. Workers 
associated with electrical products, textiles and construction 
are the next most prominent participants.
Between one-third and one-half of all German workers 
receiving short-time payments were employed in large firms 
with more than 500 employees. However, enterprises with
Table 3-4
Short-Time Workers and Rate of Short-Time Work by Industry, Germany, 1973-1977













































































SOURCE: Gunther Schmid, "Selective Employment Policies in West Germany: Some Evidence of Its Development and Impact," Discussion
Paper Series, International Institute of Management, Berlin, West Germany, July 1978, p. 34.
a. Excluding energy.
b. Based on dependent workers obliged to social insurance contributions.
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more than 500 workers represented only 5.5 percent of the 
total number of firms using STC in 1978. Thus, although the 
average participating firm had only 63 employees, it appears 
that a very small but growing proportion of large employers 
provide a significant part of the individual STC 
beneficiaries.
Most observers have concluded that the program has 
significantly attenuated aggregate unemployment in Ger 
many. One study has estimated that the use of STC reduced 
full-time unemployment by approximately 175,000 in 1975, 
and some 52,000 in 1977." 7 On the basis of these figures, 
full-time unemployment would have been one-sixth higher 
without use of short-time in 1975, and one-twentieth higher 
in 1977 (see table 3-3).
While the California STC program is still new and little 
used in comparison to regular layoffs with unemployment 
insurance, the patterns of participation to date suggest that 
American use of the program could evolve along the lines of 
that evidenced in Germany. Use of the California program 
grew slowly at first, with only 67 firms receiving certification 
during the seven months between July 1978 and February 
1979. However, growth of participation has accelerated with 
the total number of certified firms increasing to 1,348 by the 
end of December 1980. It is commonly assumed that early 
lack of use and subsequent increases of participation can be 
largely attributed to a gradual growth of awareness about the 
program. Nonetheless, when one considers that there are 
over 500,000 firms and 10 million workers in California, it is 
apparent that the program has thus far had little statewide 
impact.
The latest tabular breakdowns available entail the 312 
firms and 7,603 employees that had approved work sharing 
plans in California prior to September 1979. Some 33.3 per 
cent of certified firms were manufacturing industries and
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14.1 percent were wholesale and retail industries. Interesting 
ly, firms using regular layoffs leading to UI claims were 
decisively skewed toward retail-wholesale and service in 
dustries (see table 3-5). Data on participating workers fur 
ther underscores the applicability of this program to the 
manufacturing sector. Some 75.5 percent of the 3,165 
workers who made claims for STC benefits were employed 
by firms in the manufacturing sector in comparison to 28.5 
percent of the workers making regular UI claims (see table 
3-6). This high proportion of manufacturing workers is caus 
ed by large firm size and an extremely high rate of actual 
program utilization within this sector.
In contrast to the German program, the size of firms par 
ticipating in the California program have so far been small 
rather than large. Prior to October 1979, some 85 percent of 
participating firms had fewer than 40 benefit drawing 
employees and only 4 firms had over 200 employees (see 
table 3-5). However, applications made during summer 1980 
have included firms with over 1,000 employees, indicating 
that exclusive use by small firms may not continue if par 
ticipation in the program continues to expand.
It is noteworthy that the incidence of union affiliation has 
so far been higher among Work Sharing UI claimants than 
among workers claiming regular UI benefits. Specifically, 
25.8 percent of the workers claiming Work Sharing UI up to 
September 1979 were unionized as compared to 16.5 percent 
of regular UI claimants. While the propensity of unionized 
employees to use the program requires a far more detailed 
assessment, it would appear that unionization has not deter 
red participation.
If STC programs similar to that of California were 
adopted by other states or developed as a national program, 
it is reasonable to expect that participation would increase 
gradually at an accelerating pace as the concept gains ex-
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Table 3-5
Comparison of California Firms Using
Compensation" and Regular Layoffs
'Shared Work Unemployment
Firms using 




















































































































































1. California Employment Development Department, September 30, 1979.
2. UI Claimant Characteristics Study, July 1, 1976 and June 30, 1977, Employment Data 
and Research Division, California Employment Development Department, Sacramento, 
January 1979.
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posure, and after a number of years, possibly approach a 
level of utilization comparable to that of Germany. 
Although such a level of participation is quite speculative, it 
would appear that the STC concept could be widely applied 
and significantly affect the level of aggregate full-time 
unemployment.
Social Equity and Targetability: In discussing the equity 
and targetability of short-time compensation, one must con 
sider both firms and workers. In the case of firms, the major 
equity issue concerns the possibility that employers with 
"negative balance" UI accounts 118 might use the program 
excessively. This could lead to the subsidization of the UI 
and STC program costs incurred by firms with poor employ 
ment histories by firms with better records. While this is 
possible in Germany, 119 it is not likely in California. First, 
the regular UI tax system insures that firms with a high level 
of layoffs or workweek reductions are charged for the 
resulting use of UI funds by the government. Second, 
employers participating in Work Sharing UI whose recent 
history of unemployment insurance benefit charges exceed 
their contributions ("negative reserve employers") must pay 
additional unemployment insurance taxes ranging from .5 
percent to 3.0 percent on the first $6,000 of all employee 
wages in succeeding calendar years.
Available data indicate that such special UI tax rates effec 
tively discourage the use of the California program by 
economically marginal firms. Firms that have thus far utiliz 
ed Work Sharing UI appear to have healthier UI tax account 
standings than those using layoffs leading to UI claims. 
Some 14.0 percent of the participating firms had a negative 
reserve account status (tax contributions to the UI system 
have been greater than withdrawals) in contrast to 17.5 per 
cent of firms whose workers use regular UI.
The equity issues of STC concerning workers are more 
complex and subject to value judgments than those concern-
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ing firms. While workers may vary in their views toward the 
program, available data clearly indicate that the STC con 
cept effectively spreads the hardships of work lossage more 
thinly over a larger number of emplyees. Use of the German 
program has prevented major income loss among those who 
would have otherwise been laid off, while maintaining the in 
comes of other workers at levels reasonably close to that of 
full-time employment. Data show that some 90 percent of 
German recipients do not have their STC payments limited 
by the maximum UI benefit ceiling; and among this large 
subgroup of participants, take-home incomes are almost 
always maintained at 80 to 90 percent of regular full-time 
earnings, 120 depending on the extent of worktime reductions.
The previously cited analysis of the hypothetical costs and 
benefits of one-fifth workweek reductions with the Califor 
nia program (see table 3-2) indicates that it will generally 
produce economic gains for junior workers at the expense of 
those with seniority, minimize losses to all parties due to 
reduced income taxes and Work Sharing UI benefits, im 
prove the aggregate economic well-being of the total work 
group, and provide more free time in the form of a four-day 
workweek. If the workweek is reduced from five to four 
days, high seniority workers in the top fifth earning level 
would take home a net weekly paycheck of around $268 or 
about 91 percent of the $295 they would receive under full- 
time conditions. Low seniority employees in the lowest earn 
ing levels would take home an average of $128 under Work 
Sharing UI (about 93 percent of net full-time earnings) in 
comparison to the $74 in UI benefits they would receive if 
totally laid off. The average worker would maintain about 
92 percent of his or her regular weekly take-home earnings 
under short-time.
Under Work Sharing UI, all workers would maintain 
some degree of job attachment, as well as all or most of the
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Table 3-6
Comparison of California Workers Experiencing "Shared Work










































































































































































































1. California Employment Development Department, September 30, 1979.
2. VI Claimant Characteristics Study, July 1, 1976 and June 30, 1977, Employment Data 
and Research Division, California Employment Development Department, Sacramento, 
January 1979.
fringe benefits which accompany employment. When the 
value of fringe benefits is added to net pay, the average 
employee would maintain 94.2 percent of total full-time 
"take-home" compensation as opposed to 92.5 percent 
under layoffs. Additionally, all workers experiencing reduc 
ed workweeks under the California program would have an 
additional day of free time and a higher effective per hour 
pay rate due to the partial UI income subsidy. Finally, since 
approximately one-fifth of UI applicants are judged to be in 
eligible due to inadequate base earnings, low seniority 
employees without eligibility would maintain at least partial 
wages as opposed to complete loss of income resulting from 
layoffs.
Breakdowns of Work Sharing UI claimant data by age, 
race and sex provide mixed indications of whether use of the 
program provides greater job security for low seniority and 
minority workers. The proportion of younger workers is 
lower among Work Sharing UI than regular UI claimants, 
indicating that junior workers are retained rather than laid 
off. Breakdowns by race and sex present puzzling results. If 
minorities and women are laid off before other employees, 
their proportions should be higher among regular UI claims 
than among those claiming work sharing benefits. Curious 
ly, there is little difference by sex, and the proportion of 
minorities using the Work Sharing program is higher than 
the proportion using regular unemployment insurance.
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These figures could indicate that Work Sharing UI is used 
among firms with a high incidence of minority and women 
workers, that many minorities and women are ineligible for 
UI, and therefore not counted as participants, that 
minorities are laid off prior to use of work sharing, or that 
there are inaccuracies in the available data. 121 More detailed 
analysis will be necessary to properly assess the affirmative 
action implications of the California program.
As suggested earlier, workers have varying opinions about 
the fairness or equity of using Work Sharing UI as an alter 
native to layoffs. To many, most particularly those 
vulnerable to layoffs, the STC concept can be expected to 
seem fairer than layoffs because it spreads the hardship of 
joblessness equally over many employees rather than placing 
it fully upon only a few persons. To others, principally those 
who are relatively invulnerable to layoffs, the seniority 
system might be viewed as the more equitable system for 
dealing with labor cutbacks. According to this second view 
point, employees earn privileges and job security by the 
length of time they have been employed. Thus, young per 
sons are expected to "pay their dues" by enduring job in 
security in early years so they need not worry about loss of 
work later in life. Clearly, one's view toward the equity of 
short-time compensation as opposed to layoffs will be large 
ly determined by value judgments and personal interest in 
one of the two above philosophies of job security. In 
terestingly, national attitudinal data indicates that the STC 
concept is supported by both junior and senior workers (see 
table 3-7). 122
Since use of STC is primarily a firm decision subject to 
union approval, it has been commonly assumed that firms 
will use the program in accord with specific organizational 
constraints and that targeting is unnecessary. Thus, with the 
exception of occasional discussion of possible subsidies to 
reimburse economically marginal firms for extra costs, 123 the
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program has been proposed primarily to neutralize the ex 
isting bias of the UI system toward layoffs and simply pro 
vide workweek reductions as another alternative to layoffs.
Some persons have suggested that the STC program be 
"triggered" so that benefits are availably only during 
periods of high national or regional unemployment. Under 
such provisions, the program would essentially be targeted to 
periods of cyclic downturns and not available to firms and 
work groups in accord with specific economic problems. 124 
To date, such a targeting restriction has not been given 
serious consideration.
Flexibility for Implementation and Termination: All in 
dications suggest that the short-time compensation programs 
provide a high level of flexibility in terms of implementation 
and termination. Just as in the case of layoffs with UI, short- 
time programs can be used with varying degrees of worktime 
reductions for short and intermittent periods. Firms have a 
wide range of discretion in terms of week-to-week use of 
such programs. Thus, STC can be used when the need is pre 
sent and ceased or reduced when economic conditions im 
prove.
The diversity of usage patterns indicated by data from the 
German and California programs indicates that this program 
can be flexibly applied in accord with specific and changing 
economic conditions. The extent and duration of worktime 
reductions under the German STC program vary according 
to specific firm needs. The average German beneficiary had 
his or her worktime shortened by about 40 percent and the 
duration of use has been under three months. Between 1972 
and 1977, some 92 percent of beneficiaries suffered a loss of 
worktime under 50 percent of standard hours, and 57 per 
cent experienced a worktime loss of less than 25 percent. Be 
tween June 1977 and June 1978, 56 percent of participating 
workers received benefits for under three months and only 6
Table 3-7


































































































































































Member 38.1 28.2 18.3 6.4 8.9 202
Non-member 35.5 27.5 17.7 8.3 11.1 739
Form of payment for work NA
Wage 38.5 29.1 15.4 9.8 7.2 447
Salary 32.8 28.7 19.7 6.7 12.2 345
Other 35.9 21.2 20.5 5.8 16.7 156
Hours worked weekly .0957
Under 34 42.9 29.3 13.1 6.1 8.6 198
35-39 32.4 30.4 23.5 9.8 3.9 102
40-44 35.3 27.8 16.7 9.6 10.6 436
Over 44 33.2 24.2 21.2 5.5 15.7 217
Major activity of spouse
Men NA
Not married 37.2 26.3 19.0 5.8 11.7 137
Working full-time 32.5 26.1 15.3 15.9 10.2 157
Working part-time 26.1 30.4 20.3 13.0 10.1 69
Unemployed and off-job 44.1 23.5 17.6 11.6 2.9 34
Keeping house and other 37.7 22.9 19.5 7.1 14.8 210
Women NA O^
Not married 36.5 30.4 12.2 9.6 11.3 115 jf
Working full-time 39.8 29.3 19.9 3.9 7.2 181 ^
Working part-time 27.3 36.4 18.2 0 18.2 11 ^
Unemployed and off-job 40.0 40.0 13.3 0 6.7 15 §•
Keeping house and other 61.5 15.4 23.0 00 13 g*
Sex NA
Men 34.6 26.1 18.3 9.5 11.6 613























































































































































QUESTION: Assume that it is necessary for your employer to lay off 2 out of every 10 workers for a temporary but unknown period. Assume 
also, that in order to prevent layoffs the government would give workers one-half of their pre-tax pay for each day they shorten their workweek. 
In this way, you could get regular pay for working 32 hours, get half your pre-tax pay for the day you did not work, and no one would be laid 
off. How strongly would you favor or disfavor the use of such a plan in your own work place? (A) strongly favor, (B) favor somewhat, 
(C) neutral, (D) disfavor somewhat, (E) strongly disfavor.
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percent received benefits for periods lasting longer than one 
year. 125
Available German data clearly show that utilization of 
short-time compensation varies markedly with the business 
cycle. This appears to be particularly true for the early stages 
of an economic downturn, during which firms are not sure 
whether dismissals and long term layoffs are necessary. Such 
variations of STC utilization are dramatically demonstrated 
by the rapid upsurge during the beginning of the 1975 reces 
sion, followed by a decline in use despite the fact that 
unemployment levels did not fall appreciably (see table 
3-8). I26
There are indications that the German program has some 
rigidities not evident in the United States. Some analysts 
have observed that the rapid rise in the use of STC during 
1975 was largely due to provisions of the labor and co- 
determination laws which protect workers against the loss of 
jobs by requiring advance notices of intent to lay off and 
consent of "worker councils" and labor courts. However, 
these provisions also recognize that economic considerations 
may necessitate individual and mass dismissals. The necessi 
ty for layoffs appears to have occurred during the 1974-1975 
crisis as unemployment doubled each year (1973, 273,000; 
1974, 582,000; and 1975, 1,074,000) until stabilizing at 
around one million workers for several years. The imminent 
danger of widespread bankruptcy ultimately nullified most 
of the obstacles to mass discharge. Thus, many firms laid off 
workers once the restraints of German labor law were relax 
ed.
The typical work and wage reduction utilized by par 
ticipating firms in California is 20 percent. About two-thirds 
of those participating prior to October 1979 went from five- 
day weeks to four-day weeks. About 6 percent of par 
ticipating employers chose a 10 percent worktime reduction,
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Table 3-8
























































SOURCE: Annual Report for 1976, Bundesantap Fur Arbeit, Republic of West Germany, 
pp. 8 and 65; and Arbeits-und Sozialstatistik, Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Af 
fairs, Republic of West Germany, March 1978. Data for 1977 and 1978 cited from Gunther 
Schmid, "Selective Employment Policy in West Germany: Some Evidence of Its Develop 
ment and Impact," Discussion Pape. Series, International Institute of Management, 
Berlin, July 1978, p. 14.
NOTE: Unemployment figures are based on the number of registrations at government 
Employment Service Offices. It is estimated that about 75 percent of the unemployed 
workers in West Germany register. Unemployment rates are computed on the basis of 
registered unemployment figures. 
*1978 figures are provisional.
while 28 percent chose worktime reductions of 30 percent or 
over.
Many California employers have chosen to involve only a 
portion of their total work force in the Work Sharing UI 
program. The 312 employers using the program by the end 
of September 1979 employed 14,273 workers, but only 7,603 
of these employees were included in the utilization plans. 
More specifically, only 41.7 percent of participating firms 
had over 80 percent of their total workforce using the pro 
gram (see table 3-5). It is likely that the portion of
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workforces not receiving benefits were salaried or white- 
collar employees who are not commonly subject to layoffs, 
or members of work units which continued to function at 
full level. On the other hand, the program may be used selec 
tively such that low skilled and junior employees are laid off, 
with Work Sharing UI being used to retain highly skilled or 
senior workers; or Work Sharing UI may be used for low 
skilled and junior employees while keeping other workers 
full-time. This and related issues require closer examination.
Administrative and Regulatory Efficiency: While 
anecedotal reports suggest that existing short-time compen 
sation programs have been administered effectively and effi 
ciently, 127 there has not yet been a systematic assessment of 
administrative processes. Nonetheless, some observations 
have been made about specific issues such as determination 
of need for programs, worker influence in the decision to use 
the program, ease of filing claims by workers, and benefit 
payment procedures.
Informal assessments indicate that government ad 
ministrators of short-time programs are somewhat "at the 
mercy" of firms in determining the eligibility of 
applicants. 128 The time constraints of program ad 
ministrators coupled with the lack of specific technical 
knowledge leads many to admit that they must largely 
"trust" the good intentions of firms that apply for certifica 
tion. One representative of a German firm described the 
technical advantage that most applicants have in this matter:
As the experts of the local agencies are no 
economists, they cannot judge whether the condi 
tions for the financing are fulfilled or not. They 
have to trust our explanation of the firm's 
economic situation. If we are clever, we can con 
vince the * experts.' Nobody can judge if the loss of 
hours worked is only bypassing or if it will be 
finished after a certain period. 129
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Given these circumstances, the major goal of program ad 
ministrators is to monitor for obvious abuses and seek to 
weed out users that have little chance of recovery. As such, 
only 5 percent of applicants for German STC certification 
are denied and the vast majority of these are due to unlikely 
recovery. 130 Despite the apparent shortcomings of this cer 
tification procedure, there are few indications of program 
abuses. 131
In the interest of encouraging employer participation in 
the California program and in an attempt to keep 
"bureaucratic red tape" to a minimum, administration of 
the program has been kept simple. Employers are only re 
quired to call or write for a two-page application form, pro 
vide basic information identifying employees, state that 
worktime reductions are economically necessary, and submit 
information on the amount of wage and hour reductions. If 
the application is approved, participating employers provide 
their participating employees with a weekly statement of 
reduced hours and wages which employees then use to claim 
Work Sharing UI benefits.
German labor law requires that employer decisions to 
reduce workweeks or lay off workers must be done with the 
agreement of Worker Councils established within most 
firms. 132 As such, the decision to participate is almost always 
a joint labor-management concurrence. Worker Council 
consent concerning the use of STC is binding upon the entire 
affected staff of an enterprise or department involved. 
Dissenting workers can only terminate employment to avoid 
a shorter workweek. 133 The German program appears to 
allow firms considerable discretion in determining what por 
tions of their workforces go on short-time and how use of 
short-time is adjusted over time. Employers are allowed to 
transfer workers within the firm, and a moderate amount of 
discharges and new hiring is allowed as long as the over 
whelming portion of employees maintain their jobs. 134
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Workers in Germany appear to be generally willing to let 
management take the initiative in deciding whether or not to 
useSTC. 135
The California program was designed to interfere as little 
as possible with existing labor-management relationships. 
Participation in the program is strictly voluntary for 
employers. However, the union bargaining agent must agree 
to the plan if participating employees are covered by a collec 
tive bargaining agreement. Where no such agreement exists, 
the employer is free to make the participation decision 
unilaterally. Experience to date suggests that the decision to 
participate is mutually agreeable to workers and firms.
Like German STC, the California program is intended to 
prevent layoffs. However, unlike its German counterpart, 
California employers are not required to "document" or 
prove that a reduction in hours cannot be avoided. Nor are 
employers prevented from laying off some workers before or 
after beginning use of the program. The question of fringe 
benefit continuation (health insurance, retirement, etc.) is 
not addressed in the California legislation and therefore is 
left to each employer. No restrictions are placed upon the 
employer's operation of his or her business, including 
discharges, transfers, and new hires. Additionally, the 
number of participants as well as the original wage and hour 
reduction assigned by the employer may be easily changed by 
means of written notification to the Employment Develop 
ment Department. Restrictions on workers who participate 
are also kept to a minimum.
Once eligibility is determined for the German program, 
the Federal Labor Institute authorizes the payment of 
specified benefit amounts to workers. The firm pays these 
benefits directly to its employees, and is in turn reimbursed 
for these expenditures by the government. Short-time 
benefits are tax free. 136 However, these benefits are reduced
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in the amount of 50 percent of all earnings taken in by recip 
ients for work performed elsewhere in excess of the reduced 
work hours provided by the primary employer. 137
In California, workers receive Work Sharing UI benefits 
directly from the state by mail. However, an initial claim 
must be filed personally by each worker at a local branch of 
fice of the Employment Development Department. Benefits 
are not taxable under California law but are taxable, to the 
same extent as regular UI benefits, under federal law. There 
are restrictions on outside or extra work. Workers who either 
"moonlight" or perform work in excess of the "reduced" 
hours originally assigned by their employers have 100 per 
cent of such earnings deducted from their benefits.
Workers whose employers have stated that Work Sharing 
UI will be used as a temporary measure (defined as fewer 
than 10 weeks) are automatically exempted from the normal 
work search requirements that regular unemployment in 
surance recipients must adhere to. Employers who state that 
their expected downturn will last longer than 10 weeks but 
who believe that the downturn is nevertheless "temporary" 
in nature may also have employees exempted from the nor 
mal work search requirements simply by providing an ex 
planation as to why they believe the downturn to be tem 
porary. If, however, employers expecting a permanent 
workforce reduction use the program as a transition 
mechanism allowing employees to look for new jobs while 
working reduced work hours, those workers receiving 
benefits must adhere to the work search requirement of the 
regular UI system. During the first 15 months of the pro 
gram's existence, only one employer with five workers has 
used STC in this fashion.
Of the 7,603 California workers approved to receive Work 
Sharing UI benefits by September 1979, only 3,165 actually 
filed claims. Preliminary indications are that many
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employers who obtained certification because they expected 
to lay off or cut workweeks ultimately found use of the pro 
gram to be unnecessary. Additionally, it appears that a 
notable portion of employees within participating firms have 
failed to submit their claims for Work Sharing UI benefits. 
The reason for and extent of failure to file claims are yet to 
be discerned. Since the claim procedure is no more complex 
than that required for regular UI, it is likely that many 
workers do not find the benefits to be worth the effort of fil 
ing.
Secondary Social Impacts: While short-time compensation 
programs appear to be one of the most promising ap 
proaches to sharing work, they would produce little in the 
way of secondary social benefits. It has been suggested that 
the concept might be used as part of a long term economic 
adjustment strategy by freeing workers for retraining ac 
tivities. 138 However, little policy analysis has so far been 
directed to this possibility. While the increase of free time 
fostered by STC programs would doubtless have some social 
utility, 139 the short-term and unpredictable nature of such 
free-time gains will limit the benefits that can be expected. 
Finally, there is some possibility that the use of STC during 
macroeconomic downturns will bolster the consumer con 
fidence of workers and thus have some impact as a counter 
cyclical stabilizer.
While there are still many unanswered questions, available 
information suggests that the short-time compensation con 
cept might be successfully applied within the United States. 
Certainly this program does not provide a comprehensive 
means of combating all types of unemployment. It can do lit 
tle to help persons who are without work because they have 
just entered or re-entered the labor force. Nor is it likely to 
provide much assistance to those who have already been laid 
off for a period of time or voluntarily left their jobs. 
However, short-time compensation does have the potential
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to prevent full-time joblessness among the three to five 
million American workers unemployed because of layoffs 
and who comprise about half of the unemployed 
population. 140
Despite the potentials of short-time compensation, there 
are many reservations which must be dealt with prior to its 
widespread application in the United States. Many represen 
tatives of organized labor have expressed grave concern 
with, and sometimes outright opposition to, the concept. 
Foremost among the concerns expressed by union represen 
tatives has been the fear that use of STC would disrupt hard 
won seniority provisions and established union procedures. 
Particularly, it has been suggested that layoffs according to 
seniority are fair and that use of shorter workweeks as an 
alternative to layoffs would lead to wage losses among 
higher paid senior workers that would not be adequately 
replaced by short-time benefits. Additionally, there is con 
cern that use of the program would stimulate work group 
conflicts leading to a reduction of union solidarity and 
bargaining power, present numerous administrative com 
plications which would effectively prevent certain types of 
workers from receiving benefits, encourage firms to instigate 
greater aggregate worktime reductions than would be the 
case under layoffs, and reduce political pressures for policies 
creating full employment. 141
Members of the business community have also expressed 
concern that the program would ultimately be imposed on 
firms, encourage unions to push for shorter workweeks, and 
subsidize economically marginal firms at the expense of 
healthy firms. While these reservations are not unanimously 
expressed by all sectors and levels of labor and business, 142 
they do represent important issues that must be resolved 
prior to acceptance of short-time compensation as a major 
social policy.
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(6) Welfare and Income 
Maintenance Programs
While very few persons have suggested a linkage between 
income maintenance programs and work sharing, 143 it is well 
documented that increases in the coverage and benefit 
amounts provided by these programs tend to foster 
withdrawal from work and labor force participation. 144 Con 
sciously and unconsciously, industrial countries have 
developed and pursued income maintenance programs which 
allow and encourage less productive workers to withdraw 
from work in favor of more competitive workers. 145 These 
income maintenance programs effectively subsidize 
worktime reductions and have become powerful deter 
minants of the ways employment is distributed, just as do 
retirement pensions and student aids.
The relationship between income maintenance programs 
and the distribution of work will be further explored in the 
final chapter. In the meantime, it suffices to say that both 
the economic and social costs of these programs have reach 
ed staggering proportions. In many cases, it is apparent that 
there are no humane alternatives. However, the impact of 
these programs on time-income trade-offs (primarily the 
decision to work or not to work) should be constantly ex 
amined in order to monitor their effects on the distribution 
of work.
Overview
With the exception of short-time compensation, most pro 
grams which subsidize the reduction of worktime tend to be 
extremely costly and frequently inefficient as a means of 
transforming worktime to employment for those who are 
jobless. However, many of these programs have been pro 
posed and implemented for reasons other than the sharing of 
employment. While most of them may not be justified in
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terms of work sharing alone, their effects on the distribution 
of work may provide notable but limited opportunities for 
combating unemployment.
LIMITATION OF WORKTIME
A large portion of current discussion about work sharing 
concerns proposals to legislatively mandate limits to the 
amount of time that persons may work. Foremost among 
these proposals under consideration are restrictions on over 
time, reduction of governmentally sanctioned standard 
workweeks, mandatory vacations, forced retirement, and 
compulsory education. While many of these work limitation 
proposals have been combined with each other, as well as 
with other types of work sharing, each of these specific ap 
proaches will be discussed separately.
(7) Restriction of Overtime
The idea of transferring overtime hours into jobs for the 
unemployed has been applied in most industrial nations and 
still receives considerable attention as a potential employ 
ment policy. 146 To illustrate why many persons find this ap 
proach to be attractive, the total number of overtime hours 
for U.S. production workers was estimated to be about 2.4 
billion in 1974. If this overtime could be transferred to per 
sons seeking employment, about 1 million full-time jobs 
might be created. 147 While some proposals have sought to 
reduce overtime by mandatory limitation, 148 most proposals 
of ths sort seek to discourage overtime by requiring 
employers to pay higher rates to workers on overtime. 149 For 
example, it is now frequently proposed that overtime pay be 
increased from time-and-a-half to double-time within the 
United States in order to intensify disincentives to the use of 
overtime by employers. 150 The general assumption here is 
that such "overtime penalties" would be a flexible but per-
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suasive means of encouraging employers to hire new workers 
rather than put existing personnel on overtime.
The idea of creating new jobs by limiting overtime has 
risen to the forefront of policy debates a number of times the 
last several decades. The first major policy implementation 
of the idea took form in the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) of 1938. This law defined the standard workweek as 
44 hours in 1938, 42 in 1940 and the current 40 hours by 
1941. Hours worked by employees over this defined standard 
workweek were to be paid at time-and-a-half the regular pay 
rate. 151 In subsequent years, occasional wage controls and 
tax incentives fostered dramatic and ongoing growth of fixed 
labor costs in the form of fringe benefits (see table 2-2). 152 
Thus, it has been claimed that such fixed costs of labor have 
increased the cost of new hiring and encouraged employers 
to use overtime rather than employing additional workers to 
obtain needed labor. 153 This point of view caused organized 
labor to renew its push for a higher overtime premium dur 
ing the early 1960s. 154 This push culminated in an unsuc 
cessful 1964 proposal from the Johnson Administration to 
amend the FLSA to impose a double-time pay premium for 
overtime in selected industries. 155 National discussion and 
legislative proposals of this sort have surfaced on a near an 
nual basis since 1964. 156 Similarly, state legislation to outlaw 
mandatory overtime in California was barely defeated, but 
this proposal was primarily intended to prevent worktime 
abuses rather than create jobs. 157
The effect of an increased overtime premium on economic 
productivity and prices is not clear. It is admitted by pro 
ponents and opponents alike that such a premium increase 
would not dissuade all overtime. In many cases, overtime is 
unavoidable because of unpredictable employee absences, 
machinery breakdowns and rush orders. 158 However, there is 
disagreement on how much overtime is unavoidable, with 
estimates ranging from 25 percent 159 to the largest portion of
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overtime. 160 Whatever the figure, it can be assumed that an 
increased premium will lead to greater labor costs for those 
employees supplying unavoidable overtime work. 161 In the 
case of avoidable overtime, the impact of a higher premium 
on production and prices will depend on the extra costs 
resulting from new hiring as compared to use of more expen 
sive overtime.
One informative assessment of the respective costs under 
the current time-and-a-half premium pay indicates that "it is 
much more expensive to meet an increase in labor demand by 
working overtime than by adding employees if no considera 
tion is given to turnover costs" (turnover costs are the ex 
penses of hiring and training). 162 However, turnover costs 
can be high. For example, it has been suggested by one 
source that the relative benefits of new hiring do not surpass 
the costs of overtime until a new worker has been employed 
for at least six months. 163 While such costs vary tremendous 
ly from firm to firm, it can only be speculated that the 
relative costs of new employment are generally only slightly 
less than commensurate overtime.
The issue of costs therefore appears to focus on the 
premium pay level that would be required to dissuade use of 
overtime and stimulate new hiring. Computations which will 
be reviewed shortly (table 3-9) indicate that a double-time- 
and-a-half premium would be necessary to foster significant 
reduction of overtime in favor of hiring, and that this would 
lead to a direct 8 percent increase in the average hourly costs 
of labor among employees working four hours overtime a 
week with premium pay, and much greater hourly labor 
costs among those working longer. If significant portions of 
existing overtime is not replaced by employment, or if the 
costs of new employment are only marginally less expensive 
than such overtime, this would likely lead to a slight increase 
in the average hourly costs of labor and some rise of 
prices. 164 Of course, such effects would be somewhat
Table 3-9
Percentage Change of Average Hourly Labor Costs from Alternative Overtime Pay Premiums
(fringe benefits comprising 35 percent of standard weekly pay)























































































































































NOTE: Computations based on a $5.00 hourly gross pay rate with fixed fringe benefits with a dollar value equal to 35 percent of gross hourly 
wages for 40 hours of work per week. Thus, total average weekly pay and average hourly pay incorporates both wage and benefits. The percent 
change in average hourly pay due to overtime remains constant for all wage levels as long as percent expenditure on fringe benefits remains cons- 
tant.
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counterbalanced by the likelihood that newly hired workers 
would have lower pay levels than those already employed.
Whether or not a higher overtime premium would create 
new jobs is largely dependent on three factors. First, the ex 
tent of job creation would depend on the proportion of cur 
rent overtime that is avoidable by new hiring. If large por 
tions are unavoidable or of such short duration that new hir 
ing is unjustified, few new jobs will be created. Second, new 
job creation would be affected by the costs of overtime 
relative to those of new hiring. Illustrative computations in 
dicate that the current time-and-a-half premium has little im 
pact as a deterrent of overtime, particularly during the first 
few hours of work over 40 hours (see table 3-9). Thus, as 
previously noted, a premium of double-and-a-half or triple- 
time would be necessary to significantly deter overtime. If 
the costs of new hiring are amply lower than such overtime, a 
significant degree of added employment could result. Third, 
if the costs of overtime and new hiring are high enough, 
employers might intensify investment in labor saving capital 
or simply curtail production and the use of labor.
Estimates on the extent of job creation that might be ex 
pected from a higher overtime premium vary greatly. One 
study estimated that a double-time premium would reduce 
overtime by 48 percent, increase the number of employed 
workers by 2 percent, and result in a net loss of 4 percent of 
previously existing aggregate worktime because time lost as 
overtime would be greater than that gained in the form of 
new jobs. 165 Another source has estimated that employment 
would be increased by 1.6 percent, but no assessment was 
made of the aggregate worktime gain or loss. 166
Available data can be used to assess the potential impact 
of higher overtime premiums on aggregate employment and 
unemployment. This data indicate that the absolute max 
imum number of new jobs that could be created by an effec-
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tive overtime premium would amount to no more than 1.8 
million (for the 1978 labor force), and that the actual in 
crease of jobs would be considerably lower. Long work 
hours and incidence of premium pay have remained relative 
ly constant for the last several decades (see table 3-10). 167 Of 
the 69.5 million U.S. employees working full-time during 
May 1978, some 19 million (27.3 percent) worked over 40 
hours (see table 3-11). Of these 19 million overtime workers, 
some 42.9 percent (8.1 million) received premium pay and 
were therefore vulnerable to the effects of a higher overtime 
pay rate. 168 Since available data show that average weekly 
overtime amounts to about nine hours a week, 169 there were 
about 73 million hours or a maximum of 1.8 million full- 
time jobs that could be gained from a transfer of overtime to 
new hiring. If it is reasonable to assume that only half of ex 
isting overtime is avoidable, 170 this leaves the likely level of 
new employment that might result from an effective over 
time premium to about 900,000 jobs. Presumably, a large 
portion of such employment gains would occur in industrial 
sectors using production workers (see tables 3-10 and 
3-12). 171
The likelihood that higher overtime premiums would 
benefit and create jobs for selective occupational groups 
raises some questions about the equity of such an approach 
to work sharing. There would be little gain in overtime pay 
or job creation for most white-collar employees, most cer 
tainly those receiving salaries. Perhaps more important, 
there may be some questions about the fairness of major in 
creases of the overtime premium for workers employed 
under circumstances where long hours are unavoidable and 
therefore not transferable to new employment.
Increasing the overtime premium is likely to prove to be 
somewhat inflexible in terms of implementation and ter 
mination. Because such an approach requires statutory ac 
tion, it is not likely to be altered rapidly to meet changing
Table 3-10
Percent of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers Who Worked Long Weeks and Percent of Those Working Long
Weeks Who Received Premium Pay; by Industry Group, May 1973 - May 1978
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SOURCE: George D. Stamas, "Working a Long Week and Getting Premium Pay," Monthly Labor Review, May 1979, p. 4. 
1. Includes postal service.
Table 3-11
Incidence of Long Hours and Premium Pay, May 1978 (full-time work force)
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SOURCE: Joyce M. Nussbaum and Donald E. Wise, "The Overtime Pay Premium and 
Employment" Work Time and Employment, Special Report No. 28, National Commission 
for Employment Policy, Washington, DC, 1979 (data originally cited from Employment 
and Earnings, United States, 1909-75, U.S. Department of Labor).
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social conditions. In the same way that the current time-and- 
a-half premium has remained stable for over four decades 
despite its alleged impotence as a deterrent to overtime, a 
major increase of the premium could remain unchangeable 
despite the emergence of conditions that would make such a 
premium ineffective or inadvisable. At the same time, it 
must also be noted that the statutory overtime premium is 
not totally inflexible. One of the most attractive features of 
this approach is that it does not directly mandate shorter 
hours. While the overtime premium is somewhat inflexible, 
employers have the institutional flexibility to decide whether 
or not to use overtime under the premium pay requirements 
set by law.
There appear to be some limits to the efficient and effec 
tive administration of statutory overtime premiums. Early in 
the development of the current FLSA overtime statutes, it 
was recognized that it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to impose overtime premiums in some industrial sectors. 172 
The problems of enforcing these premiums proved to be par 
ticularly difficult among non-union workers and certain 
other sectors. As a result, the law has been applied, and is 
likely to be applied, selectively because of the difficulty of 
monitoring and enforcement in some sectors. Thus, we find 
that 64.7 percent of all workers receiving overtime premiums 
in 1978 were among the roughly 21 percent of the American 
labor force that are unionized, and only 42.9 percent of all 
employees working overtime in 1978 received premium pay 
(see table 3-10). 173
The only major secondary social benefit that can be ex 
pected from an increased overtime premium is the possibility 
that it would discourage abuses and social ills related to pro 
longed hours of work. While there are certainly an ample 
number of workers who welcome and seek overtime, 174 there 
is also a notable incidence of human hardship resulting from 
mandatory impositions of long hours. 175 Even in cases where
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workers willingly accept overtime, there have been reports of 
resulting lack of attention to personal and family matters 
that might be attenuated by an overall reduction of prolong 
ed hours.
The impact of the premium pay approach to limiting over 
time and creating jobs depends heavily on the extent of pay 
increases mandated over the standard workweek and 
avoidability of overtime to employers. These issues are clear 
ly controversial. While the overall job creating and price in 
flating potentials of a higher overtime premium are 
speculative, this approach may have some value as a work 
sharing strategy. 176 Most particularly, harsh disincentives for 
overly prolonged hours, targeted and perhaps graduated 
premium pay requirements, expansion of the standard 
workweek time frame to months or years, and requirements 
that employees working overtime be given "compensatory 
time off* could enhance the viability of sharing employment 
via overtime limitation. 177 Further, neutralization of fixed 
labor cost barriers to new hiring, 178 which will be discussed in 
a later section, could increase the effectiveness of this ap 
proach. As an overview, Joseph Garbarino aptly summariz 
ed the likely results of this approach as, "a combination of 
more pay for those workers whose overtime is really 
unavoidable, a reduction of total overtime worked, and 
some increase in employment." 179
(8) Reduction of the Standard Workweek
Mandatory premium overtime pay rates require the 
establishment of a standard workweek as a benchmark for 
the instigation of overtime. For example, the United States 
and many other nations have defined their standard 
workweek as 40 hours, thus requiring that employees work 
ing more than 40 hours during a given week should receive 
overtime pay. A leading work sharing policy, which is often 
combined with higher overtime pay, is reduction of the stan-
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dard workweek. This would result in the overtime pay penal 
ty going into effect sooner, creating an incentive for 
employers to cut the workweek and presumably hire addi 
tional workers.
The concept of reducing the standard workweek has been 
at once the most applied and the most controversial of work 
sharing policies. As noted earlier, this approach was not only 
proposed, but implemented in the form of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938. In most cases, the temporary work 
sharing undertaken by individual firms during the depression 
era prior to the passage of this act had already reduced the 
average workweek below the 40 hour standard established by 
this legislation (see table 1-1). Nonetheless, it is commonly 
agreed that limitation of the workweek deterred resumption 
of long hours in subsequent years. Ultimately, however, the 
growth of fixed labor costs such as health insurance and pen 
sion programs has led many observers to suggest that this ap 
proach may no longer be an effective deterrent to long 
workweeks. 180
Perpetuation of high unemployment during the 1970s 
revitalized interest in this approach to work sharing and 
catalyzed the formation of an alliance of labor leaders to 
promote a phased reduction of the standard workweek from 
40 to 35 hours. 181 In the United States, the forefront of this 
movement took the form of the All Unions Committee to 
Shorten the Workweek. This group held its first national 
convention during April 1978, 182 and has come to actively 
support federal legislation to implement its goal. 183
The impact of this proposed reduction of the standard 
workweek on the costs of production would depend largely, 
but not solely, on whether workers would receive the same 
weekly pay for a reduced workweek as they would for the 
current workweek. If all workers earned the same pay level, 
the direct increase in the hourly cost of labor would be about
13 2 Policy Options
14 percent if the standard workweek was effectively shorten 
ed to 35 hours without a pay loss. Of course, workers' in 
comes do vary substantially, and new workers hired to 
replace lost worktime would commonly receive low, junior- 
level pay. One of the most recent studies indicate that a 
reduction of the standard workweek to 35 hours without a 
weekly pay loss would increase the hourly costs of labor be 
tween 6 and 8 percent. 184 While the most recent legislation 
submitted on this issue does not guarantee maintenance of 
weekly pay levels, labor leaders have tended to assure their 
members that weekly earnings would not be cut. 185 As such, 
there is some question about the extent to which a legislated 
workweek reduction would directly increase the hourly costs 
of labor. 186
A mandatory limitation of the standard workweek would 
also be likely to increase production costs in a number of in 
direct ways. First and foremost, such a contraction of the 
workweek would tend to create a shortage of labor, growth 
in the competition for workers among employers, and a 
resultant bidding up of pay levels to attract needed 
employees. 187 In many cases, the skills of newly hired 
workers may be lower than existing occupational norms, 
leading in some measure to less output for higher labor 
costs. 188 Correspondingly, some organizations may sustain 
added costs due to technical difficulties confronted in ad 
justing to a universally mandated 35-hour workweek. 189 
Additionally, the per hour costs of fixed fringe benefit ex 
penditures would increase for all employees with reduced 
workweeks (see table 2-2). At the same time, advocates of 
the shorter standard workweek argue that the growth of ag 
gregate consumer income brought about by increased 
employment would stimulate economic growth by expanding 
overall market demand. 190 While the issue of costs and im 
pacts on productivity remains controversial, most analysts 
tend to agree that a mandatory reduction of the standard
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workweek would significantly increase the costs of produc 
tion and prove to be highly inflationary. 191
While it is commonly agreed that a reduction of the stan 
dard workweek would redistribute existing worktime to 
create jobs, there is disagreement over the number of jobs 
that would be created and the permanence of such employ 
ment gains. Simplistic calculations indicate that the max 
imum number of full-time jobs that might be created would 
amount to 9.6 million for the 1978 labor force (full-time jobs 
being redefined as 35 hours a week). 192 However, more 
precise speculations indicate a new job yield that is substan 
tially lower. Only 67.3 million of the 100.4 million persons 
employed in 1978 were working over 35 hours a week, and 
some 50.5 million of these had workweeks between 35 and 40 
hours (see table 3-11). The ten million maximum job creation 
noted above was computed on the assumption that all of 
those working over 35 hours would forfeit five hours of their 
workweeks to create new positions, a figure that should 
realistically be cut drastically because the average person 
employed between 35 and 40 hours a week is likely to work 
significantly under 40 hours. Indeed, even the 8.7 million 
new jobs figure claimed by the All Unions Committee for the 
Shorter Workweek appears unduly high. 193
The job yield from a 35-hour standard workweek would 
be even further limited by other factors. The impact of a 
lower statutory workweek on the length of actual workweeks 
would depend upon the effectiveness of the premium pay re 
quirement as a deterrent to overtime. If, as many maintain, 
the current time-and-a-half premium is an adequate deter 
rent, the premium would have to be raised significantly 
before it would prevent workweeks over 35 hours to any 
notable degree.
Of more importance, the analysis of the previous section 
indicates that the existing universal overtime premium re-
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quirement has been applied selectively. In short, less than 
half of those legally eligible for overtime pay received such 
compensation in 1978 (see tables 3-11 and 3-12), and most of 
those receiving premium pay were unionized and in the pro 
duction trades. 194 For the most part, the overtime premium 
does not appear to be applied outside of the roughly 21 per 
cent of the U.S. labor force that are members of unions. 
Thus, one can expect that failure to enforce the overtime 
premium and the willingness of many employers to sustain 
the costs of overtime wages to maintain desired work hours 
will drastically cut the job creating potentials of a shorter 
standard workweek.
Finally, firm tendencies to displace workers with capital 
and organizational efficiencies due to the higher costs of 
labor resulting from shorter workweeks, 195 coupled with the 
problems of finding new employees with the skills required 
to make up for worktime reductions among current 
employees, 196 is likely to create a situation where the number 
of new jobs created will not be equal to the worktime 
foregone due to a lower standard workweek.
All in all, estimation of the number of new jobs that might 
be created by this approach to work sharing is extremely 
speculative. However, one can be reasonably sure that the 
number would be substantially lower than half of the 8.7 
million that some claim might be created. 197 Indeed, one rele 
vant British study conducted in 1978 estimated that a reduc 
tion of the standard workweek from 40 to 35 hours would 
only create between .5 and 2 percent more jobs—roughly 
one-half to two million new jobs in terms of the 1978 U.S. 
labor force. 198
The equity issues associated with reducing the standard 
workweek are similar to those previously discussed for the 
higher overtime premium. Briefly, available data indicate 
that actual enforcement of such a provision would likely be
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limited to unionized workers and firms. Thus, the burden of 
higher production costs would likely be borne by select in 
dustries or consumers in general, while the economic gains 
and job yield would likewise be focused on limited categories 
of workers. Further, most analysts tend to believe that this 
approach to work sharing would be exceedingly 
inflationary, 199 and thus drastically complicate the economic 
problems of those persons seeking to maintain their standard 
of living on fixed incomes.
For the most part, the flexibility for implementing and ter 
minating a shorter standard workweek would be low. While 
there have been some suggestions that the standard 
workweek be adjusted automatically in response to the level 
of unemployment, 200 workweek standards to date have prov 
en to be extremely difficult to change. Thus, it is likely that 
such an approach would not be easily adjusted in response to 
changing social and economic conditions.
As already noted, the successful enforcement of the stan 
dard workweek and overtime premium has been limited. 
Aside from employees who are unionized or within work en 
vironments constantly under government surveillance, the 
experience to date has been that workweek restrictions are 
near impossible to enforce, and that a serious effort to apply 
such work limitations would require a large and costly 
regulatory apparatus.
The secondary social benefits that might be derived from a 
successfully implemented shorter workweek would be 
moderate. Added free time would certainly enhance the 
quality of life, 201 although most data show that contem 
porary workers prefer other types of free time, such as vaca 
tions. 202 Of course, the way in which a shorter workweek is 
scheduled will determine the utility of added free time to in 
dividuals. For example, parents in dual-earner families 
might place great value on shorter workdays while others
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might prefer fewer but longer workdays during each week. 
For some lines of work, the shorter week would reduce 
fatigue and presumably job related injuries.
All in all, proposals for sharing employment by amending 
the Fair Labor Standards Act to reduce the standard 
workweek are among the least attractive of existing work 
sharing options. Most persons who have studied this ap 
proach have concluded that it would likely reduce produc 
tivity, foster higher prices for the consumer, and possibly 
even decrease aggregate employment over the long-run due 
to intensified capitalization of the production process 
brought about by higher labor costs. 203 Of course, it should 
be noted that some compromise between total loss of pay 
and no pay loss for workweek reductions could alter the 
negative impacts associated with this proposal within 
economic sectors where a lower standard workweek could be 
enforced.
(9) Mandatory Vacations
Many European nations have legislated mandatory 
minimum vacations. For example, by the mid-1970s 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France had statutes which 
set a minimum of three weeks vacation for all workers. 204 
Sweden insures even more in the way of vacation rights. In 
1980, all workers were guaranteed five weeks of paid vaca 
tion by law. It has occasionally been suggested that such 
mandated vacations might reduce the size of the labor force 
and thus alleviate unemployment. 205
In many ways, the pros and cons of using mandatory vaca 
tions as a work sharing approach are similar to those review 
ed in this volume's prior sections on the sabbatical leave. 
Whether or not mandatory vacation laws would guarantee 
continuity of pay during absence from work is not always 
stated in proposals. If pay was maintained during vacations
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by the government or employers, the result would likely be 
inflationary, although such inflationary impacts would 
probably vary in relation to the length of vacations. 
Specifically, each added week of paid vacation would be ex 
pected to increase the costs of labor by about 2 percent. Fur 
ther, it has been suggested that vacations would have to be 
extremely long or evenly distributed among employees over 
the work year before most employers would hire new 
workers to make up for labor lost as a result of annual 
leaves. 206 . Nonetheless, extended vacations such as those 
guaranteed in Sweden could have employment impacts that 
merit further investigation.
(10) Forced Retirement
Over the last several decades, many organizations have in 
stigated policies which make retirement mandatory or almost 
mandatory at a preset age. In the United States, for example, 
evidence suggests that about 45 percent of employers pro 
viding private pension plans had such provisions in 1974. 207 
Such forced retirement has been initiated in large part to 
allow employers to replace highly paid senior employees with 
lower paid and possibly better trained junior workers, 208 pro 
vide management with a palatable mechanism for ter 
minating less productive older workers, 209 and insure ad 
vancement opportunities for younger employees. 210 These 
retirement regulations certainly influence the distribution of 
work among age groups and have, therefore, been viewed as 
a potential work sharing device. 211
Without belaboring the point, it is sufficient to suggest 
that the progressive lowering of compulsory retirement age 
has resulted in growing resistance to mandatory termination 
on the basis of age. 212 As an indication of this resistance, two 
nationally representative surveys conducted in 1974 and 1977 
found that 86 percent agreed that "nobody should be forced 
to retire because of age if he wants to continue working and
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is still able to do the job." 213 As a result of this consensus, 
national and state laws have been passed making forced 
retirement illegal. Thus, it would appear that forced retire 
ment, whether publicly or privately instigated, is now in- 
feasible and is likely to become an increasingly improbable 
option for sharing work.
(11) Compulsory Education
The United States and other nations have statutes requir 
ing young persons to remain in school up to a specified age. 
Most of these statutes have been enacted to guarantee 
custodial guidance and a minimum level of educational at 
tainment for all children and youth. 214 As a result, the 
minimum ages for leaving school are relatively low, generally 
set at 15 or 16 years. 215 Such compulsory education laws have 
work sharing implications in that they attenuate competition 
for employment by delaying the labor force entry of young 
persons. However, existing minimum schooling re 
quirements are commonly well below the age at which the 
vast majority of young persons complete their formal educa 
tions, and it is generally conceded that enforcement of 
significantly increased minimum schooling would be almost 
impossible. 216 As such, work limitation via compulsory 
schooling appears to be an inadvisable approach to 
redistributing employment. In fact, more has been said 
about lowering working age limits to allow opportunity for 
work experiences as an alternative to schooling for some 
young persons.
Overview
In overview, programs to spread employment among a 
larger number of persons by imposing limitations on the 
workweek, workyear or worklife appear to be costly, unen 
forceable and generally unacceptable in terms of constrain 
ing individual freedom. Increased overtime restriction may
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have some potential for redistributing work, but problems 
would have to be overcome to insure the avoidance of undue 
cost and inflexibility. Mandatory reduction of the standard 
workweek would be highly inflationary if not accompanied 
by a commensurate or partial pay reduction, and politically 
infeasible with significant pay reductions. Expanded vaca 
tions could be costly and would be unlikely to create new 
jobs unless vacations were greatly prolonged or intricately 
scheduled. Finally, compulsory retirement and schooling 
laws would be extremely unpopular, occasionally illegal, and 
probably impossible to enforce.
LONG TERM TIME-INCOME TRADE-OFFS
It has been proposed that worktime be reduced gradually 
over the course of several years by forfeiting portions of pay 
raises made possible by economic growth or promotions in 
exchange for more free time. If potential macroeconomic 
output were to be maintained, the resulting decline of 
worktime would make it necessary for employers to hire 
more workers in order to maintain potential economic out 
put. Organized labor has been a major advocate of this ap 
proach, proposing that worktime reductions primarily tak 
ing the form of shorter workweeks be accomplished through 
the collective bargaining process with the possible assistance 
of incentives from the government. 217
A recent updating of earlier computations by Juanita 
Kreps and Joseph Spengler in 1966 indicate that rather 
remarkable increases of free time could be gained by forego 
ing a portion of moderate projections of economic 
growth. 218 Working from projections of "slow" economic 
growth prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, an 
updating of these earlier computations show how much free 
time the average American worker might expect to gain by 
the year 2000 if one-third of predicted real economic growth
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were to be exchanged for more leisure. As figure 3 
demonstrates, the number of hours worked per year by the 
average worker would decline from 1,911 in 1976 to 1,598 in 
the year 2000. If individuals could have their choice of the 
form this increased leisure might take, the average worker 
could have a 33-hour workweek, or an 11-week paid vaca 
tion each year, or a 13-month paid sabbatical leave every 
seven years, or retirement at the age of 56, or some combina 
tion of the above options (see table 3-13 for 
computations). 219
Previously cited responses from a 1978 nationally 
representative survey of American workers indicates that 
there may be widespread support for such a gradual ap 
proach to reducing worktime and sharing employment (see 
table 2-3). 22 ° As already noted, the average American worker 
stated a desire to trade almost two-thirds of a 10 percent pay 
raise for five alternative forms of free time. If workers were 
willing to make the kind of time-income exchanges indicated 
by this survey three times over the next twelve years, the total 
number of hours worked each year by the average employee 
would decline from about 1,900 in 1978 to about 1,500 in 
1990. 221 The first of these four-year trade-offs would result 
in a reduction of the average worker's annual worktime by 
approximately 130 hours. For a labor force of 100 million, 
this would amount to an aggregate forfeiture of about 12.6 
billion work hours or 6.2 million full-time work years. 222 
Assuming that potential aggregate economic output is main 
tained, some portion of this foregone worktime would 
become jobs for those who are unemployed.
These computations suggest tremendous potential for long 
term worktime reductions that could significantly attenuate 
unemployment. They also raise the questions of how social 
policies might encourage such long term time-income ex 
changes, and whether an acceptable portion of the worktime 
foregone in this fashion would be transformed into new
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Figure 3
Alternative Uses of Economic Growth in GNP Per Capita and Hours 
Worked, 1976-2000 (Based on extrapolations of BLS "slower recovery" 
economic projections)
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SOURCE: Computed on the basis of economic growth, labor force, and total population 
projections cited from Charles Bowman and Terry Morlan, "Revised Projections of the 
U.S. Economy to 1980 and 1985," Monthly Labor Review, March 1976; Howard Fuller- 
ton, "Revised Projections of the Labor Force to 1990," Monthly Labor Review, December 
1976; and Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1976, Series E Projections, p. 394.
Table 3-13
Projected Growth of Productivity and Possible Use of Potential Free Time, 1975-2000
(Bureau of Labor Statistics "slower recovery" projections and extrapolations to 2000,1972 dollars)




























































































































SOURCES: Actual and projected adjusted GNP: GNP for 1975 from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976, p. 394. Projections for 
1980 and 1985 from "slower recovery" computations by Charles Bowman and Terry Morlan, "Revised Projections of the U.S. Economy to 
1980 and 1985. Monthly Labor Review, March 1976; and 1990, 1995 and 2000 projections computed by extrapolation of a linear regression bas 
ed on data and projections from 1965 to 1985. GNP figures adjusted to compensate for .25 percent potential GNP exchanged for free time in 
BLS projections. Actual and projected GNP per capita is the dollar value of average adjusted GNP per person in U.S. population. Potential 
hours per year released from work per worker is the number of hours per year per worker that could be subtracted from 1975 annual work hours 
if 1975 per capita GNP were held constant and potential per capita economic growth is exchanged for free time. 
NOTES: 
Workweek: The average hours of work per week for the average worker.
Vacation: Total vacation time per year per worker. Potential increased vacation time is added to an estimated 1975 average vacation time of 
three weeks.
Sabbatical: The amount of extended free time possible every seven years if all potential free time gains are allocated to a sabbatical. 1975 annual 
vacation time is maintained.
Retirement: Average retirement age for worker aged 21 who allocates all potential free time toward earlier retirement. A 10 percent increase was 





employment opportunities. Assuming that mandatory trade 
offs of this sort are undesirable, it would be necessary to 
stimulate collective bargaining and other employee-employer 
negotiation processes toward more emphasis on increasing 
free time. While little has been accomplished in the way of 
developing social policies for this purpose, four approaches 
which could stimulate the exchange of potential income for 
worktime reductions include neutralization of tax incentives 
for selected fringe benefits, public subsidization of fringe 
benefits, tax incentives for worktime reductions, and en 
couragement of flexible benefit options.
(12) Neutralization of Tax Incentives 
for Selected Fringe Benefits
Tax systems within the United States and other nations 
allow lower taxation or waiver of taxation for selected fringe 
benefits. 223 For example, the dollar value of private health 
insurance in the United States is essentially tax free, while 
wages and salaries are taxed. 224 Thus, there has been greater 
value to workers for certain types of compensation as oppos 
ed to other types. As a result, organized labor and other 
employee interest groups have placed heavy emphasis upon 
increasing tax free benefits as opposed to other bargaining 
goals, such as added free time. 225
Social policies to neutralize existing differential taxation 
for various forms of compensation might encourage greater 
emphasis on exchanging potential pay raises for free time in 
two ways. 226 First, such changes would remove disincentives 
to provide forms of compensation other than time off. Sec 
ond, neutralization of taxes would attenuate the multi- 
decade trend toward providing increasing portions of worker 
compensation in the form of fringe benefits, 227 which add to 
the fixed costs of labor and therefore create disincentives for 
worktime reductions of all types (see table 2-2).
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The worktime and employment impacts of neutralizing 
taxes imposed on worker compensation requires detailed 
analysis which is not possible at this time. However, it is 
unlikely that neutralized compensation taxes would have an 
overwhelming impact on the exchange of potential income 
for time. Nonetheless, such changes in the tax system would 
remove current disincentives now deterring discussion and 
negotiation for worktime reductions.
(13) Public Subsidization 
of Fringe Benefits
Since the fixed costs of labor, most notably nonwork hour 
related benefits such as health care and life insurance, are 
significant barriers to worktime reductions, it can be ex 
pected that relief of these costs to employers would reduce 
the disincentives to work sharing. 228 Such subsidization 
could take the form of direct reimbursement to firms or 
social programs such as a national health care system. Sub 
sidization of selected fringe benefits would make it easier for 
employers to reduce worktime, lessen the cost of hiring new 
workers, and generate potential slack to negotiate for free 
time in lieu of displaced benefit expenditures.
Unless government subsidization of fringe benefits was 
funded by added taxes in one form or another, it is likely 
that the costs would be highly inflationary. However, if such 
subsidization was based on taxes levied on individuals in ac 
cord with earnings in amounts no greater than the cost of ex 
isting private benefits, and the costs saved by employers by 
the substitution of private benefits was refunded to workers 
in such a way as to nullify losses from increased individual 
taxes, the costs to workers and inflationary effects would re 
main stable. However, expenditures on certain fringe 
benefits need no longer constitute a fixed cost barrier to 
firms otherwise willing to initiate worktime reductions. 
While the complexities of developing an efficient and
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equitable system for such rechanneling of fringe benefit costs 
would be awesome, such reinstitutionalization of selected 
benefits could remove powerful disincentives to worktime 
reductions and the redistribution of employment.
(14) Tax Incentives for
Worktime Reductions
While progressive tax systems doubtless provide some 
disincentives for long hours, it is unlikely that any general 
tax system provides an effective means of reducing worktime 
and sharing employment. 229 However, it is possible that 
realignment of specific tax provisions to make paid time-off 
the-job tax free in the same way as other fringe benefits 
could prove to be a powerful tool in stimulating collective 
bargaining and other employee-employer negotiations to 
place much higher emphasis on worktime reductions. This 
idea is based on the notion that "paid leisure" such as vaca 
tions and holidays230 is economically the same as worktime 
reductions with no pay loss, 231 and that the later could be 
computed for tax purposes as paid leisure. If all equivalents 
of "paid time off the job," whether it be shorter workdays, 
vacations or sabbaticals, were made tax free in the same way 
as the cash value of other selected fringe benefits, workers 
would receive a kind of "bonus" for paid free time taken in 
lieu of pay raises resulting from promotion or economic 
growth. At the same time, such worktime reductions would 
cost employers no more than current paid leisure. Clearly, 
such realignment of tax policy would provide tremendous in 
centives for both employers and employees to reduce 
worktime. Employers could offer workers more value for the 
cash value of compensation paid, and employees and 
organized labor would receive more value for benefits 
negotiated.
The costs of stimulating worktime reductions by differen 
tial taxation of "paid leisure" could be surprisingly low. To
146 Policy Options
illustrate the cost, if preferential tax rates for paid leisure 
were to cause 100 full-time workers earning $20,000 a year 
with an income tax of 20 percent to choose to forego all of a 
10 percent pay raise for a 10 percent reduction of annual 
worktime, the aggregate worktime reduction would equal ten 
full-time jobs, and the taxes directly forfeited by the govern 
ment for each of the 100 employees would amount to $400. 
The tax revenues forfeited by the government for all 100 
workers would be $40,000; but there would be a resulting 
potential for fully employing up to ten job seekers at a public 
cost of $4,000 a position. Further, since any increase of hir 
ing to replace labor lost due to worktime reductions will in 
crease the number of tax-paying workers, the revenues lost 
to the government would ultimately depend on the replace 
ment rate of new jobs for forfeited worktime. In some cases, 
the loss of public revenues could be negligible.
It should be noted, however, that employers would have 
significant increases in fixed labor costs due to the need to 
provide fringe benefits for a larger number of employees. 
This could lead to inflationary price increases or government 
subsidies, or perhaps some prorating to allow employers and 
employees to share extra costs. Most probably, a large por 
tion of employers would not hire new workers to replace all 
worktime reductions, but would make up some of the lost 
labor input with productivity increases. 232 Conceivably, new 
firm efficiencies could balance and even overcompensate in 
creased fixed labor costs.
The job creating and preserving impact of preferential 
taxes for "paid leisure" is a matter of speculation. Signifi 
cant forfeitures of potential income for free time would cer 
tainly give rise to some new demand for labor. However, the 
gradual way which worktime would be reduced with this ap 
proach could facilitate organizational adjustments which 
minimize the need for new hiring. Additionally, job creation 
potential would also vary greatly in accord with amounts and
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types of free time gained by workers. Minor reductions of 
the workday or small increases in vacation time may not lead 
to new hiring. 233 Correspondingly, sabbatical leaves, 
significantly shorter workweeks, and greatly prolonged vaca 
tions could open jobs for the unemployed. It is also notewor 
thy that gradual time-income trade-offs over many years 
could be an effective way of preserving jobs within declining 
or realigning industries. 234 Finally, there is a possibility 
(which will be discussed in the next section) that government 
incentives could encourage employers to replace large por 
tions of foregone worktime with new employees.
If the proper mix of incentives and options were actualiz 
ed, it is likely that a large number of workers would choose 
to forego potential pay raises for more free time. 235 
However, it should be emphasized that willingness to trade 
income for time is strongly influenced by the forms of pros 
pective free time. 236 Thus, options to gain relatively un 
popular forms of time may not elicit widespread worker or 
union support. Nonetheless, the total reductions of 
worktime that may be possible through several rounds of ex 
changing some portion of potential pay raises for free time 
could be substantial, and the prospect that some of this 
foregone work would create jobs opens the possibility of 
greatly reducing unemployment.
Redistributing work by providing tax incentives suppor 
tive of long term time-income trade-offs would, if anything, 
appear to result in increased social equity. Presumably, only 
the more affluent groups of workers would respond to these 
incentives and embark upon a path of exchanging economic 
growth for time. It might be suggested that this would 
amount to "leisure subsidies for the rich." However, it 
might also be suggested that resulting worktime reduction 
would create more and better jobs for the poor and 
unemployed, thus providing the earnings, status and self- 
sufficiency that are the cornerstones of social equity. Fur-
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ther, special government subsidies might be applied to target 
jobs resulting from work reductions to those in greatest need 
of employment.
For the most part, worktime reductions encouraged by 
preferential taxation would be relatively inflexible. Such 
worktime reductions would occur slowly over a number of 
years, and would not likely be reversed easily within a short 
period of time. However, it may be possible to use such 
policies to lower and raise worktime over medium range 
periods of four to five years.
The administration and regulation of preferential taxation 
for paid leisure could be accomplished in much the same way 
as current tax laws affect selected fringe benefits. One major 
area of difficulty may concern the issue of whether existing 
or only new gains in paid leisure should receive preferential 
tax treatment. On one side, the application of preferential 
taxes to existing paid leisure could be viewed as a "windfall" 
benefit for worktime reductions that have already occurred. 
On the other side, it may be inequitable to deny tax incen 
tives to workers with pre-existing paid leisure. Of course, 
cost considerations would heavily influence these equity con 
siderations. 237 A second major problem would likely stem 
from efforts to insure that a reasonable portion of worktime 
reductions result in new jobs.
The secondary social impacts of worktime reductions 
stimulated by tax incentives would most likely depend upon 
individual need for the types of free time gained. Some in 
dividuals may require extended leaves from work to pursue 
mid-life retraining programs, others may need shorter 
workdays to cope with family and child raising respon 
sibilities, and so forth. While there are doubtless forms of 
free time that are more popular than others (see tables 2-3 
and 2-4), no single type of time off the job will be valuable to 
all persons. Thus, union and organizational policies pro-
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viding only one or limited types of time-income trade-offs 
may be oppressive to a significant number of individuals. As 
such, the secondary utility of certain types of worktime 
reductions may be a disutility for many.
All in all, the concept of using preferential taxation to 
stimulate long term worktime reductions is a largely unex 
plored but potentially valuable approach to redistributing 
employment. Preliminary assessment of this proposal sug 
gests that it may involve reasonably low costs to both the 
private and public sector. At the same time, it is likely that 
such tax incentives could stimulate considerable exchange of 
potential income for leisure. However, major questions re 
main concerning how much forfeited worktime would foster 
new jobs, and how this job yield might be enhanced as well 
as targeted to those with the greatest need.
(15) Encouragement of Flexible 
Benefit Options
It has been noted several times that the willingness of 
workers to trade current or potential income for worktime 
reductions depends on the types of prospective free time to 
be gained and the extent of choice among alternative forms 
of free time. Certain types of free time, such as vacations 
and longer weekends, appear to be more popular than other 
types; and the proportion of workers willing to exchange in 
come for time increases with the variety of free time 
schedules that are available. Correspondingly, social policies 
designed to stimulate long term time-income trade-offs 
would become increasingly effective as the variety of free 
time choices are expanded.
One approach to maximizing individual choices concern 
ing whether to trade potential pay for time would be to en 
courage flexible benefit option programs. Such programs, 
which are also known as "cafeteria benefit plans," have
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been tried experimentally in a limited number of firms. 238 
The basic idea of these programs is that overall expenditures 
of fringe benefits for individuals are totaled, then individual 
workers are given the opportunity to choose between differ 
ing combinations of benefits to suit their personal needs 
within the cost limitations of their program. For example, a 
young worker might place emphasis on longer vacations and 
training opportunities within his or her benefit program 
while a parent of young children might be prone to select the 
maximum health plan and increased life insurance. 239 When 
raises and alternative worktime reductions have been fit into 
this "cafeteria plan" concept, the range of choices at the in 
dividual's discretion is expanded to include increased free 
time in contrast to other forms of compensation. If such pro 
grams could be encouraged within organizations, the poten 
tials for significant long term time-income trade-offs and 
work sharing could be enhanced with minimum detriment to 
those unable or unwilling to forego income for time. 240
The specifics of flexible benefit plans are still largely unex 
plored. Most important, beyond technical assistance and the 
removal of legal barriers preventing trade-offs between 
various benefits and cash, 241 there is no immediately ap 
parent social policy leverage for stimulating the formulation 
of such programs. However, there are some signs that such 
plans will spread on their own merits. A number of work 
organizations have reported that such programs are 
manageable and well received by employees. 242 Similarly, 
some labor leaders are cautiously noting that flexible benefit 
plans facilitate the maintenance of union solidarity during 
collective bargaining periods because rank-and-file members 
are not required to make painful choices leading to one com 
pensation and benefit package prior to negotiations.
In terms of work sharing, flexible benefit plans would like 
ly foster worktime reductions and potentially redistribute 
work at no major additional costs. In addition to the time
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consuming obstacle of exposing this proposal to workers and 
employers, there are also potential problems resulting from 
the complexities of administration, regulation and revers 
ibility, and coordination of diverse worker behaviors 
resulting from individual choices among many benefit op 
tions. However, it would appear that these problems can 
ultimately be limited or resolved, and that flexible benefit 
options should be given further attention as a means to both 
share work and optimize social resources. 243
Overview
In sum, it appears that proposals for encouraging long 
term time-income trade-offs for purposes of sharing work 
may have potential. These approaches are relatively uncostly 
and noninflationary, have the capacity to yield a significant 
number of new jobs, and potentially reflect the emerging 
goals and priorities of today's work force. However, it 
should be emphasized that many of these proposals have had 
little or no testing, and that many details are yet to be 
developed.
Available data on time-income trade-off preferences also 
indicate that there is considerable interest among a large por 
tion of today's workers in exchanging some part of current 
income for more free time (see table 2-4). 244 This observation 
has caused a number of persons to suggest that volunteeristic 
programs might be developed which allow individuals to 
trade current earnings for more free time, thus opening job 
time for those who are unemployed or in danger of being laid 
off. 245 Although this concept has had only limited applica 
tion to date, a brief description of two case examples will 
help illustrate how it might work on a national scale.
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One of the more interesting applications of voluntary 
time-income trade-off options was started in the United 
States by the Santa Clara County Government in 
California. 246 In 1976, the county faced a severe budgetary 
cutback which would require significant layoffs. After a long 
series of negotiations, the local unions reluctantly agreed247 
to a voluntary work sharing program in which individual 
employees were given the options of keeping their current 
pay and hours, exchanging 5 percent of current annual in 
come for 10.5 added days of paid vacation, 10 percent of 
earnings for 21 days vacation, or as much as 20 percent for 
42 days of vacation taken in two periods. 248 In response to 
the threat of imminent layoffs and the desire for more 
leisure, some 17 percent of the 10,000 county workers volun 
tarily requested one of these trade-off options in the first 
year. Most workers chose the 5 and 10 percent trade-off op 
tions, 249 enough worktime was foregone to avoid layoffs, 
and the idea of trade-off options became so popular among 
rank-and-file workers that involved unions made it a plank 
in subsequent collective bargaining negotiations. 250
The Public Defender's Office in nearby Alameda County 
in California introduced another time-income trade-off pro 
gram which proved to have job creating potential. In 1977 it 
was noticed that the heavy caseloads of the lawyers 
employed by this office was leading to extreme exhaustion 
and demoralization. In an attempt to provide attorneys and 
other staff the opportunity for rest and self renewal, Chief 
Public Defender James Hooley instituted a voluntary trade 
off program which allowed employees to forfeit 25 percent 
of annual pay for a three-month extended vacation. Subse 
quently, about 16 of the office's 100 attorneys have selected 
this "renewal sabbatical" each year, and the office has 
found it possible to hire 4 additional replacement attorneys 
with the foregone pay. 251
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Other similar programs have been applied elsewhere. In 
Germany, for example, a number of firms have initiated an 
nual "workyear contracts" in which employees and 
employers negotiate individual worktime arrangements each 
year. Apparently, this approach periodically adjusts 
worktime to individual needs, provides employers with 
predictable labor supplies, and frequently requires new hir 
ing. 252 In an effort to provide more permanent part-time jobs 
and options to adjust worktime to family needs, the Swedish 
government has provided options to voluntarily shift back 
and forth between full- and part-time work, 253 presumably 
with the creation of more jobs with less than full-time hours. 
Similarly, the notion of "job splitting," in which two per 
sons share one full-time job, has been increasingly 
applied. 254
The notion of encouraging voluntary time-income trade 
offs as a means of reducing worktime and creating jobs has 
been receiving some policy attention, 255 and most recently 
legislative and programmatic initiative by the State of 
California. James Mills, the President of the California State 
Senate, has introduced and gained partial passage of legisla 
tion for an experimental time-income trade-off program 
which he calls "leisure sharing." 256 The program, which has 
two parts designed to encourage trade-off options in both 
the public and private sectors, has been proposed explicitly 
as a job creation program. While the administrative details 
are still being developed, part of this program is intended to 
provide government subsidies to partially compensate 
private employers for increased fixed labor costs resulting 
from worktime reductions. The initial stages of the program 
provide technical assistance to interested employers and 
employees. Participation by workers and firms is intended to 
be completely voluntary and subject only to minor regula 
tions. Particularly, some eligibility criteria may be establish 
ed to guarantee that a minimal proportion of foregone
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worktime is transformed to new employment. 257 Mills 
believes that this approach has considerable appeal in a tight 
fiscal era because it is volunteeristic and reasonably uncostly. 
In observing the unique aspects of this approach, he notes 
that "the unemployed are asked to trade in their enforced 
idleness for a job. What was the prospect of ... dreary in 
activity for one jobless worker now becomes a valued com 
modity called leisure when it is picked up in ... increments 
by fully employed workers who want a little more time off." 
He further questions, "Does this modest approach to saving 
or creating job opportunities make less sense than the pre 
sent system of taxing the wages of many hours of work to 
finance welfare payments to able-bodied workers who can 
not find jobs?" 258
The general notion of voluntary time-income trade-off op 
tions as an approach to redistributing employment is a novel 
idea which merits considerable attention. Public policies to 
foster this approach to work sharing would presumably 
focus on the removal of existing barriers to worktime reduc 
tions, and possibly limited incentives to employers for the 
provision of trade-off options for the purposes of creating 
jobs. Two general policies to foster such trade-off options 
will be discussed. First, the impact of neutralizing various 
payroll taxes paid by employers will be briefly outlined. Sec 
ond, a more extensive assessment will be made of govern 
ment tax incentives or subsidies to neutralize the extra costs 
of reducing worktime and perhaps encourage new hiring.
(16) Neutralization of Payroll Taxes
It has been generally noted that employer payroll taxes 
cause barriers and distortions in the upward or downward 
adjustment of worktime. In the United States, for example, 
employer payroll taxes for social security and unemployment 
insurance are paid only to some maximum employee earning 
level each year. In 1979, employers were required to only pay
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social security taxes on the first $22,900 earned by each 
employee each year, and UI taxes on the first $6,000. As a 
result, it frequently costs an employer higher payroll taxes to 
have employees on reduced worktime. For example, in 1979 
it would cost an employer $222 more in UI and social securi 
ty taxes to have two half-time workers earning $7,500 as op 
posed to one earning $15,000 (see table 3-14 for further il 
lustrations of variation of payroll taxes with worktime). 259 
As another example, German employers are not required to 
make payroll taxes for workers employed under 20 hours a 
week, thus creating a notable disincentive for increasing the 
worktime of such part-time personnel and an incentive to use 
more part-time workers.
In terms of avoiding disincentives to both upward and 
downward worktime adjustments, it would appear highly 
desirable to not only eliminate threshold and ceiling earning 
levels for the payment of payroll taxes, but also acute 
notches in tax determination formulas (e.g., tax rates which 
jump 10 percent at $6,000 income, another 10 percent at 
$7,000, etc.). While it may be ideal to have near continuous 
payroll tax scales260 with no minimum and extremely high or 
nonexistent ceilings, political and budgetary considerations 
would likely make such reforms impractical. However, the 
minimization of payroll tax discontinuities would be a 
significant adjustment paving the way for the emergence of 
time-income trade-off options as well as most other ap 
proaches to work sharing. 261
(17) Subsidies for Worktime Reduction Options
Government subsidies to attenuate increased employer 
costs resulting from worktime reductions and possibly pro 
vide incentives for implementing options for such reductions 
would likely be the most effective and flexible means of en 
couraging time-income trade-off options. Although there is 
little empirical data on this topic, a number of issues have
Table 3-14
Illustrative Variation of Selected U.S. Payroll Taxes for Employer Maintaining the Equivalent of 100 Full-Time
Workers by Variations of Pay Level and Worktime
Distribution of 
work time



























$10,000 full time 
annual pay
Payroll taxes
per employee ......... 835 774 712 651 590 492
Total taxes
per employer ......... 83,500 85,880 89,050 92,456 98,497 98,300
Added taxes
per worker ........... - 23.89 55.50 89.56 149.97 148.00
Payroll taxes
per labor hour ........ .42 .43 .45 .47 .49 .49
$15,000 full time 
annual pay
Payroll taxes
per employee ......... 1,142 1,050 958 866 774 682
Total taxes
per employer ......... 114,150 116,501 119,700 122,922 129,208 136,350
Added taxes
perworker ........... - 23.51 55.50 87.72 150.58 222.00
Payroll taxes
per labor hour ........ .57 .58 .60 .62 .65 .68
$20,000 full time 
annual pay
Payroll taxes 





per employer ......... 144,800 147,119 150,350 154,808 159,919 167,000
Added taxes
per worker ........... -- . 23.19 55.50 100.08 151.19 222.00
Payroll taxes
per labor hour ........ .72 .74 .75 .78 .80 .84
$25,000 full time 
annual pay
Payroll taxes
peremployee ......... 1,626 1,601 1,448 1,295 1,141 988
Total taxes
per employer ......... 162,577 177,739 181,000 183,855 190,631 197,650
Added taxes
perworker ........... - 151.62 184.23 212.78 280.53 350.73
Payroll taxes
per labor hour ........ .81 .89 .91 .92 .95 .99
$30,000 full time 
annual pay
Payroll taxes 
peremployee ......... 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,509 1,325 1,142
Total taxes
per employer ......... 162,577 180,460 203,221 214,320 221,134 228,300
Added taxes 
per worker ........... -- 178.83 406.44 517.44 585.58 657.23
Payroll taxes 
per labor hour ........______ .81_________.90________1.02________1.08________1.11________1.14
NOTE: For purposes of demonstrating the impact of payroll taxes on worktime it is assumed that the employer must maintain aggregate hours 
of labor equal to 100 full-time workers. In the U.S., employers in 1979 paid 6.13 percent of each employees, first $22,900 earnings for Social 
Security, and an estimated 3.7 percent of the first $6,000 for Unemployment Insurance. 
DEFINITIONS:
"Payroll taxes per employee" refers to the combined UI and Social Security payroll taxes paid by the employer for each employee. 
"Total taxes per employer" refers to the total of all UI and Social Security payroll taxes paid by the employer for all employees. 
"Added taxes per worker" refers to additional payroll taxes paid by the employer over what would have been paid per full-time worker. 
"Payroll taxes per labor hour" refers to the payroll taxes for UI and Social Security paid by the employer for every hour of labor received.
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been raised, and these will be discussed within the context of 
the evaluation criteria applied to previously assessed ap 
proaches to work sharing.
The impact of a subsidy program to encourage time- 
income trade-off options on productivity and inflation is dif 
ficult to pinpoint. Ultimately, the principal cost of such a 
program would depend on the amount of subsidization re 
quired to induce a significant proportion of employers to set 
up such options. Assuming that several workers would have 
to give up a total of worktime equivalent to a full-time job 
before an employer would hire a new employee, 262 and that 
the quantifiable extra costs of this new worker to an 
employer would be roughly equal to the fixed costs of a full- 
time worker; it is reasonable to speculate that the amount of 
government subsidy required to encourage time-income 
trade-offs resulting in new jobs would roughly equal the 
value of these extra fixed costs.
To illustrate potential costs, the average U.S. employer 
spends about 30 percent (or about $6,000 a year in 1980 
dollars) on accountable fringe benefits per worker, a signifi 
cant portion of which are fixed despite variations of 
worktime. 263 Thus, it might be assumed that the government 
would have to offer a sizable subsidy for each new job, and 
since each new position created in this fashion would not 
likely increase aggregate work hours or productivity, the im 
pact would be inflationary. Further, reduced worktime and 
income among workers foregoing earnings for time would 
likely lessen aggregate tax revenues due to progressive in 
come tax systems. Further, productivity could be reduced if 
new worktime arrangements cause organizational inefficien 
cies.
There are, however, a number of factors which could at 
tenuate these costs. First, a ceiling might be placed on the 
subsidy so as to reduce the above-noted average subsidy
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substantially. 264 Second, many employers may discern 
organizational benefits (e.g., lower absenteeism, reduced 
turnover, higher morale and productivity, retraining and 
reduced skill obsolescence, more management flexibility, 
etc.) as resulting from voluntary trade-off options, 265 and 
therefore require less than full reimbursement for increased 
labor costs. Most notably, if voluntary trade-offs become 
popular as fringe benefits, employers may find it desirable to 
provide such options in lieu of other forms of compensation 
in order to competitively recruit and retain personnel. 266 
Third, the pay and benefits of new workers hired to replace 
worktime foregone as a result of trade-off options would 
likely be lower than that of senior employees. Fourth, 
workers desiring to trade income for time might also be will 
ing to share some of the extra costs in some prorated 
fashion. 267 Finally, widespread voluntary trade-off options 
might reduce the necessity for expenditures on social pro 
grams such as day care centers, social security and 
unemployment insurance. 268 Thus, there are a number of 
reasons why minimal government subsidies might be 
somewhat lower than actual increases of fixed labor costs. 
Nonetheless, even partial reimbursement to employers for 
costs entailed would be substantial and program details to in 
sure job creation and minimal curtailment of abuses could 
add to these expenditures. Ultimately, the issue of costs must 
be assessed in comparison to other employment programs 
with the help of more theoretical analysis and data from 
limited experimentation.
The question of whether an acceptable portion of 
worktime foregone as a result of voluntary trade-off options 
would lead to the creation or preservation of jobs is equally 
difficult to answer. The hope that some have expressed for 
this approach to creating jobs is based on the possibility that 
desire for more free time among many workers, need on the 
part of employers to replace some portion of any foregone
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worktime with new employees, and the job creating poten 
tials of existing wage subsidy programs269 might provide a 
novel and potent mix of factors to effectively redistribute 
work. 270 Available evidence demonstrates that wage sub 
sidies which attenuate fixed labor costs tend also to en 
courage worktime reductions. 271 If ways can be found to 
allow or encourage employees to voluntarily forfeit 
worktime, it seems reasonable that such partial subsidization 
of costs to employers would also encourage a reasonably 
high level of new hiring rather than increased capitalization 
or reduced productivity; this would be particularly so if 
receipt of subsidies is in some part determined by new hiring 
as well as worktime reductions. Presumably, organizations 
which allow some workers to reduce worktime and then hire 
new workers into the same production units would be hiring 
to replace lost labor and this would be a de facto demonstra 
tion of spreading work among more persons. Job preserva 
tion, or the prevention of layoffs, would be more difficult to 
assess.
Since job creation and preservation would be the primary 
goal of this program, it would seem particularly advisable to 
make payment of government subsidies conditional upon the 
demonstrated worktime reductions and new job creation. 
Optimal results might be gained by providing graduated sub 
sidies up to some maximum in accord with the proportion of 
foregone worktime replaced by new workers. 272 Similarly, 
the amount and availability of the subsidy might be varied by 
increments in accord with several "trigger levels" of 
unemployment.
Given that voluntary trade-offs proved to be an efficient 
means of redistributing employment, what would be the ex 
tent of participation and aggregate impact of such pro 
grams? Speculations on this issue must be made from the 
standpoint of both employers and employees. From the 
standpoint of employers, the capacity to provide time-
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income trade-off choices and create jobs as a result of 
foregone worktime would vary greatly according to 
organizational constraints. Some employers could provide 
trade-off options but produce few new jobs as a result of 
worktime reductions. Others could produce options and a 
high job yield. Still others would be severely limited concern 
ing the types of trade-off options that might be possible 
(e.g., shorter workdays, vacations, etc.). While few 
organizations would be likely to instigate a total range of 
trade-off options with perfect replacement rates, it is 
likewise probable that few organizations would have ab 
solutely no capacity for some type of trade-off program. 273
From the standpoint of workers, available evidence sug 
gests considerable willingness to forego earnings for more 
free time. As previously noted, a 1978 survey of American 
workers found that the average worker would forego 4.7 per 
cent of current earnings for his or her most desired form of 
free time. 274 In terms of the U.S. workforce, this would 
amount to a forfeiture of some 8.6 billion hours of work or 
4.2 million full-time work years. If these findings are 
somewhat reflective of real choices that might be made275 
there would appear to be a notable potential for creating 
jobs by promoting voluntary time-income trade-offs. 
However, it is crucial to note that this same survey shows 
that certain types of free time are more popular than others 
and that the propensity of the work force to forego earnings 
for time increases with the variety of potential types of free 
time that are made available. 276 Thus, special incentives 
might be considered to encourage employers to instigate a 
variety of trade-off options, thus enhancing employee par 
ticipation. For example, employers might be given a slight 
increment in subsidies for every type of time-income trade 
off option made available to their workers. Additionally, 
worker participation would likely be increased if employees 
were given some power of initiative to stimulate the creation 
of trade-off options.
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One possibility for increasing such individual initiative 
would be to invest the subsidy for worktime reductions with 
the worker in the form of a voucher. Under these conditions, 
individual workers or groups of workers might approach 
employers with subsidies to cover the extra costs of desired 
worktime reductions. In this way, the attention of employers 
would be directed to this program by both the government 
and workers, serving to maximize participation. Whether or 
not resulting participation and impact on unemployment 
would be significant is still a matter of conjecture. However, 
if only 20 percent of a 100 million worker labor force were to 
find it possible and desirable to give up an average of 10 per 
cent of income for time, and only 50 percent of this foregone 
worktime created new jobs, some one million new full-time 
workers would be hired. Correspondingly, 50 percent of a 
100 million workers labor force foregoing 10 percent of cur 
rent earnings, which is approximately the stated preferences 
of a previously noted national survey on time-income trade 
off preferences (see table 2-4), would create 2.5 million jobs 
under the same conditions (see table 2-5).
There are two issues of social equity which merit attention. 
First, willingness to forego earnings for time is likely to be 
greatest among more affluent workers, thus raising the ques 
tion of whether government subsidies to stimulate time- 
income trade-off options would only be a benefit to upper 
income groups. In one sense this is true, but if the program 
goal of opening jobs is achieved, there would be an expan 
sion of employment opportunities which would presumably 
reduce joblessness and perhaps foster upward social mobility 
for lower income groups. Second, it is likely that government 
expenditures for subsidies to attenuate the extra costs related 
to worktime reductions will be highest among more affluent 
workers with the most generous fringe benefits. Thus, it 
would easily cost much more to free jobs in some occupa 
tions and industries than it would in others. Once again, this
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raises questions of equity. Some portions of this problem 
might be resolved by a ceiling limiting the amount of sub 
sidy. For the most part, however, the counterbalancing 
social equity consideration would focus on the jobs made 
available and the distribution of these jobs. Presumably, 
some incentive or regulation might be instigated to target 
some portion of jobs created to those in greatest need.
Assuming that the administration of a voluntary trade-off 
program does not become too cumbersome, this approach to 
work sharing would appear to manifest the greatest possible 
flexibility for implementation and termination. With the ex 
ception of minimal restraints on shifting back and forth be 
tween agreed upon worktime arrangements, 277 the voluntary 
trade-off approach to work sharing offers maximum short- 
and long-run adaptability in response to changing in 
dividual, organizational and labor market conditions. Fur 
ther, a variety of triggering mechanisms could adjust the at 
tractiveness of the program in accord with the level of 
unemployment. Finally, the trade-off approach embraces 
virtually all forms of worktime reductions thus far con 
sidered, whether they be shorter workdays, reduced 
workweeks, longer vacations, sabbaticals, permanent part- 
time or "job splitting."
The greatest potential problem with subsidies to encourage 
work sharing through voluntary trade-offs are likely to stem 
from administration and regulation. First, any increased 
specification, such as a job creation requirement or 
targeting, will increase administrative difficulties as well as 
discourage participation and compliance. Second, there may 
be a serious problem with insuring the accountability of par 
ticipants. Most important, the task of determining whether 
or not new jobs are created and, what is more difficult, 
preserved, would require constant and sophisticated 
monitoring. Operational guidelines would have to be 
carefully designed with the goal of optimizing desired im-
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pacts with a minimum of regulation. It may not be possible 
to develop an effective and efficient administrative 
mechanism.
Finally, the encouragement of voluntary time-income 
trade-off options would likely have tremendous secondary 
social benefits. Trends from survey and behavioral data in 
dicate a strong and growing preference on the part of 
workers for more flexibility in determining worktime ar 
rangements. 278 Additionally, worktime flexibility and reduc 
tions can be expected to attenuate numerous social 
problems concerning transitions from school to work, needs 
for mid-life retraining, child care, time related family ten 
sions, equal employment access for working parents, dwin 
dling affirmative action gains, transitions to retirement, 
recovery from illness and stress and the basic desire for more 
leisure. 279 The encouragement of voluntary trade-off options 
could provide worktime conditions to help reduce 
problems in all of these areas. Indeed, the enactment of such 
a program may be economically and socially justified 
regardless of its job creation impacts.
Overview
To summarize, the notion of sharing work through volun 
tary time-income trade-off options is a new and relatively 
unexplored concept. Preliminary assessment suggests that it 
may have the potential for fortuitously combining the desire 
for more time off the job evidenced by a significant portion 
of today's employees with incentives from the government, 
to effectively redistribute employment to those in need of 
work. Since this exchange of unwanted work for unwanted 
"leisure" would be essentially voluntary, the resulting 
redistribution should be a benefit to all. The principal issues 
to be resolved are whether ample jobs could be created in this 
fashion, and whether the costs and administrative complica 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Prospects for Work Sharing
It seems fitting to conclude this volume by addressing two 
questions. First, which of the options discussed in the 
previous chapter are the most promising approaches to work 
sharing? Second, how do the most promising work sharing 
policies compare with other approaches to combating 
unemployment?
Clearly, this final chapter cannot provide definitive 
answers to these questions. A rigorous treatment of these 
issues would require an intricate analysis that is beyond the 
scope of this study. Nonetheless, preliminary assessments 
may serve to provide some rough comparisons and observa 
tions which will focus some of the key issues that must be 
resolved before the most promising work sharing options can 
be accepted or rejected as viable strategies for fighting 
joblessness.
AN EXPLORATORY COMPARISON 
OF WORK SHARING POLICIES
In broad overview, assessments of major work sharing 
proposals indicate that most options are inadvisable or only 
marginally promising. Among the seventeen options discuss-
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ed in this volume, only two appear to be highly promising. 
Preliminary evaluation suggests that nine others have 
enough potential to justify continued attention and varying 
degrees of experimentation. The remaining eight do not ap 
pear to merit continued consideration.
A rough comparison of all seventeen work sharing options 
is presented in figure 4, which broadly summarizes and cross 
references the costs and benefits of each proposal in accord 
with the criteria used in previous chapters. Thus, each option 
has been assessed for its likely impacts in terms of cost and 
productivity, job creation and preservation (replacement of 
foregone worktime with new employment), degree of par 
ticipation and effect on aggregate unemployment, equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits among employees and 
employers, flexibility of implementation and termination, 
ease of administration and regulation, and secondary social 
effects. Each area of impact has been broadly summarized 
for each work sharing approach into the three categories of 
(1) poor, (2) neutral or fair, and (3) good or excellent. These 
assessments represent the best judgments of the author, and 
readers may wish to re-evaluate proposals for themselves.
As noted previously, this attempt to summarize the costs 
and benefits of different work sharing policies suggests that 
only a few are promising. If all criteria are given equal 
weight in judging the viability of the seventeen proposals, 
only two options appear to be particularly promising. These 
two options are short-time compensation and incentives to 
encourage voluntary time-income trade-off options for in 
dividuals. Nine other options that may merit varying degrees 
of continued attention include pension systems to encourage 
earlier retirement, financial aid to encourage longer school 
ing, worker sabbaticals, adult educational leaves, welfare 
and income maintenance programs, neutralization of tax in 
centives for selected fringe benefits, public subsidization of 
fringe benefits, tax incentives for worktime reductions, en-
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Figure 4
Cross-Impact Analysis of Work Sharing Options
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couragement of flexible benefit options, and neutralization 
of employer payroll taxes. In most cases, these marginal 
work sharing approaches would only be promising with 
specific modifications or in combination with other policy 
options. In two cases, specifically financial aid to encourage 
prolonged schooling and income maintenance programs, 
there is doubt that modifications would produce effective 
work sharing programs. Indeed, these two options, and 
possibly others, were considered worthy of continued con 
sideration because of secondary impacts not directly related 
to the creation or preservation of jobs.
Clearly, the weight given to each of the criteria used in 
assessing the alternative work sharing policies is subject to 
much disagreement. At the beginning of this volume, it was 
suggested that many work sharing approaches have been 
proposed for purposes other than reducing joblessness. 
Without intending to ignore or downplay these important 
secondary impacts, it seems appropriate to highlight selected 
criteria for the purposes of focusing on the impacts of alter 
native work sharing policies on employment and economic 
production.
A second review of work sharing options in terms of the 
three criteria of cost and productivity, job creation and 
preservation, and aggregate impact on unemployment 
modifies only moderately the list of promising and potential 
ly promising approaches. Specifically, neutralization of 
employer payroll taxes is added to short-time compensation 
and voluntary time-income trade-off options to enlarge the 
list of highly promising policies. Correspondingly, the 
number of proposals which appear to merit some measure of 
continued attention is reduced to eight. The specific pro 
posals falling into this second group include pensions to en 
courage earlier retirement, worker sabbaticals, limitation of 
overtime hours, reduction of the standard workweek, 
neutralization of tax incentives for selected fringe benefits,
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public subsidization of fringe benefits, tax incentives for 
worktime reductions, and encouragement of flexible benefit 
options. Of this "second string" list, it is the author's judg 
ment that those options with the least promise include the 
proposals to impose mandatory limitations on overtime and 
reduce the workweek. Given modification to insure work 
sharing effectiveness, all other options on this second list 
merit serious consideration.
In overview, only two of the seventeen work sharing pro 
posals appear to be particularly promising. At the other end 
of the spectrum, those options entailing statutory limitation 
of worktime appear to be notably unpromising as a group. 
While the remaining options cannot be viewed as meriting 
priority attention, they should receive continued discussion.
COMPARING WORK SHARING WITH 
OTHER EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
Ultimately, the viability of work sharing must be judged in 
comparison to other approaches to combating unemploy 
ment. Such a comparison does not lend itself to neat and 
precise calculations. There are important differences be 
tween the major employment policies of our times which do 
not allow direct comparison. Further, existing data on these 
programs is rarely comparable. Nonetheless, a provisional 
discussion of the general costs and benefits of work sharing 
in contrast to other employment policies may help focus 
future discussion.
As a brief preview, the costs and benefits of the most 
promising forms of work sharing will be compared to those 
of income maintenance to jobless persons, macroeconomic 
demand management, public job creation programs, and 
employment subsidies. Education and job training programs 
will not be considered because they do not directly adjust the 
balance between the number of workers seeking employment
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and the number of jobs available. The criteria for com 
parison will be roughly similar to that used to assess alter 
native work sharing programs. Specifically, each broad 
employment policy category will be generally assessed for its 
cost and impact on economic production, job creating or 
preserving capacity, extent of effect on aggregate unemploy 
ment, and miscellaneous secondary effects.
The two most promising work sharing proposals will be 
briefly reviewed to set the scene for assessing the viability of 
sharing work relative to other employment policies. Short- 
time compensation is clearly distinct from voluntary trade 
off options. Short-time compensation programs entail a 
realignment of unemployment insurance payments that 
would otherwise have been paid to workers who were totally 
laid off. As such, the costs of using the program are expected 
to be only marginally higher than regular layoffs with 
unemployment insurance.' In other words, the costs relative 
to the status quo are expected to be minimal. Available data 
suggest that effective job preservation will be high with 
short-time compensation, and that a mature program could 
reduce aggregate full-time unemployment by as much as one- 
sixth during the peak of a recession such as that experienced 
in 1975. 2 Finally, it can be expected that use of short-time 
compensation would have little secondary social impact, re 
main highly flexible in terms of implementation and termina 
tion, and redistribute the burden of unemployment by main 
taining about 90 percent of the regular weekly take-home 
pay of the average employee in participating work groups. 3
Efforts to share employment by providing government in 
centives to encourage voluntary time-income trade-off op 
tions for individuals would have impacts different from 
those of short-time compensation. In terms of program 
costs, previous analysis suggests that it could cost up to 
$6,000 a year (in 1980 dollars) in subsidies to stimulate the 
creation of one new job if foregone worktime was totally
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redistributed to new employment. Program administration 
costs coupled with less than total replacement rates could be 
expected to increase job creation costs. The job creation and 
preservation potentials of this approach would vary accord 
ing to organizational setting and program requirements. Im 
pact on aggregate unemployment is highly speculative, but 
prior analysis suggests that this approach could create a net 
gain of between 1 and 2.5 million jobs. 4 In terms of second 
ary impacts, this approach would likely be highly flexible, 
maximize the work-leisure preferences of individual 
employees, and produce a number of social benefits (i.e., 
reduce family time pressures, foster adult education, allow 
phased retirement, etc.). 5 However, unlike some employ 
ment policies yet to be considered, neither voluntary trade 
off options nor short-time compensation can be expected to 
result in any significant production gains to counterbalance 
program costs.
One of the basic questions to be addressed in assessing the 
viability of work sharing relative to other employment 
policies concerns the costs and benefits of allowing high 
unemployment. Given existing income maintenance and 
welfare programs, the Congressional Budget Office recently 
computed figures indicating that it would cost the govern 
ment between $5,000 and $7,000 a year for every new 
unemployed person during 1980. 6 Implicit in the use of such 
income maintenance programs as a response to unemploy 
ment is the assumption that there would be no new job crea 
tion or productive economic return for these expenditures. 
Indeed, some analysts believe that certain income 
maintenance programs actually increase the rate of 
unemployment by providing an incentive not to work. 7 For 
those who cannot work, there is clearly little alternative to 
participation in such income maintenance programs. 8 
However, for those who can work and those who might ac 
quire the abilities to work, the social and economic impact of
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the income maintenance response to joblessness is unattrac 
tive. The previously noted disincentives to work created by 
many of these programs can contribute to the emergence of 
an overly dependent, commonly impoverished and occa 
sionally socially degenerate segment of the population who 
become increasingly cut off from the rewards and obliga 
tions of productive existence. 9 Without belaboring the point, 
the costs are high, not only in public dollars, but more im 
portant, in human misery and underutilization of productive 
potentials.
An impressive array of economists advocate that the best 
approach to reducing unemployment is to stimulate the crea 
tion of jobs by policies designed to increase aggregate de 
mand and economic growth. 10 While the policy tools 
available for such demand stimulation have focused on tax 
reductions to increase consumer expenditures and aggregate 
demand, 11 other macroeconomic approaches to job creation 
include expansion of the money supply to encourage invest 
ment and consumer expenditures, and increased government 
spending to enlarge demand and stimulate economic 
growth. 12
Most economists seem to agree that demand management 
techniques have successfully stimulated economic growth 
and job creation in the past. 13 However, there is disagree 
ment about the nature and extent of these past impacts, and 
whether demand management can be effectively used in the 
context of the "stagflation" of the 1970s and 1980s. One 
1975 study by the Congressional Budget Office estimated 
that a tax cut of $8 billion would ultimately create 320,000 
new jobs, at a cost to the government, of about $25,000 a 
job. 14 Correspondingly, there would be an increase of 
economic growth and production. There is little conclusive 
empirical evidence concerning the impact of such 
macroeconomic policies on aggregate unemployment. For 
example, it is commonly assumed that the employment im-
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pacts of tax cuts were greatest during the noninflationary 
period between 1964 and 1969. During this period, 
unemployment dropped from 5.7 to 3.5 percent. Some 
scholars have suggested that the tax cut of 1964 and other 
macroeconomic policies not only reduced the unemployment 
rate by 2.2 percent, 15 but enabled the labor market to absorb 
the large post-World War II "baby boom" generation. 16 
Others have suggested that other social forces reduced 
joblessness during that period and that the tax cut can only 
be credited with a small portion of the decline in unemploy 
ment. 17 In terms of secondary impacts, advocates of 
macroeconomic approaches to job creation note that these 
policies are reasonably flexible, require little administrative 
apparatus, and are generally conducive to overall economic 
growth. Critics note that the job yield for forfeited public 
dollars is relatively low and that job creation cannot be 
targeted to those in the greatest need of employment. Final 
ly, there appears to be a growing consensus that economic 
realignments and high rates of inflation are likely to limit the 
use of macroeconomic approaches to job creation. Indeed, 
the traditional expansionary use of these policies is now be 
ing reversed in many cases as a means of combating infla 
tion. As a result, the traditional macroeconomic policy tools 
are likely to provide, at best, a constrained means of reduc 
ing joblessness in forthcoming years.
During times of high unemployment, policymakers have 
commonly looked to public, job creation programs as a 
means of reducing joblessness, 18 particularly for social 
groups most burdened by the lack of employment. 19 Since its 
American debut in the 1930s, this approach has been criticiz 
ed as a costly and ineffective way of combating unemploy 
ment. As a preface to reviewing the viability of this employ 
ment policy, it is important to recognize that these programs 
have, in large measure, fallen prey to public disappointment 
borne of "swollen rhetoric" about their potentials and un-
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due criticism. 20 It is true that public job creation has not 
"solved" the unemployment problem as some advocates 
claimed it would. However, a large measure of this failure 
has been the result of limited application rather than the in- 
viability of the approach. To underscore this point, it is 
noteworthy that the federal government spent slightly less 
than $4 billion during 1976 to create about 580,000 jobs to 
meet the employment needs of a population of 7.3 million 
jobless persons. If the same proportion of the GNP had been 
spent on public job creation as had been spent at the peak of 
the "New Deal," some $39 billion would have been allocated 
to create 5.8 million jobs. 21
The relevant issue, then, is not whether public job creation 
has removed aggregate unemployment, but rather the costs 
and impacts of these approaches relative to work sharing and 
other policies. In terms of the impact of public employment 
programs on production and the cost of creating each job, 
the impacts are varied. With the exception of relatively ex 
pensive public works projects, 22 it seems safe to claim that 
each publicly created job costs between $6,000 and $15,000 
(former figure in 1977 dollars and later in 1980 dollars). 23 To 
focus in a bit, one estimate of the costs of creating a public 
service job through the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act Program was $9,009 in 1978. 24 Unlike work 
sharing or income maintenance, such public service employ 
ment results in increased production in return for the costs of 
creating jobs. However, the level of productivity may be 
relatively low because many of the jobs created in this 
fashion are targeted to the low skilled "hardcore" 
unemployed. At the same time, production resulting from 
these jobs can be directed toward goals of priority public im 
portance. Conceptually, the job creating capacities of these 
programs are immediate, with new employment resulting 
directly from funding for jobs. However, recent analysis has 
indicated that jobs funded in this fashion are frequently used
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to replace already existing positions at the state and local 
levels. Estimates of the rate of replacement for contem 
porary public employment programs range from about 20 to 
80 percent, 25 with the lower estimate representing the most 
empirically grounded figure. Thus, the net job creation of 
such programs can be expected to be less than the total 
number of positions initially funded. Theoretically, the im 
pact of these programs on aggregate unemployment is 
limited primarily by the extent of funding. There are many 
notable secondary impacts. On the positive side, public job 
creation can be targeted to groups in the greatest need, and 
such programs can be expanded and contracted to meet 
changing economic conditions. On the negative side, critics 
have suggested that jobs created in this fashion are dead-end 
positions leading to no occupational security or advance 
ment, that the work performed by persons participating in 
these programs has little value, and that such programs re 
quire expensive and cumbersome administrative apparatus. 
Available data indicate that these criticisms may have some 
basis in fact, but that they can hardly be said to describe 
public job creation programs in general. 26
One of the most recent innovations in American job crea 
tion policy is the employment subsidy. This approach pro 
vides a public subsidy to employers for hiring persons eligi 
ble to participate in the program. This subsidy is intended to 
cover training and other costs of hiring, and is provided to 
create an incentive for employers to hire persons who have 
demonstrated hardship in finding employment. For the most 
part, these subsidies have been aimed at private sector 
employers. 27
Despite the fact that employment subsidy programs are 
relatively new, it is possible to make a few observations 
about their impacts. The subsidies available under these pro 
grams have been increased substantially since this approach 
to job creation was first used. The most recent program pro-
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vides a maximum subsidy of up to $2,100 on the first $4,200 
the participating employee earns, and it is estimated that the 
total cost to the government of employing one person 
through this approach was $6,329 in 1978. 28 The difference 
between the amount of the subsidy and total cost of employ 
ment is largely due to the job creating efficiency of this ap 
proach. Like public job creation, there is a certain degree of 
"displacement" or "windfall" effect. Specifically, evidence 
indicates that many firms that accept the subsidy would have 
hired new employees without the incentive. Estimates of this 
effect range from 50 to 80 percent. 29 The potential impact of 
employment subsidies on aggregate unemployment is still 
highly speculative. The existence of the program is still 
unknown to many employers and there is no reliable data in 
dicating the extent to which firms may choose to participate 
once this visibility problem is removed. Even if such sub 
sidies were widely known and used, these programs may in 
fluence who gets new jobs as opposed to creating or 
spreading jobs. The secondary impacts of this program are 
similar to those of public job creation. On the negative side, 
it has been claimed that jobs created in this fashion are 
"dead-end" positions which tend to be terminated as soon as 
the subsidy is exhausted, that the productive return on jobs 
created in this fashion cannot be directed to meet public 
priorities, and that subsidies tend to cause employers to ra 
tion new hiring rather than actually create new jobs. On the 
positive side, this approach appears to be easily targeted to 
those in greatest need, and reasonably flexible in terms of ad 
justment to changing economic conditions. Further study is 
necessary before the nature and extent of these secondary 
impacts can be adequately assessed.
With the exception of macroeconomic policies and income 
maintenance programs, all of the other public responses to 
unemployment appear to have roughly the same costs and 
impacts on joblessness. The focal question then is whether
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these employment policies would have redundant or conflict 
ing effects of applied simultaneously, or whether they have 
unique characteristics which would allow them to be applied 
as productive compliments to each other?
WORK SHARING IN THE 
OVERALL SCHEME OF THINGS
The analysis of this volume should make it abundantly 
clear that the best of work sharing policies, applied in the 
most effective way possible, are not a panacea for the 
unemployment problem. Nor does work sharing hold the 
promise of replacing existing employment policies. Work 
sharing, like other approaches, has some unique 
characteristics which may make it acceptable and applicable 
where other employment policies are resisted and ineffective. 
Thus, work sharing at its best may hold some promise as yet 
another weapon in the arsenal of approaches which could 
contribute to what appears to be a prolonged battle against 
unemployment.
Past trends and prevailing speculations indicate that unac- 
ceptably high unemployment could persist for many years in 
to the future. Since the Korean War, unemployment in the 
United States has crept persistently upward through a se 
quence of recessions and recoveries. With the brief exception 
of the late 1960s, unemployment has risen higher with each 
recession and remained higher after each recovery. What 
used to be considered unacceptable levels of joblessness is 
now considered a "full employment" goal. 30 While there are 
important qualifications that must be made in assessing con 
temporary levels of unemployment, 31 it is commonly agreed 
that the battle against unemployment has not been vic 
torious. Further, "hidden unemployment," that shadowy 
segment of the population who have become discouraged 
from searching for work, adds to the problem. Indeed, as 
noted previously, one labor economist estimated that a full
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17 million persons would have sought employment in 1977 if 
jobs were available. 32 This number has most probably 
grown, and will be likely to increase in coming years. Every 
indication suggests that the unemployment problem is large 
and persistent, and that all promising employment policies 
should be used to combat this problem.
In the overall scheme of things, work sharing should not 
be ignored as a potential supplement to existing employment 
policies. However, any deliberate effort to implement work 
sharing in the near future should be made with considerable 
caution. Most discussion of the viability of work sharing has 
been theoretical and speculative. Thus, initial applications 
should be monitored closely to insure that they fulfill intend 
ed goals. Further, it has been noted that many social policies 
have a point of maximum yield followed by declining 
returns. 33 Put differently, some public policies may be highly 
effective when used by participants who are prone to utilize 
the program, and decline in effectiveness when efforts are 
made to stimulate use among individuals and institutions less 
prone to participate. For example, the employment subsidy 
program may foster high job yield at a relatively low cost 
among employers who heretofore have been ambivalent 
about hiring workers with poor employment histories or lit 
tle work experience. However, efforts to encourage more 
resistent employers to use the program could result in higher 
subsidy expenditures for all participants and possibly pro 
gram abuses. It seems particularly likely that work sharing 
policies may have levels of participation that provide max 
imum job creation for minimum cost. Thus, it would seem 
advisable initially to apply the most promising work sharing 
approaches among occupational and industrial sectors where 
they are most easily and inexpensively applicable. Such a 
"creaming" of work sharing potentials would presumably 
supplement existing employment policies in the most cost- 
efficient fashion.
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From a long-range perspective, there is reason to believe 
that ongoing social realignments occurring within the United 
States will tend to make the general notion of sharing 
employment increasingly attractive. One of the most impor 
tant labor market trends of our times is a tendency for an in 
creasing proportion of the working age population to seek 
employment, but to work less than what we have traditional 
ly called "full time." 34 This trend has important long term 
social and economic implications. First and foremost, it is 
essentially a trend toward the redistribution of employment. 
Second, this trend has emerged from real social prob 
lems and emerging aspirations resulting from the increasing 
number of persons experiencing the time pressures of "dual- 
earner" family life, growing numbers of retirement age per 
sons who wish to work less than full-time, young and mature 
students seeking to juggle school with job holding, and those 
who are simply seeking to shift their life styles toward new 
balances between work and leisure. 35 These social 
developments suggest that the desire to work less than "full 
time" will manifest social and political pressures for a 
number of institutional reforms allowing individuals more 
discretion to reduce worktime. Against this backdrop, work 
sharing proposals are likely to be popular and politically at 
tractive. It is therefore important that efforts be made to 
determine which, if any, work sharing approaches offer real 
potentials for effectively redistributing employment.
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